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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problems of Extradition and Canadian Law
Most problems of modem extradition law can be encapsulated in a sin-
gle proposition: International borders are at once essential, yet unimportant.
They are essential because the world is divided into sovereign states, each
with its own government and system of criminal justice, and unimportant be-
cause the speed and ease of movement across borders in the twentieth cen-
tury has enabled fugitives to evade the law enforcement authorities of one
state by fleeing to another. The paradox is that fugitives wish to take advan-
tage of this ease of travel while reserving the right to seek the protections of
one state's law against extradition to another. All states that have entered
into extradition treaties and possess a domestic legal system for the protec-
tion of human rights face the same problem.
An effective and efficient network of extradition treaties serves the
public interest. Extradition is of cardinal importance to the efforts of states to
combat crime. States seek to secure the return of fugitives who have fled to
other states and to return fugitives who have fled to their shores to face jus-
tice abroad. At the same time, they must avoid trammelling the rights of fu-
gitives. Historically, this concern has been largely overlooked. Only in re-
cent years have the courts grappled with the difficult balancing exercise that
weighs the imperatives of the public interest against the protection of indi-
vidual liberties.
Canada has been at the forefront of attempts to strike the right balance
in extradition law between public goals and private rights. The introduction
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of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' in 1982 introduced consti-
tutional judicial review on substantive grounds to Canada for the first time.
Since then, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided several important ex-
tradition cases. Each decision has addressed how the advent of the Charter
has affected Canada's extradition legislation and system of international
treaties and, specifically, how the newly guaranteed rights of fugitives can be
protected without making the extradition system unworkable.
The interaction between the Charter and Canadian extradition law
raises fundamental questions about the nature and scope of Charter adjudica-
tion.2 It also highlights the relationship between domestic and international
law and, especially, the role of international law in the development and ar-
ticulation of domestic constitutional norms. This Article argues that when
faced with abstract Charter provisions in the extradition context, courts
should look to international human rights norms as an interpretative guide. In
addition, courts should refer to other relevant domestic legislation. Finally,
this Article contends that courts should consider the manner in which foreign
law is treated in conflict of laws cases as an appropriate analogy for extradi-
tion cases.
B. Unresolved Questions About the Application of the Charter to Extradi-
tion
1. How Should Constitutional Judicial Review Be Exercised in Ex-
tradition Cases?
Canada has long been a party to treaties enabling it to extradite fugi-
tives, both Canadian citizens and foreigners, to foreign states. 3 The interna-
tional obligations stemming from these treaties have been implemented in
domestic law.4 The advent of the Charter has subjected this legislation to
1. CAN. CoNsr. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
[hereinafter Charter].
2. Extradition is "the surrender by one state to another, on request, of persons accused or con-
victed of committing a crime in the state seeking the surrender." R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 514
(can.).
3. Most of the extradition treaties to which Canada is a party are listed in ANNE WARNER LA
FoREsr, LA FoREsT's E nTRADoN TO AND FROM CANADA 359-86 (3d ed. 1991).
4. Extradition is governed by the Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-23 (1985) (Can.), as
amended. Rendition is the equivalent of extradition between Commonwealth states and is governed by the
Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C., ch. F-32 (1985) (Can.). On the distinction between extradition and rendi-
tion, see Chan c. Directrice de la Maison Tanguay [1996] R.J.Q. 335 (Que. Super. Ct.) (Can.), aft'd,
[1996] 113 C.C.C.3d 270 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 114 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.);
Commonwealth of Australia v. Cousins [1992] O.J. No. 598 (Ont. Prov. Div.) (Can.); Great Britain v.
Taylor [1988] 5 W.C.B.2d 313 (Ont. Prov. Ct.) (Can.). Rendition, unlike extradition, is not treaty-based.
The distinction in procedural protections provided to a fugitive who is to be rendered to a foreign state as
opposed to being extradited does not ground a Charter challenge under section 15. See Philippines (Repub-
lic) v. Pacificador [1993] 14 O.R.3d 321, 335-39 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.); Hong Kong v. Sun [1992] O.J. No.
1484 (Ont. Prov. Div.) (Can), appeal refused, [1996] 109 C.C.C.3d 383 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
1998]
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constitutional scrutiny under section 7 of the Charter.' Constitutional judicial
review in extradition cases is complex because in many cases courts must
evaluate the foreign criminal justice system that is requesting the return of
the fugitive. Foreign criminal justice systems inevitably diverge in substance
and procedure from the requirements imposed by Charter norms.
The Supreme Court of Canada consistently has acknowledged that the
executive decision to surrender a fugitive for extradition is subject to review
under the Charter. Yet, to date, the Court has resisted Charter-based chal-
lenges to Canadian extradition law. The Court has attempted to balance the
rights of fugitives against the exigencies of the executive's conduct concern-
ing foreign relations and the fight against transnational crime. Consequently,
the Court has adopted a standard of review for extradition decisions that is
deferential but that permits judicial intervention in compelling circumstances
to quash surrender decisions. In this way, extradition law simultaneously en-
sures the speedy transfer of fugitives to the state where they are most appro-
priately tried and protects their rights.6
Nonetheless, several ambiguities remain in the Supreme Court of Can-
ada's framework for judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions. Four
recent cases-United States v. Jamieson,7 United States v. Ross,8 United
States v. Whitley,9 and United States v. Leon' 0-presented the Court with a
splendid opportunity to clarify the governing principles for review of execu-
tive surrender decisions in extradition cases. The cases presented two main
issues: What degree of constitutional protection is accorded to Canadian citi-
zens who face extradition to a foreign state? And what is the relevance of the
treatment to which the fugitive will be subjected in the requesting state? A
tension between the rights of fugitives and Canada's treaty obligations in-
fuses both issues.
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in all four decisions, sug-
gesting that it considered the issues that they presented to be of national im-
portance and that it wished to address them. Yet, inexplicably, the Court is-
5. See Charter § 7 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. ").
6. See In re Evans [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1006, 1008 (H.L.) (Eng.) ("Extradition treaties and legis-
lation are designed to combine speed and justice."); accord United States v. Dynar [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d
481, 522 (Can.).
7. [1994] 93 C.C.C.3d 265 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), rev'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 465 (Can.) [hereinafter
Jamieson II] (involving extradition of U.S. citizen to Michigan to face 20-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence for sale of cocaine to undercover officer); see also United States v. Jamieson [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d
460 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) [hereinafter Jamieson 1] (involving application challenging committal decision).
8. [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 469 (Can.) (discuss-
ing extradition of Canadian citizen to Florida to face 15-year sentence and $250,000 fine for trafficking and
conspiracy).
9. [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 693 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), aff'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 467 (Can.) (involving
extradition of Canadian citizen to New York for federal drug trafficking and conspiracy charges to face 20-
year mandatory minimum sentence).
10. [1995] 96 C.C.C.3d 568 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), aff'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 888 (Can.) (discussing
extradition of Canadian citizen to New York to face federal conspiracy and trafficking charges).
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sued one-sentence decisions-a perfunctory style of judgment normally re-
served for decisions involving meritless appeals by right-, in Jamieson II,
Ross, and Whitley, and its brief opinion in Leon did not address the full
range of issues presented in that case. By merely adopting the reasoning of
Justice Baudouin in Jamieson II, Justice Taylor in Ross, and Justice Laskin
in Whitley, the Supreme Court left the two central issues raised by the cases
in an uncomfortable state of uncertainty. Two subsequent decisions, Mexico
v. Hurley" and United States v. Burns, 2 seem certain to return the issues to
the Supreme Court for resolution. Justice La Forest recently retired from the
Court, 3 so it will be facing these issues without the primary architect of the
Charter framework for Canadian extradition law.
2. What Is the Relevance of the Treatment to Which the Fugitive Will
Be Subjected in the Requesting State?
The second issue addressed in this Article is the relationship between
the treatment that fugitives may receive abroad and reviews of ministerial
decisions to extradite such fugitives. This dynamic has generated consider-
able controversy, both in Canada 4 and abroad. 5 It has arisen recently in an
important decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. 6 The broader issue of the
treatment that the fugitive will face if extradited to the requesting state has
arisen before Canadian courts in two particular contexts: extradition of a fu-
gitive to face a mandatory minimum sentence that is harsh (perhaps uncon-
11. [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 414 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (involving extradition of gay Canadian citizen
to face murder charges in Mexico).
12. [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (discussing extradition of Canadian citizens to
face first-degree murder charges and death penalty in Washington state).
13. Justice La Forest retired from the Supreme Court of Canada effective September 30, 1997.
See Sean Fine, Top Court to Lose La Forest, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 27, 1997, at Al.
14. See LA FOREST, supra note 3, at 119-21; James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Fun-
damental Justice and the Deflection of Refugees from Canada, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 213 (1996);
Amanda J. Spencer, Fugitive Rights: The Role of the Charter in Extradition Cases, 51 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REv. 54 (1993); Sharon A. Williams, Extradition from Canada Since the Charter of Rights, in THE
CHARTER'S IMPACT ON THE CRtMiNALJusIcE SYsTEM 387 (Jamie Cameron ed., 1996).
15. See Anne Mori Kobayashi, Note, International and Domestic Approaches to Constitutional
Protections of Individual Rights: Reconciling the Soering and Kindler Decisions, 34 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
225 (1996); Jami Leeson, Note, Refusal to Extradite: An Examination of Canada's Indiament of the
American Legal System, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 641 (1996); James D. McCann, Note, United States
v. Jamineson: The Role of the Canadian Charter in Canadian Extradition Law, 30 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 139
(1997); Rita Patel, Note, One More Effect of NAFTA-A Multilateral Extradition Treaty?, 14 DICK. J.
INT'LL. 153 (1995).
16. See Hurley [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 430-35; Michael Valpy, Extradition Canadian-Style,
With Eyes Firmly Shut, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 29, 1996, at A19 (discussing plight of gay man
facing extradition to Mexico); Michael Valpy, Should Canada Extradite Dennis Hurley to Mexico?, GLOBE
& MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 23, 1996, at A17 (same); see also United States v. Bray [1997] O.J. No. 645, 12
(Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (holding that concern for fugitive's safety in Kentucky did not compel exercise of Min-
ister's discretion to refuse fugitive's extradition); Brisson v. United States [1994] 61 Q.A.C. 198, 204-05
(Que. C.A.) (Can.) (rejecting argument that extradition of fugitive to United States violates sections 7 or 12
of Charter).
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stitutionally so) by Canadian standards' 7 and extradition to face the possible
imposition of the death penalty. The question of the application of section 12
of the Charter has arisen in both contexts.' 8
Canada is not alone in wrestling with the legality under domestic law of
extraditing a fugitive to face a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence abroad;
courts in other states have the same problem.' 9 Individuals convicted of drug
offenses in the United States, for example, typically face harsh prison sen-
tences under federal or state law. The sentences are often long not only in
comparison with the penalties for other offenses in the United States, but
also relative to the sentences that a Canadian court would impose had the
same crimes been committed in Canada. The issue has arisen repeatedly in
Canadian courts because the United States-Canada's major extradition part-
ner2 -- imposes the death penalty and mandatory minimum prison sentences
at the federal level2' and in many of the states.' By contrast, Canada aban-
17. See United States v. Johnson [1997] O.J. No. 3778 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (noting that
numerous cases have found no violation of fugitive's section 7 Charter rights in surrendering to face
mandatory minimum sentences for any offense); United States v. Dibben [1996] A.Q. No. 1340 (Que.
C.A.) (Can.) (same), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3 S.C.R. vii (Can.); see also Gu6rin c. Canada
(Ministre de la Justice) [1996] R.J.Q. 1457 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (ordering extradition to face 20-year
mandatory minimum sentence for drug trafficking), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3 S.C.R. ix (Can.);
United States v. Lombardo [1996] 32 W.C.B.2d 171 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (ordering extradition to face 20-
year mandatory minimum sentence), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3 S.C.R. x (Can.); Zimmerman v.
Canada (Minister of Justice) [1995] 66 B.C.A.C. 137 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (ordering extradition to face 78-
97-month sentence for wire fraud); Zabartany c. Centre de Pr6vention de Parthenais [1993] A.Q. No. 272
(Que. C.A.) (Can.) (holding section 7 objection to lengthy foreign sentence not pleaded); Bouthillier v.
Downs (Juge) [1992] 51 Q.A.C. 31 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (ordering extradition to face 10-year mandatory
minimum sentence and large fine for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute); Chouinard v.
Downs (Juge) [1992] 51 Q.A.C. 26 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (ordering extradition to face minimum 10-year
sentence and large fine for drug offenses); Doyer v. Downs (Juge) [1992] 51 Q.A.C. 1 (Que. C.A.) (Can.)
(ordering extradition to face 20-year mandatory minimum sentence and large fine for marijuana offenses),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Doyer [1993] 4 S.C.R. 497 (Can.); United States v.
Berladyn (No. 2) [1992] 14 B.C.A.C. 304 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (ordering extradition of first-time offender
to face 20-year prison sentence for property offenses); ttats-Unis c. Tavonnina [1996] R.J.Q. 693 (Que.
C.S.) (Can.) (ordering extradition to face 10-year minimum sentence in Florida for conspiracy to traffic in
heroin, with no possibility of parole until 85% of sentence served), aff'd on other grounds, [1997] 112
C.C.C.3d 563 (Que. C.A.) (Can.).
18. The Charter states that everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment. See Charter § 12.
19. See Leon Sheleff, The 'Penological Exception' to Extradition: On Ultimate Penalties,
Human Rights and International Relations, 27 ISR. L. REv. 310 (1993) (providing overview of how
penological exception to extradition has been applied by various national courts); Extradition of Murder
Suspect Denied, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 28, 1996, at A12 (discussing Italian court's refusal to
allow extradition of fugitive to United States on murder charges without assurances that he would not face
death penalty).
20. The vast majority of extradition requests made to Canada are from the United States. In the
period 1985-91, the United States accounted for 361 of the 435 extradition requests (83%) that Canada
received. See H.C. Debates, 34th Parl., 3d Sess., Nov. 7, 1991, at 4783 (statement of Mr. Ian vaddell).
21. At the federal level alone, there were at least 100 mandatory minimum penalty provisions in
1991. See United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JusTICE SYSTEM 5-15 (1991)).
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doned the death penalty for all civilian offenses more than twenty years
ago.' Indeed, the death penalty may even be unconstitutional in Canada.24
There are good reasons for regarding mandatory minimum sentences as
an undesirable, counterproductive, and ultimately simplistic response to
crime. 5 Yet these factors do not in themselves automatically present consti-
tutional issues.26 Mandatory minimum sentences give rise to two distinct ob-
jections, which are often conflated. The first is the sheer length of the sen-
tences: They may appear to be disproportionate to their Canadian counter-
parts. The second is their mandatory minimum nature, which may limit or
eliminate altogether the discretion of the sentencing judge in a manner that
might be considered unconstitutional in Canada. The Jamieson cases, Ross,
and Whitley examined whether extradition to a foreign state to face a man-
datory minimum sentence for an offense committed there violates a fugitive's
section 7 or section 12 Charter rights.
3. What Degree of Constitutional Protection Should Be Accorded to
Canadian Citizens in Extradition Cases?
The third issue addressed in this Article is the impact of section 6(1) of
the Charter upon the federal government's ability to surrender Canadian citi-
zens for extradition.27 On its face, section 6(1) protects the right of Canadian
citizens to "remain in" Canada-a guarantee that extradition appears to
violate. Early Charter cases29 held that the extradition of Canadian citizens
22. A number of other countries with which Canada has extradition treaties, such as Albania,
Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, India, Liberia, Thailand, Tonga, and Yugoslavia (Serbia), also retain the death
penalty.
23. See Criminal Amendment Act (No. 2), ch. 105, § 5, 1974-1976 S.C. 2130 (Can.). The
death penalty remains on the books for certain military offenses under the National Defence Act, R.S.C.,
ch. N-5, §§ 73-76, 78-80 (1985) (Can.).
24. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 833 (Can.) (stating strong
ground for believing that death penalty cannot be justified except in exceptional circumstances).
25. See TAMASAK WIcHARAYA, SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALTY: THE IMPACr OF SENTENCING
REFORMS ON COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME 168-71 (1995); Vincent L. Broderick, The Delusion of Man-
datory Sentencing, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 62. See generally Lois G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE
UNTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY SENCENCING (1994) (arguing that harsh U.S. treatment of
criminals has disastrous consequences). Whatever their penological unsoundness, such sentences are con-
stitutional in the United States. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that state man-
datory life sentence without possibility of parole for first-lime drug possession is not cruel and unusual
punishment under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
26. This is not to say that certain mandatory minimum sentences cannot, in particular circum-
stances, infringe upon constitutional rights.
27. See J.G. Castel & Sharon A. Williams, The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections 1
and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263 (1987) (arguing
that section 6 of Charter does not enable fugitives to resist extradition).
28. Charter § 6(1) ("Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Can-
ada.").
29. See, e.g., In re Voss & The Queen [1984] 12 C.C.C.3d 538 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.); In re Fed-
eral Republic of Germany & Rauca [1983] 4 C.C.C.3d 385 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.); United States v. Swystun
[1987] 50 Man. R.2d 129, 133-34 (Man. Q.B.) (Can.); In re Decter & United States [1983] 5 C.C.C.3d
364 (N.S. S.C.T.D.) (Can.).
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violated section 6(1) but upheld those violations under section l." Justice La
Forest accordingly held for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
the leading case, United States v. Cotroni, although he conceded that under
certain circumstances, section 1 would not trump section 6(1).31 In United
States v. Bums, the British Columbia Court of Appeal forced the issue to a
head by ruling that the extradition of a Canadian to face the death penalty
violates section 6(1) and cannot be upheld under section 1.32
Questions remain as to the proper scope of the government's obligation
to pursue charges against a fugitive in Canada, rather than surrender the fu-
gitive for extradition to face charges abroad. Whether a fugitive's Canadian
citizenship should affect this decision is similarly unclear. Finally, the ap-
propriate scope of review of prosecutorial discretion to stay or decline to
bring proceedings in favor of a fugitive's surrender to face charges abroad
remains uncertain. As Ross, Whitley, and Leon indicate, these questions are
contentious, and the Supreme Court's recent decisions have done little to re-
solve the uncertainty.
C. Overview
This Article argues that the appropriate standard of review of ministe-
rial surrender decisions under section 7 of the Charter is one that properly
balances the rights of fugitives with the needs of the international community
and with Canada's interest in a functional and efficient system of interna-
tional extradition. Application to extradition of Charter norms according to
strict domestic standards would be unworkable. The standard of review must
be at once true to constitutional principles and sensitive to the particular in-
ternational context of extradition. This standard of review, the "residual
threshold standard," is generally deferential to ministerial surrender deci-
sions, yet gives the courts the residual power to intervene in order to protect
fugitives in compelling situations.
This Article argues that in applying the residual threshold standard of
review, Canadian courts should look to the basic standards of international
human rights law as guidelines in setting out the threshold for intervention
under domestic law. Unincorporated treaties and customary norms may be
used to help interpret broad domestic constitutional guarantees, such as those
contained in sections 7 and 12 of the Charter. In this way, Canadian courts
can insist that fugitives be treated in accordance with international standards
30. Charter § 1 ("The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.").
31. See United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, 1498 (Can.); see also Great Britain v.
Taylor (No. 2) [1990] O.J. No. 2015, 62-63 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (finding that rendition of Canadian
citizen under Fugitive Offenders Act violates section 6(1) of Charter but upholding rendition under section
1).
32. See United States v. Bums [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524,533-36 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.).
[Vol. 23: 141
Extradition Under the Canadian Charter
and avoid the pitfalls associated with the imposition of a domestic standard
of review upon foreign legal systems.
In the context of foreign mandatory minimum sentences, a residual
threshold approach allows courts to accord a certain leeway (or "margin of
appreciation") to foreign sentencing legislation and decisionmaking. Interna-
tional human rights law has relatively little to say about sentencing decisions,
but the idea that Canadian courts should intervene only in clear cases should
play an important role. Rather than focusing on the absolute length of for-
eign sentences, Canadian courts should take into account that in general, for-
eign courts consider the same range of factors that inform domestic sentenc-
ing decisions. Given that foreign sentences may differ from Canadian sen-
tences for a number of valid reasons, Canadian courts should not be too
quick to quash ministerial surrender decisions when the fugitive faces a for-
eign sentence that appears lengthy by domestic standards. In cases where the
foreign sentence is overwhelmingly disproportionate, however, judicial in-
tervention may become a constitutional necessity, but such cases will be few.
Judicial review in such circumstances is bound to be impressionistic, so the
courts' mindset is of central importance.
The other primary issue addressed in this Article is the proper role of
section 6(1) of the Charter in extradition cases where the fugitive is a Cana-
dian citizen. To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has accorded the section
6(1) Charter right relatively little weight in its extradition decisions and has
upheld all violations of section 6(1) of the Charter under section 1. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal's recent decision in Burns places consid-
erable (and, arguably, undue) weight on section 6(1). The court's reasoning
in Burns is faulty because it is based on a misinterpretation of the existing ju-
risprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada and, more importantly, on a
misunderstanding of the principles underlying that jurisprudence. The Su-
preme Court would do well to respond with a more explicit section 1 argu-
ment in extradition cases. As it stands, the values underlying section 6(1)
have been given insufficient consideration in the balancing of interests under
section 1. That said, the argument that the effect of section 6(1), or that the
combined effect of section 6 and section 7, is to mandate the introduction of
a nationality-based prescriptive jurisdiction for Canadian citizens in extradi-
tion cases is weak and should be rejected.
The best opportunity to give a more prominent role to section 6(1) is in
transnational offense cases, where the offense has connections with more
than one state, resulting in the possibility that the fugitive will be charged
with a crime in both Canada and the requesting state. In such cases, section
6(1) of the Charter should hold Canadian authorities to a test modeled on the
civil forum non conveniens doctrine, which would require that they justify
their choice to extradite the fugitive rather than institute charges against him
or her in Canada.
1998]
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Constitutional Judicial Review of the Surrender Decision
In determining the nature and scope of judicial review of ministerial
surrender decisions in extradition cases under the Charter, several prelimi-
nary concerns must be addressed. The cases considered in this Article all in-
volve attempts to challenge decisions of the Minister of Justice to surrender
fugitives for extradition. These challenges have been grounded in sections 1,
6, 7, and 12 of the Charter, which is the supreme law of Canada. Acts by
public authorities that violate Charter provisions are invalid.33
A comerstone of this Article's thesis is that extradition's essentially
transnational nature influences the manner in which it should be subjected to
judicial review. Although the Charter does not apply to the actions of foreign
governments,' 4 it does apply, at least in part, to domestic extradition pro-
ceedings.3 Because the extradition process involves cooperation between
Canada and foreign states, there is lingering uncertainty as to the scope of
the Charter's applicability to it.
Extradition is quasi-criminal in nature; a committal hearing is a civil
proceeding that determines whether a fugitive should be sent to a foreign
state to face criminal proceedings or imprisonment, but it is not a criminal
trial.36 No determination of guilt is made by the extraditing state.37 Accord-
ingly, extradition is very much sui generis, 8 as a civil proceeding with po-
tentially criminal consequences. Therefore, the full procedural protections of
a criminal trial do not apply.3
33. See Charter § 52(1)-(2).
34. See R. v. Terry [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207, 215-17 (Can.); R. v. Harrer [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562,
570 (Can.); R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 518 (Can.).
35. See Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 654-56 (Can.); Semdt
[1987] 1 S.C.R. at 520-22.
36. Extradition is, however, a "criminal matter" for federalism purposes. See Saxena v. Thai-
land (Kingdom) [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 398, 406 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (determining that province is constitu-
tionally unable to provide appeal route in extradition cases).
37. The determination of guilt or innocence is made by the court in the foreign state. See United
States v. Wagner [1995] 104 C.C.C.3d 66, 75 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.); St.-Gelais v. United States (1994] 62
Q.A.C. 287, 293 (Que. C.A.) (Can.); Philippines (Republic) v. Pacificador [1993] 14 O.R.3d 321, 333
(Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
38. But see R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison [1997] 3 W.L.R. 117, 121 (H.L.) (Eng.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (stating that extradition proceedings are criminal proceedings rather than sui generis).
39. See United States v. Dynar [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d 481, 523-25 (Can.) (establishing no right
to full Crown disclosure at committal hearing); Waddell v. Canada [1996] 33 W.C.B.2d 20 (B.C. C.A.)
(Can.) (finding no right to jury trial at extradition hearing); Roumania (State) v. Cheng [1996] 32
W.C.B.2d 128 (N.S. S.C.) (Can.) (stating that Crown duty of disclosure is narrower in extradition hear-
ings than in criminal trials); United States v. Ngai [1995] O.J. No. 3625 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (deter-
mining that there is no right to cross-examine afflants). The distinction in procedural protections afforded
an accused at a preliminary inquiry and a fugitive at an extradition hearing does not violate section 15 of
the Charter. See United States v. Kerslake [1996] 142 Sask. R. 112, 130 (Sask. Q.B.) (Can.).
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The first stage of extradition, judicial in nature, consists of an applica-
tion for a warrant of committal.40 Although the Charter guarantees the fair-
ness of a committal hearing,41 the role of the extradition judge is necessarily
limited.42 At this early stage, the extradition judge need only determine
whether there is a prima facie case that the fugitive has committed an extra-
dition crime.43 This is accomplished by examining whether sufficient evi-
dence exists to justify the committal of the fugitive for trial in Canada, if the
offense had been committed in Canada.' This standard is similar to that
utilized at a preliminary inquiry. Defenses that may be raised at the foreign
trial will not be entertained at the extradition hearing.45
If a warrant for committal is issued at the first stage, the fugitive may
appeal to the court of appeal.46 If the appeal is unsuccessful, the second stage
of extradition is reached.47 At this political stage, the Minister of Justice
must determine whether to surrender the fugitive for extradition abroad.48
The fugitive may make representations to the Minister giving reasons for re-
fusing surrender.4 9 If the Minister decides to surrender the fugitive for extra-
dition, the fugitive may seek judicial review of the ministerial surrender de-
cision by the court of appeal in the province in which the fugitive has been
committed for surrender.5"
The precise jurisdiction of an extradition judge at the first stage has
given rise to controversy, particularly with regard to Charter remedies. Ini-
tially, the courts held that Charter challenges based on the treatment that the
fugitive would face abroad were premature at the first stage and that such
challenges should be brought only after the ministerial surrender decision
40. This application is brought by the federal government on behalf of the requesting state. The
diplomatic note making the request need not be filed with the court. See In re von Einem & Federal Re-
public of Germany [1984] 14 C.C.C.3d 440, 443 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.).
41. See Dynar [1997] 115C.C.C.3dat522.
42. See United States v. Whitley [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 693, 699-700 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (fol-
lowing R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (Can.)), aft'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 467 (Can.).
43. See Argentina v. Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 553 (Can.).
44. See Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-23, § 18(1)(a) (1985) (Can.); United States v. Lpine
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 286, 296 (Can.); In re McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, 514 (Can.); see also Philippines (Re-
public) v. Pacificador [1993] 14 O.R.3d 321, 333 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (holding that evidentiary standard set
by Extradition Act § 18(1)(b) is constitutionally sufficient).
45. See United States v. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, 571-72 (Can.); Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. at
558-59; Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 516.
46. See Extradition Act § 19.2 (Can.). On a matter of public importance, further appeal lies
(with leave) to the Supreme Court of Canada. See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 40(1) (1985)
(Can.).
47. See, e.g., Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 654-56 (Can.);
McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. at 519.
48. See Extradition Act § 25(1) (Can.).
49. See id. § 19.1(1). The fugitive may not seek an extension of time for this purpose; the
proper route is to attack the ministerial surrender order itself. See Reid v. Canada (Minister of Justice)
[1995] 82 O.A.C. 59, 62 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
50. See Extradition Act § 25.2(1) (Can.). The Federal Court of Canada no longer has jurisdic-
tion to hear applications for judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions. See Garcia v. Canada (Min-
ister of Justice) [1997] F.C.J. No. 453 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.).
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had been made.5 Similarly, extradition judges were held not to have com-
petent jurisdiction for the purpose of ordering Charter remedies.52 Amend-
ments to the Extradition Act suggest, however, that extradition judges at the
first stage may fashion Charter remedies, exclude evidence, stay proceed-
ings, and hear evidence on anticipated breaches of the Charter.53 In addition,
the court of appeal may defer the hearing of an appeal from the extradition
judge's decision until the Minister has made a surrender decision,' resulting
in a hearing that is simultaneously the appeal and judicial review of the min-
isterial surrender decision. This is in keeping with the view that the role of
the extradition judge is to "protect the fundamental rights of the fugitive."55
Nevertheless, the Charter protection afforded to a fugitive at a committal
hearing will not necessarily equal that available at a criminal trial.56
With this background, we may turn now to the central question under
consideration, namely, the determination of the appropriate standard of re-
view of ministerial surrender decisions in extradition cases. The Supreme
Court of Canada has said since Operation Dismantle v. R. that the exercise
51. See United States v. Garcia [1994] O.J. No. 1027, 45 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (holding
that Charter challenge must await ministerial surrender decision), appeal dismissed, [1996] 31 W.C.B.2d
458 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 34 W.C.B.2d v (Can.); cf. United States v.
Houslander [1993] 13 O.R.3d 44, 51-53 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (stating that fugitive may not use hearing
before extradition judge to "create a record" for eventual Charter challenge of anticipated ministerial su r-
render decision).
52. See United States v. Legros [1992] 77 C.C.C.3d 353, 364 (N.S. T.D.) (Can.). But see
United States v. Turner [1992] 75 C.C.C.3d 150, 160-61 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (holding that extradition
judge may invoke Charter remedies).
53. See Extradition Act § 9(3) (Can.); United States v. Dynar [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d 481, 528-
29 (Can.) (observing that extradition judge at committal hearing is "court of competent jurisdiction" for
purposes of section 24 of Charter); see also United States v. Bums [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 546 (B.C.
C.A.) (Can.) (holding that judge at committal hearing can order Charter remedies); United States v.
Cazzetta [1996] 108 C.C.C.3d 536, 543-46 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (holding that section 9(3) of Extradition
Act endows extradition judge with jurisdiction to order Charter remedies), leave to appeal refused, [1996]
3 S.C.R. xiv (Can.); India v. Singh [1996] 108 C.C.C.3d 274, 284 (B.C. S.C.) (Can.) (deeming evidence
obtained by torture in requesting state to be inadmissible in extradition hearing); United States v. Tilley
[1996] 183 A.R. 158, 159-60 (Alta. Q.B.) (Can.) (allowing fugitive to call evidence of alleged Charter
breaches in anticipation of ministerial surrender decision); United States v. Cobb [1997] O.J. No. 4362,
20-23 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (concluding that section 24 of Charter provides extradition judge with
jurisdiction to hear Charter claims); cf Paul Michell, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to
Transnational Forcible Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 383, 479 (1996) (argu-
ing for jurisdiction to control abuse of process in extradition proceedings). But see United States v.
D'Agostino [1997] 41 C.R.R.2d 325, 337-39 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (adopting more restrictive scope to
extradition judge's jurisdiction to grant Charter relief conferred by section 9(3) of Canadian Extradition
Act).
54. See Extradition Act § 19.4(2) (Can.); see also id. § 19.9 (allowing Supreme Court of Can-
ada to defer appeal until after ministerial surrender decision).
55. United States v. Manno [1997] 112 C.C.C.3d 544, 561 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal
refused, [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d (Can.); see also United States v. Bums [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 546
(B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (arguing that having committal judge determine Charter issues before ministerial sur-
render decision would ensure that initial reviewable determination of fugitive's Charter rights would be
made by judicial body rather than non-judicial minister).
56. See cases cited supra note 39.
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of executive discretion is never beyond judicial review. 7 It is also well
known, however, that the appropriate standard of judicial review of the ex-
ercise of executive discretion varies with the particular context at issue. 8
Why does the extradition context lead to a standard of review other than the
usual domestic standard of review? The Supreme Court of Canada has indi-
cated that although the courts are to play a supervisory role to ensure execu-
tive compliance with constitutional dictates, 9 they also should show defer-
ence to the executive in the realm of extradition, is connected both to Can-
ada's international treaty obligations and to the conduct of foreign affairs."c
Upholding the rights of fugitives while maintaining an effective international
extradition system is a delicate task. Precisely how that balance is to be
achieved under Canadian law is not yet clear.
B. Section 7, Fundamental Justice, and Standards of Review
1. Introduction: Section 7Review
The ministerial surrender decision in Canada undoubtedly affects a fu-
gitive's "life, liberty and security of the person." 61 Accordingly, the decision
must be made "in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice"62 ;
otherwise, it will violate section 7 of the Charter. Section 7 rights are ac-
corded to "everyone," which includes foreign citizens as well as Canadian
citizens, so citizenship per se has no relevance to section 7 review. In the
cases recently before the Supreme Court of Canada, the fugitives argued that
their committal 4 or surrender 5 for extradition to face a foreign mandatory
minimum sentencing regime would violate their section 7 rights. In the deci-
sions finding no section 7 violation,66 the Court held that judicial intervention
would be appropriate only in extreme circumstances, such as where surren-
57. See Operation Dismantle v. R. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.), cited in R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1
S.C.R. 500,521-22 (Can.).
58. See Chiarefli v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, 732 (Can.) (citing R. v. Wholesale
Travel Group [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (Can.)); see also Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1996] 3
S.C.R. 3, 45 (Can.) (stating that meaning and content of Charter rights vary with context).
59. See Jaineson II [1994] 93 C.C.C.3d 265, 277 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), rev'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R.
465 (Can.); Jamieson I [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 466-67 (Que. C.A.) (Can.).
60. See Argentina v. Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 551 (Can.).
61. Charter § 7.
62. Id.
63. See infra Subsection IV.B.2, however, for an evaluation of the argument that section 6 and
section 7 of the Charter have the combined effect of barring the extradition of Canadian citizens in certain
situations.
64. See Jamieson 1 [1992173 C.C.C.3d at 465.
65. See United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 341-42 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 469 (Can.); United States v. Whitley [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 693, 697 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.),
aff'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 467 (Can.); Jamieson II [1994] 93 C.C.C.3d at 277 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), rev'd,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 465 (Can.).
66. See Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 367-73; WhiRtley [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 702-13; Jami-
eson 1 [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d at 465-69.
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der would expose the fugitive to an unjust or oppressive foreign punishment
or procedure. The Court held that in most cases the extradition process ac-
cords with the principles of fundamental justice. The main bulwark protect-
ing fugitives' rights is the Minister's broad discretion to refuse to surrender
fugitives for extradition.67 Judicial review offers residual protection to fugi-
tives.
In exercising judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions under
section 7 of the Charter, courts must consider the punishment that the fugi-
tive likely will receive in the requesting state. With this in mind, the courts
must determine whether surrender of the fugitive for extradition to face such
punishment would deprive him or her of the right to life, liberty or security
of the person, and, if it would, whether the deprivation would accord with
the principles of fundamental justice. For the most part, courts have assumed
that section 1 plays a negligible role in section 7 cases; the Supreme Court,
for example, has often stated that it would be only in the most unusual cir-
cumstances that a section 7 violation could be upheld under section 16 Ac-
cordingly, a conventional analysis suggests that a fugitive's case stands or
falls under section 7.
This Article argues that the balancing of social and individual interests
inherent in the surrender of a fugitive for extradition is better considered un-
der section 1, so that an argument based upon the international public inter-
est can be given proper weight. Consequently, there is reason to doubt the
Supreme Court of Canada's view that section 7 violations can never be up-
held under section 1.69 Indeed, the Court's view has had the regrettable ef-
fect of transferring almost all of the balancing of individual and societal in-
terests to section 7, under which the individual bears the burden of proving a
Charter violation.70 More of the balancing exercise should take place under
section 1, so that the government bears the onus of demonstrating that a
67. See Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-23, § 22 (1985) (Can.); see also Brisson v. United States
[1994] 61 Q.A.C. 198, 205 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (distinguishing between committal order and ministerial
surrender decision). Although the federal government acts as counsel for the requesting state in the judicial
stage of the extradition process and then exercises the discretion as to whether to surrender the fugitive for
extradition, there is no conflict of interest. See Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992 3 S.C.R. 631,
657--60 (Can.) (holding that dual role of Minister does not lead to institutional bias in extradition process).
But see United States v. Burns [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 544 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (suggesting that because
Minister's department has "assumed responsibility for the conduct of extradition proceedings" on behalf of
requesting state, Minister is not "independent and impartial tribunal" for determination of fugitive's Char-
ter rights).
68. See In re B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 518 (Can.) (stating that sec-
tion 7 violation can be upheld under section 1 only in "exceptional conditions"); see also id. at 523-24
(stating that section 7 violation cannot be upheld under section 1). But see R. v. Hess [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906,
917-27 (Can.) (undertaking section 1 analysis for section 7 violation).
69. But see David J. Mullan, The Impact of the Charter on Administrative Procedure: 7he
Meaning of Fundamental Justice, in THE 1990 IsAAc PrrBLADO LEcrIaXS, PuBuc INTEREST V. PRIVATE
RIGHTS: STRmING THE BALANCE IN ADMINISRATIVE LAw 29, 53 (1990) ("There is no place for s. 1 ar-
guments when s. 7 has been violated.").
70. See, e.g., R. v. Penno [1990] 2 S.C.R. 865, 894 (Can.) (holding that "principles of fund a-
mental justice" under section 7 encompass both interests of individual and those of public).
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prima facie violation of a Charter right should be upheld as a reasonable
limitation upon that right.7' That said, the arguments advanced in this Article
apply regardless of whether the balancing of individual and societal interests
takes place under section 1 or section 7.
There are three possible standards of review of ministerial surrender
decisions in extradition cases: the non-inquiry standard, the domestic thresh-
old standard, and the residual threshold standard.72 This Article demonstrates
that the Supreme Court of Canada essentially has adopted a version of the
residual threshold standard of review. It then examines the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights and the push towards a domestic
threshold standard of review in extradition cases that it has inspired. The
Article argues that the Supreme Court was correct to adopt a version of the
residual threshold standard and that the domestic threshold standard, though
initially attractive, is unworkable in practice. The residual threshold standard
best achieves the appropriate balance between the public interest in an effec-
tive extradition system and the rights of fugitives. Finally, the Article sug-
gests that the Supreme Court's version of the residual threshold standard of
review must be fleshed out to render it coherent and capable of addressing
the challenges contained in new cases.
2. The Supreme Court of Canada's Standard of Review in Extradi-
tion Cases
The leading case on the relationship of section 7 of the Charter to the
extradition process is R. v. Schmidt.' A Canadian citizen challenged her sur-
render for extradition to Ohio to face state child stealing charges by arguing
that she already had been acquitted of kidnapping under U.S. federal law for
the same offense. She claimed that her surrender for extradition would vio-
late sections 7 and 11(h)74 of the Charter, even though a double jeopardy plea
was unavailable to her under Ohio law. The Supreme Court dismissed her
challenge. In reviewing the ministerial surrender decision, Justice La Forest
held that courts should look to the treatment that the fugitive is likely to face
in the requesting state and intervene only when this treatment would violate
the principles of fundamental justice. Torture was cited as an example of
71. See Dennis Klinck, The Charter and Substantive Criminal "Justice", 42 U.N.B. L.J. 191
(1993) (discussing relationship between section 7 and section 1 of Charter); Thomas J. Singleton, The
Principles of Fundamental Justice, Societal Interests and Section I of the Charter, 74 CAN. B. REv. 446,
472-73 (1995).
72. See Tracey Hughes, Etradition Reform: The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting the Rights
ofa Requested ndividual, 9 B.C. INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 293, 312-20 (1986).
73. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (Can.).
74. According to section 11 of the Charter, "any person charged with an offence has the
right... if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and pu n-
ished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again." Charter § 11(h).
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treatment that would trigger an order to quash a ministerial surrender deci-
sion.75 Yet Justice La Forest wrote:
Situations falling far short of this may well arise where the nature of the criminal pro-
cedures or penalties in a foreign country sufficiently shocks the conscience as to make a
decision to surrender a fugitive for trial there one that breaches the principles of fun-
damental justice enshrined in s. 7.76
Regrettably, however, Justice La Forest's opinion was Delphic as to
how to identify the situations in which the court would intervene, although
he did emphasize that a court must look to the foreign legal system as a
whole: Canadian courts must not quash a surrender decision merely because
the criminal justice system in the requesting state does not provide the same
procedural protections accorded to criminal defendants in Canada. Justice La
Forest suggested that even the absence of the presumption of innocence, long
considered an essential constitutional guarantee in Canadian criminal trials,
would not render the requesting state's legal system objectionable as long as
it could be considered just overall.77 Justice La Forest's reasons suggest that
the executive is best positioned to make decisions about the "general fair-
ness" of foreign legal systems (for example, by entering into or terminating
treaties and by exercising the discretion not to surrender a fugitive for extra-
dition) and that it would be an unusual case in which the courts would inter-
vene in such a decision.
3. Soering's Legacy
No consideration of the appropriate standard of review of ministerial
surrender decisions in extradition cases is complete without an account of the
importance of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Soer-
ing v. United Kingdom.7" In Soering, a West German citizen successfully re-
sisted extradition from the United Kingdom to Virginia, where he faced trial
on charges of murder and the possible imposition of the death sentence if
convicted. He did so on the grounds that the so-called "death row phenome-
non"-the lengthy period of detention on death row and the accompanying
mental anguish in anticipation of execution-was prohibited by article 3 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.79 The European Court based its decision on the principle
75. The United Nations Human Rights Committee held similarly in Kindler v. Canada, Decision
of July 30, 1993, Concerning Comm. No. 470/1991, 6.2, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 307, 309
(1993).
76. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 522.
77. See id. at 522-23; see also Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Director of Investigation & Re-
search [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 583 (Can.) ("Fundamental justice may take different forms in different socie-
ties, given their own legal traditions.").
78. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
79. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]
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that state responsibility attached to actions by parties to the European Con-
vention that resulted in or facilitated the violation of rights guaranteed under
it.80 This was so even though the treatment or punishment would come at the
hands of the government of the State of Virginia (obviously not a party to the
European Convention), not the United Kingdom. As long as substantial
grounds existed for believing that the treatment or punishment would be im-
posed upon the individual, a Convention state could neither extradite nor de-
port him or her.8"
The revolutionary element of Soering was the European Court's re-
fashioning of the relationship between extradition law, human rights law,
and state responsibility.' The European Court held that Convention states
must ensure that the rights of all individuals subject to their jurisdiction, in-
cluding fugitives facing extradition abroad, are protected, even where-per-
haps especially where-the requesting country is not a Convention state. Na-
tional courts must ensure that the human rights obligations of their states are
satisfied in the extradition context, and courts must refuse to allow extradi-
tion where fugitives face a "real risk" of being subjected to cruel and inhu-
man treatment (as defined by the Convention) in the requesting state. Im-
portant decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)"3 and its Op-
tional Protocol8' subsequently have adopted Soering's logic on this point.8 5
("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."). On article 3
jurisprudence more generally, see Antonio Cassese, Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECrION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 225 (R. St.
J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
80. State responsibility is, in essence, the attribution of liability to a state in international law for
wrongful acts or omissions. In the human rights context, a state is said to bear responsibility where its off i-
cials or agents have acted or failed to act in such as way as to attract liability. See generally IAN BROWNLE,
SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I (1983) (providing overview of general
principles of state responsibility by considering both legal principles and state practices).
81. See Michael O'Boyle, Extradition and Expulsion Under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTItUTONAL LAW 93, 99 (James
O'Reilly ed., 1992).
82. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently extended the interpretation of article 3
adopted in Soering to expulsion and deportation cases. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No.
22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 74, 79-80 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (holding that expulsion of Sikh
separatist to India violated article 3 given substantial evidence that he would be tortured); Ahmed v. Aus-
tria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 278, 19 39-41 (1996) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (holding that expulsion of Somali to Soma-
lia would expose him to serious risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to article 3).
But see Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576189, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 1, 70 (1991) (Eur. Ct.
H.R.) (finding that deportation to face possible persecution in Chile on account of political activities there
did not breach article 3 of Convention).
83. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [here-
inafter ICCPR].
84. Id. at 59.
85. See Cox v. Canada, Decision of Oct. 31, 1994, Concerning Comm. No. 539/1993, 16.1,
reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 410, 416 (1994); Ng v. Canada, Decision of Nov. 5, 1993, Concerning
Comm. No. 469/1991, 14.2, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTs. L.J. 149, 156 (1994); Kindler v. Canada, Deci-
sion of July 30, 1993, Concerning Comm. No. 470/1991, 19 6.2, 13.2, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTs. L.J.
307, 309 (1993).
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Despite the importance of Soering's new conception of state responsi-
bility, the decision's virtues must be distinguished from its vices. First, the
European Court did not decide that extradition to face the death penalty per
se violated the fugitive's Convention rights.86 Rather, it was the probable ex-
posure of the fugitive to the "death row phenomenon" that troubled the So-
ering Court. By relying upon the "death row phenomenon" as the basis for
its decision, the Court reached the paradoxical result that the procedural
protections accorded a fugitive in the requesting state were deemed to be the
source of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." By implication,
if the requesting state were to prune back stays and rights of appeal and exe-
cute death row prisoners more quickly, article 3 would not have been
breached.' Thus, although a court must examine the treatment or punish-
ment that the fugitive likely would face abroad, it is not clear that the "death
row syndrome" itself (or at least the version outlined in Soering) necessarily
would provide grounds to quash a ministerial surrender decision.88
Crucially, the force of the European Court's pronouncements on the
relationship among extradition, human rights, and state responsibility also
was qualified by the fact that Germany, another Convention state, actively
sought the fugitive's extradition from the United Kingdom so that he could
be prosecuted for murder in Germany on the basis of nationality jurisdiction.
The fugitive would not have faced the death sentence in Germany. In fact,
the Soering Court was not forced to make a stark choice between extradition
or allowing the fugitive to walk free. If it had been, the case might have
been resolved differently.89 As it stands, the factual context of Soering seems
to undermine the Court's rather sweeping pronouncements.
86. But see David Beatty, The Canadian Charter of Rights: Lessons and Laments, 60 MOD. L.
REv. 481, 489, 495 (1997) (implying that Soering recognized right not to be extradited to countries that
retain the death penalty). Beatty's suggestion is simply incorrect. Professor William Schabas acknowledges
that the Court in Soering "stopped short of holding the death penalty itself to be inhuman and degrad-
ing. . . ." William A. Schabas, Soering's Legacy: The Human Rights Committee and the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council Take a WalkDown Death Row, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 913,914(1994).
87. A similar criticism was made by Justice La Forest in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 838 (Can.) (discussing extradition of U.S. citizen to face death penalty in Pennsylva-
nia); see also Guerra v. Baptiste [1996] 1 App. Cas. 397 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.) (stating that if
death sentence is to be imposed, it should follow as soon as possible after sentencing, with appropriate a I-
lowances for appeals or reprieve).
88. This is not to suggest that the conditions that a fugitive would face on death row could never
give rise to human rights concerns. On the death row syndrome in the United States, see Daniel P. Blank,
Book Note, Mumia Abu-Jamal and the 'Death Row Phenomenon', 48 STAN. L. REv. 1625 (1996).
89. See Indler 15.3, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307, 314 (1993). The European Court
did give great weight to the safe haven argument and the international public interest argument; on different
facts, these considerations might have carried the day. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 89, at 35 (1989). It should be noted that the Soeing Court was influenced by somewhat excep-
tional extenuating circumstances, including the fugitive's relative youth (18 years old at the time of the o f-
fense) and mental condition (he was allegedly suffering from an "abnormality of mind")-factors that
might be taken into account even by courts operating under a non-inquiry or residual threshold standard.
See id. 108. These complicating factors prevent Soering from providing a clear example of the applica-
tion of the domestic threshold standard of review. In the end, the Virginia authorities provided assurances
to the British government that they would not seek the death penalty, and the fugitive was extradited to the
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What Soering does demonstrate is that there are three main elements
that should influence the development of rules governing the scope of judi-
cial review of ministerial decisions to surrender fugitives for extradition to
foreign states. The three elements-domestic constitutional standards, inter-
national human rights law, and the law of state responsibility-are linked:
An extraditing state is under international human rights obligations, and it
breaches these obligations (and engages state responsibility under interna-
tional law) when a fugitive is extradited to a state that is likely to impose a
punishment violating those international human rights standards. Of course,
Soering was a case concerning the European Convention on Human Rights
and technically applies only to Convention states. Its logic, however, extends
to more general international human rights obligations as well.
The final consideration is that the interpretation of domestic constitu-
tional standards should be informed by the combination of international hu-
man rights standards and an awareness of the consequences that will arise for
state responsibility should these international obligations be violated. Inter-
national human rights law binds Canada on the international plane. It is not
enforceable directly in domestic courts in the absence of implementing leg-
islation. Nonetheless, where possible, domestic law should be interpreted to
accord with international human rights law standards, particularly where the
applicable domestic constitutional provisions-sections 7 and 12 of the
Charter-are open-textured. Thus, by following international human rights
law standards, a domestic court both will satisfy domestic constitutional
standards in the extradition context and ensure that the state will not incur
responsibility for violation of international human rights obligations by
sending a fugitive abroad in circumstances in which it is reasonably foresee-
able that the fugitive will be subjected to objectionable treatment in the re-
questing state.
4. The Non-Inquiry Standard
The first possible alternative to the residual threshold standard of re-
view is a "non-inquiry" standard, which contemplates a narrowly circum-
scribed role for courts in the extradition process. Under such a standard, Ca-
nadian courts would be highly deferential to the executive and would not ex-
amine the nature of the foreign criminal justice system or the treatment that
the fugitive likely would face in the requesting state, considering this type of
inquiry to be a matter for ministerial discretion rather than judicial interven-
tion. The non-inquiry standard was the traditional pre-Charter approach of
United States, where he was convicted of murder and sentenced to two life terms of imprisonment. See Ian
Ball & Wendy Holden, Shakespeare Lovers in Murder Most Foul: Envoy's Son Guilty of Macbeth Killings,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 26, 1990, at 3; Hugh Davies, Life Sentence for Killer Son of Diplomat,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 6, 1990, at 3.
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the Canadian courts in extradition matters, 90 and it continues to be applied by
English91 and U.S. courts.'
The non-inquiry standard has the advantages of speed and efficiency
because courts need not conduct lengthy hearings into the nature of foreign
law and conditions and thus save time and resources. Moreover, this stan-
dard obviates the need for courts to make controversial judgments about the
quality of foreign criminal justice systems. The courts should consider such
matters to be foreign affairs issues to be addressed by the executive. It sug-
gests that, as a matter of institutional capacity, courts have limited ability to
evaluate consistently conditions in foreign states. Advocates of the non-
inquiry standard contend that the refusal of a state to extradite a fugitive on
the basis of humanitarian concerns would place the state in violation of its
treaty obligations and would contravene domestic law.' The non-inquiry
standard also ensures that fugitives do not escape trial and punishment: If a
domestic court declines to allow a fugitive to be surrendered for extradition
because the fugitive would face objectionable treatment abroad, the fugitive
would in most cases not be tried at all.
Yet the rule of non-inquiry is undesirable as a standard of review of
ministerial surrender decisions in extradition cases. Although the non-inquiry
rule reflects an understandable concern to protect the public against interna-
tional fugitives, it does not adhere to constitutional values or protect individ-
ual rights. 9' Measured against the three elements stressed by the European
90. See In re Rosenberg [1918] 29 C.C.C. 309, 313 (Man. C.A.) (Can.) (determining that fact
that fugitive will not receive fair trial abroad is irrelevant to decision to extradite). See generally Stephen R.
Morrison, Extradition from Canada: Rights of the Fugitive Following Committal for Surrender, 19 Cu,.
L.Q. 366 (1977) (surveying remedies available to fugitive and proposing reforms).
91. See R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison [1991] 2 App. Cas. 64 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.). More recent developments indicate that the executive decision to surrender a fugitive for extradition
may be subjected to judicial review on the basis of rationality, according to the Wednesbury principle, see
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (Eng. C.A.). See R. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Dep't [1992] Imm. A.R. 293 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.) (holding it unjust and
oppressive to return fugitive to United States). But see R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex p.
Launder [1997] 1 W.L.R. 839 (H.L.) (refusing to quash surrender order sending fugitive to Hong Kong).
Some Canadian commentators have expressed surprise that the English administrative law doctrines of un-
reasonableness and disproportionality play an increasingly large role in England but have seemingly little
impact on the process of Charter review in Canada. See, e.g., JoHN M. EVANs Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw: CASES, TEXT, AND MATERA.S 1051 (4th ed. 1995) (comparing England's use of reasonableness and
disproportionality to expand scope of review of discretion with Canada's use of same standards for re-
stricting scope of review).
92. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Smith, 82 F.3d 964, 965 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that court
will not inquire into fairness of requesting state's justice system); Yapp v. Reno, 26 F.3d 1562, 1565 (1ith
Cir. 1994) (holding that American defendant in extradition case has no right to speedy foreign trial under
Sixth Amendment); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329-30 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that
non-inquiry rule precludes examination of fairness of requesting state's judicial system); see also Jacques
Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition, 76
COCRNELL L. REv. 1198, 1205 (1991) ("All circuits that have considered the issue have adopted the rule of
non-inquiry. . . ." (footnote omitted)).
93. See Semmelman, supra note 92, at 1221.
94. See, e.g., In re Normano, 7 F. Supp. 329, 330-31 (D. Mass. 1934) (rejecting Jewish fugi-
tive's efforts to resist extradition to Nazi Germany in order to avoid religious persecution). But there are
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Court in Soering-(1) domestic constitutional standards; (2) international
human rights law; and (3) the law of state responsibility-the non-inquiry
standard is inadequate. The standard gives no regard to either domestic con-
stitutional norms or international human rights law. Moreover, it ignores the
potential for state responsibility arising from surrender of a fugitive to face
unconscionable treatment in the requesting state. As such, the non-inquiry
standard is insensitive to modern realities and should be rejected as an alter-
native to the residual threshold standard.
5. The Domestic Threshold Standard
The second possible alternative to the residual threshold standard is a
"domestic threshold" standard under which courts of the extraditing state
would subject the laws and procedures of the requesting state to scrutiny on
a domestic constitutional standard.95 In cases in which foreign laws or prac-
tices violate domestic constitutional standards, extradition would be refused.
The domestic threshold standard makes no allowance for the transnational
context of extradition. Indeed, the treatment or punishment that the fugitive
could face in the requesting state is essentially deemed to be the action of the
domestic authorities for purposes of Charter review.
Something similar to the domestic threshold standard is often thought to
be the approach that the European Court set forth in the celebrated Soering
case.96 A version of the domestic threshold standard, influenced by the rea-
soning of Soering, has been adopted by courts in Ireland' and the Nether-
lands.9" The domestic threshold standard has its supporters in Canada as
decisions that go the other way. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Weinberg v. Schlotfeldt, 26 F. Supp. 283,
284 (N.D. Ill. 1938) (declining to deport Jewish alien to Czechoslovakia because doing so at the time
would constitute "cruel and inhuman punishment").
95. See David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition, 15
HAsTINGs INr'L & CoMP. L. REv. 111, 124-33 (1991); cf. John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiy and the
Impact of Human Rights on Ertradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 401, 434-38 (1990)
(subjecting United States's imposition of death penalty to human rights norms).
96. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). On Soering, see generally
Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 845 (1990); Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991); John Quigley
& S. Adele Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30
VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989); and Christine Van den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 757 (1990).
97. See, e.g., Ellis v. O'Dea [1991] 1 I.R. 251 (or.) (holding that allegations that foreign trials
do not meet Irish constitutional standards were unsubstantiated); Finucane v. McMahon [1990] 1 I.R. 165
(Ir.) (holding that extradition will be refused when it can be demonstrated that fugitive would face ill treat-
ment in requesting state); Russell v. Fanning [1988] I.R. 505, 531 (Jr.) (discussing assault and ill treatment
of prisoners recaptured after escape from Maze prison).
98. See Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (HR) (Sup. Ct.), 16 RvdW
76, 343 (Neth.), reprinted in The Netherlands: Opinion of the Advocaat-Generaal and Supreme Court De-
cision in The Netherlands v. Short, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990) (Neth.) (declining to extradite U.S. soldier to
United States to face death penalty).
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well, most notably Professor David Beatty.' It is understandable that those
who object to the non-inquiry standard would prefer a greater role for do-
mestic constitutional norms in extradition law. Nevertheless, the arguments
against the domestic threshold standard are too strong. The most fundamen-
tal objection to a domestic threshold standard was advanced by Justice
McLachlin in Kindler: "If we were to insist on strict conformity with our
own system, there would be virtually no state in the world with which we
could reciprocate." 0 Moreover, while the domestic threshold standard pos-
sesses the advantages of vindicating the rights of fugitives, it suffers from se-
rious disadvantages that render it inappropriate for adoption by Canadian
courts. First, it undermines the effectiveness of the extradition system. The
domestic threshold standard would cause undue delays in the extradition of
fugitives. Indeed, in many cases it would prevent extradition altogether. Al-
though this may be appropriate in some cases, as I shall argue below, the
domestic threshold standard tips the delicate balance between individual
rights and the public interest too far in favor of the former.
In essence, extradition is an international process of cooperation be-
tween states for the suppression of crime and the protection of the public.' °
It facilitates the orderly return of fugitives to the states in which they are al-
leged to have committed offenses or to the states that suffered harm from
those offenses. Without extradition, it would be easy for fugitives to evade
prosecution merely by crossing borders."°2 The extradition process provides
"a mechanism to overcome the jurisdictional and territorial difficulties of
prosecuting and punishing serious crimes committed by fugitives who have
left the country in which the crimes were committed. "3 Extradition serves a
pressing social goal, and the domestic threshold standard of review simply
does not accord the public interest sufficient weight.
99. See DAvID M. BEATrY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85 (1995); Beatty,
supra note 86, at 488-89, 494-95 (1997).
100. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 844-45 (Can.).
101. See United States v. Waddell [1993] 87 C.C.C.3d 555, 557-58 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.).
102. On the importance of suppressing transnational crime, see Libman v. R. [1985] 2 S.C.R.
178, 213-14 (Can.), which states the importance of international cooperation for national law enforcement;
Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Doot [1973] App. Cas. 807, 834 (H.L.) (Eng.), which provides rationales
for the trend in expanding criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes; and Edward M. Morgan,
Criminal Process, International Law, and Ertraterritorial Crime, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 273 (1988),
which discusses the movement toward internationalization in the application of criminal law.
103. United States v. Kerslake [1996] 142 Sask. R. 112, 120 (Sask. Q.B.) (Can.); see also United
States v. Manno [1997] 112 C.C.C.3d 544, 551 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) ("mhe extradition process forms part
of an approach which has a much more practical purpose, namely to minimize the effect of borders which
separate states in order to bring the criminal to justice and to have him answer for his acts."), leave to ap-
peal refused, [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.).
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C. Why the Residual Threshold Standard Is Desirable
1. The Residual Threshold Standard
Between the extremes of the non-inquiry standard and the domestic
threshold standard lies the residual threshold standard for review of ministe-
rial surrender decisions. As discussed above in Subsection II.B.2, the Su-
preme Court of Canada has adopted the outline of a residual threshold stan-
dard. Courts in other states also have developed various forms of it." 4 Under
the residual threshold standard, courts generally defer to ministerial surren-
der decisions, but they will intervene in "compelling situations." 105 The Su-
preme Court has indicated that extradition will violate the principles of fun-
damental justice under section 7 where the fugitive faces a "simply unac-
ceptable" situation"16 or where the foreign punishment "sufficiently shocks"
the Canadian conscience." The courts claim a residual discretion to inter-
vene but will invoke it rarely.
Only the residual threshold standard of review balances the three So-
ering factors against the practical realities of the international extradition
system. The residual threshold standard gives weight to domestic constitu-
tional norms but does not invoke them on a purely domestic standard. The
residual threshold standard acknowledges the international context in which
extradition must operate and uses this context as a factor in the interpretation
of domestic Charter standards. The residual threshold standard also makes
use of international human rights norms to interpret domestic Charter norms.
In this way, the threshold point at which courts will intervene to prevent sur-
render of a fugitive for extradition is guided by whether international human
rights norms would be violated by the surrender so that state responsibility
would follow.
104. The possibility of refusing to extradite has been kept open on occasion by U.S. courts but
has always been denied on the facts. See, e.g., Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir. 1980);
Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960); see also Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1369 n.8
(9th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging possibility of judicial inquiry into anticipated treatment of fugitive in re-
questing state); Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating in dicta that extra-
dition is unlikely where foreign conditions are extreme). See generally RESTATEMENT (1HD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 476 cmt. h (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENr] (dis-
cussing extradition when there is danger of persecution or unfair trial). Recent decisions, however, indicate
that the rule of non-inquiry remains firmly entrenched. See, e.g., Abmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d
Cir. 1990) (repudiating Gallina v. Fraser); In re Extradition of Sandu, 886 F. Supp. 318, 321-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
105. R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 526 (Can.). A similar approach is suggested in Leslie
Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition Proceedings: An Argument for a
Humanitarian Exception, in 1983 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STuD. 153, 164 (John M. Lummis et al. eds.,
1983).
106. United States v. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, 572 (Can.); see also R. v. Larabie [1988] 42
C.C.C.3d 385, 390 (Ont. H.C.J.) (Can.) ("inhere may come a point where the consequences of extradi-
tion would be so extreme as to outrage the standards of decency.").
107. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 849 (Can.); Schmidt [1987] 1
S.C.R. at 522.
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2. The International Public Interest
Extradition serves the public interest by ensuring that Canada does not
become a safe haven for foreign fugitives. Extradition also fulfills Canada's
treaty obligations, and in an interdependent world, it serves the goals of in-
ternational cooperation and comity by facilitating the protection of the pub-
lic, both in the requesting state and elsewhere. To be sure, extradition has an
important human rights dimension. But the interest of states in prosecuting
and suppressing crime should not be ignored. Often, fugitives take advantage
of the ease of crossing borders in order to engage in criminal activity or to
evade capture but are quick to invoke the protection of those same borders
once they are apprehended.10
In response, a nascent idea of the protection of the international public
interest is developing." This concept recognizes that Canada has an interest
in ensuring that its territory not be used as a staging ground for criminal ac-
tivity in foreign states. The Supreme Court of Canada supported the idea in
Libman v. R., a case concerning the prosecution in Canada for fraud of a de-
fendant who allegedly operated a "boiler room" telephone stock sales opera-
tion in Toronto that solicited purchases by U.S. residents of shares in Costa
Rican corporations. The Supreme Court held that Canada properly exercised
prescriptive jurisdiction over the offense because there was a real and sub-
stantial connection between the offense and Canada. Justice La Forest wrote,
"[W]e should not be indifferent to the protection of the public in other coun-
tries. In a shrinking world, we are all our brother's keepers. In the criminal
arena this is underlined by the international cooperative schemes that have
been developed among national law enforcement bodies."11
Justice La Forest was suggesting that Canada has a strong interest in
protecting the public in other states and ensuring that Canadian territory does
not provide a safe haven for criminals who "prey on [foreign] citizens."'
This idea of an "international public interest" should play an important role
in section 7 and section 1 Charter review of ministerial surrender decisions.
Just as rigid adherence to a territorial conception of prescriptive jurisdiction
would render transnational crime unpunishable, a rigid invocation of domes-
tic constitutional norms would do so in the extradition context. This does not
mean that fugitives do not possess Charter rights, but it does mean that the
scope of those rights should be determined by reference to the context in
108. See Michell, supra note 53, at 444.
109. See United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, 1486-87 (Can.); Morgan, supra note
102, at 273-75. Justice La Forest asserts that Canada is part of an emerging world community and should
not confine itself to parochial and nationalistic concepts of community. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at
1486.
110. Libman v. R. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 214 (Can.). Similar language is employed in Cotroni
[1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1485-86, and Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot [1973] 1 App. Cas. 807, 831,
834 (H.L.) (Eng.).
111. Libman [1985] 2S.C.R. at214.
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which they are to be exercised. 12 The existence of international extradition
treaties emphasizes the importance of the governmental objectives for the
purposes of section 7 and section 1 interpretation." 3 The goal must be to bal-
ance the protection of individual rights and the effectiveness of the extradi-
tion system.
3. The Charter and Extradition Treaties
The Canadian Government cannot derogate from Charter rights simply
by entering into international treaties and enacting those treaties into domes-
tic law." 4 Yet at the same time, an ex post facto imposition of strict Charter
requirements upon the extradition process easily could lead Canada to breach
its treaty obligations, which also would be undesirable. In general, the
Charter should be interpreted so as not to violate existing treaty obligations,
and in cases of ambiguity, it should be interpreted by reference to them. The
international extradition system is part of the backdrop against which the
Charter was adopted, and as Justice La Forest noted in Cotroni, the Charter
must not be interpreted in an historical vacuum." 5
An enlightened approach to interpretation may provide considerable
latitude to courts in avoiding conflicts between treaties and the Charter.
Treaties and implementing legislation should be interpreted (so far as possi-
ble) in such a manner as to comply with the Charter. Moreover, the applica-
ble treaty will have been implemented into domestic law by the Extradition
Act, which clearly states that specific provisions in the treaty trump incon-
sistent provisions of the Extradition Act." 6 As extradition treaties are to be
interpreted according to the rules of public international law,"7 which in-
cludes international human rights law, the latter might be a useful interpreta-
tive aid for Canada's treaty obligations and the dictates of the Charter. Ac-
cording to one theory, a refusal to surrender a fugitive for extradition be-
cause of concerns about the fairness of proceedings in the requesting state
112. See KUndler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 833 (Can.) (stating that "the global context must be kept
squarely in mind" in performing balancing exercise under section 7); id. at 848 (McLachlin, J., concur-
ring). But see O'Boyle, supra note 81, at 99-100 (criticizing international public interest approach as justi-
fying derogation from rights of fugitives).
113. See Slaight Communications, Inc. v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056 (Can.) (ratifica-
tion of treaty indicates importance of governmental objective under section 1).
114. See United States v. Alfaro [1992] 75 C.C.C.3d 211, 229 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (stating that
extradition is subject to juridical sovereignty of Charter).
115. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1490-91 (La Forest, J., concurring); see also Thomson
Newspapers v. Director of Investigation & Research [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 578 (Can.) (noting that long-
standing practices may be influential in indicating scope of "fundamental justice" under section 7); id. at
539, 547 (La Forest, J., concurring). Treaties are usually invoked in Charter litigation in order to expand
the scope of the Charter right in question. But there is no reason why international obligations should not
also be invoked to establish a context within which Charter rights should be defined, thereby structuring
the broad language of Charter rights without necessarily expanding their scope.
116. See Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-23, § 3 (1985) (Can.) (noting that applicable treaty pro-
vision prevails in event of inconsistency with Extradition Act).
117. See In re Palacios [1984] 45 O.R.2d 269, 277 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
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might be considered merely a form of treaty interpretation, because fair
treatment of the fugitive could be thought of as an implied term of an extra-
dition treaty." 8
Yet at a certain point, either the treaty or the Charter must yield where
there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two. In the end, the
Charter will trump a treaty for the purposes of domestic law.' 9 In the event
of a conflict between the Charter and an extradition treaty, the preferable
approach would be for the court to "read down" the relevant portion of the
domestic implementation legislation so as to give it no effect. The executive
then would be compelled to amend Canada's extradition treaties explicitly so
that they comply with Charter norms and to require new treaties to accord
with them as well.'2 This would be an exceptional remedy, however, and
the vast majority of cases would not reach this stage.
4. The Unworkability of the Domestic Threshold Standard
Although the domestic threshold standard has its attractions, it is un-
workable in practice. Three main arguments caution against its adoption.
First, the domestic threshold standard would cause undue delay, seriously
impairing the efficient operation of the extradition process. Second, the do-
mestic threshold standard does not give sufficient weight to the values of
mutuality and reciprocity, nor to the practical compromises that those values
necessitate. Third, the domestic threshold standard does not afford an appro-
priate measure of deference to the superior expertise of the executive in for-
eign relations.
The first argument against the domestic threshold standard is that it
represents a counsel of perfection that is unworkable because it would lead to
undue delay in the return of fugitives to face trial. Among the most impor-
tant elements of an effective international extradition system is the need to
118. See Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judidal Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases
After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 129 (1992); Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1313, 1325 (1962).
119. The position in Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The constitutional
rights of individuals, including the right to due process, are superior to the government's treaty obliga-
tions.") was expressly taken by Justice La Forest in R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 520-21 (Can.),
and implied by Justice Wilson, see id. at 533. Accordingly, the possibility must exist that at the margin, an
extradition treaty and/or its accompanying implementation legislation could be unconstitutional on Charter
grounds. No one doubts that Canada can legislate in violation of its international obligations, but courts
will presume against such an eventuality and require a clear indication of legislative intent to do so. See
Daniels v. White [1968] S.C.R. 517, 541 (Can.). In general, domestic legislation that implements treaty
obligations will be interpreted in such a way as to be consonant with those obligations. See National Corn
Growers Ass'n v. Canada (Import Tribunal) [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, 1371 (Can.). The traditional view is
that the Crown treaty-making prerogative is not amenable to judicial review. See R. v. Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [1994] Q.B. 552, 569-70 (1993) (Eng.). Whether this is true in a
post-Charter era is uncertain; it seems more likely that the Crown's prerogative would be considered ame-
nable to review, but on a deferential standard. See Operation Dismantle v. R. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.).
120. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, Mar. 16, 1990, Can.-Mex., art. IV(b), [1990] Can. T.S.
No. 35 (incorporating "fundamental justice" standard articulated by Supreme Court under section 7).
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minimize the time from the fugitive's arrest abroad to his return to face trial
or imprisonment in the requesting state. The residual threshold model would
satisfy this concern; the domestic threshold standard would not. Clearly, re-
ducing delay should be a concern in all civil and criminal processes. But in
the particular context of extradition, the steps that a Canadian court takes
must be premised on the knowledge that the fugitive will receive a full trial
in the requesting state upon his return. The greater the number of procedural
requirements imposed upon the extradition process in Canada, the greater the
likelihood that the Canadian proceedings will evolve into a de facto full trial
on the merits. The practical effect of a domestic threshold standard would be
to subject the fugitive to two trials, one in Canada and one abroad. Problems
of delay and double jeopardy then would arise.
Moreover, the longer the delay in the return of a fugitive to the re-
quested state, the less likely it is that a conviction will be secured in any
state for reasons entirely unconnected to the merits of the case against the
fugitive. The extradition system thus has been constructed with the need for
dispatch in mind."' An extradition hearing is not a trial and should not ex-
pand to become one, lest the goals of the extradition system be compro-
mised." A more intrusive standard of review would multiply the number of
cases for review and increase the burden on the courts."z Increased delay
also might provide an incentive for foreign states to resort to irregular tech-
niques to secure the return of requested fugitives.124
The second argument against the domestic threshold standard is rooted
in the values of mutuality and reciprocity, both of which militate strongly in
favor of a residual threshold standard of review. Adoption of a domestic
threshold standard would make it very unlikely that Canada would be able to
abide by its treaty obligations to extradite fugitives because, if taken literally,
almost no fugitives could ever be extradited. If Canada could not fulfill its
treaty obligations, it could not expect its treaty partners to reciprocate by
extraditing requested fugitives."as Given diversity among states, the interna-
121. See United Kingdom v. James [1996] O.J. No. 369, 9 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) ("Pro-
ceedings in Canadian courts in furtherance of Canada's international obligations are by their very nature
intended to be expeditious."), appeal allowed in part, [1996] 108 C.C.C.3d 289 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave
to appeal refused, [1997] 114 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.). Cases ddressing the constitutionality of extraditing a
fugitive where delay has been caused by the foreign government that might be prejudicial to the fugitive
may be distinguished on the basis that in those cases the delay was not caused by the domestic authorities.
See United States v. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, 571-72 (Can.); Argentina v. Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R.
536, 552 (Can.); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). Undue delay may be
taken into consideration in the courts of the requesting state. As well, the Canadian position on the impact
of delay in purely domestic cases is unclear, so it would be difficult to invoke it as a standard against which
foreign law should be evaluated. Finally, it should not be forgotten that in some cases the delay was caused
by the fugitive himself. See R. v. McMaster [1996] O.J. No. 402 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.); Kakis v. Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779, 782-83 (H.L.) (Eng.).
122. See In re McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, 551 (Can.) ("[E]xtradition proceedings are not trials.
They are intended to be expeditious procedures to determine whether a trial should be held.").
123. See O'Boyle, supra note 81, at 106.
124. See Michell, supra note 53, at 460 n.383.
125. See ldziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 663 (Can.).
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tional extradition system could not function if states subjected extradition to
full domestic constitutional standards. The international obligations inherent
in extradition proceedings must not be ignored. The principles of mutuality
and reciprocity counsel that a residual threshold standard of review is more
appropriate than a domestic threshold standard.
Transnationalism in the abstract is not a goal in itself; rather, transna-
tionalism is valuable and worthy of consideration under section 1 of the
Charter only so far as it advances important social goals.126 A residual
threshold standard recognizes that comity and reciprocity should be accorded
weight because they serve a functional purpose-they ensure that the extra-
dition system operates efficiently and also that when parties sign an extradi-
tion treaty, they make a bargain to serve their own interests. Canada hardly
can expect other states to accede to its requests for extradition if it imposes
its full domestic standards upon the criminal justice systems of its treaty
partners when they request extradition of fugitives from Canada. There is a
tradeoff between the rights of fugitives to have the Charter apply to them on
a purely domestic standard and the pressing social goal of maintaining a
functioning extradition system. This is precisely the sort of tradeoff that sec-
tion 1 was designed to address. 27
By subjecting foreign criminal justice systems to domestic constitu-
tional standards, the domestic threshold standard of review would impugn
the good faith of the requesting state, making it less likely that effective ex-
tradition relationships could be developed or maintained. 2 Although domes-
tic courts should, so far as possible, avoid making pronouncements regarding
the validity of a foreign state's social policies, the good faith of the request-
ing state pales in comparison to the fundamental rights of fugitives. 29 That
said, the cases rarely concern fundamental rights such as protection against
torture. Far more common are cases over which reasonable people may dis-
agree as to whether a fundamental right is truly at issue.
The third argument against the adoption of the domestic threshold stan-
dard is that it does not reflect the modem notion that in exercising judicial
review, courts should accord a measure of deference to bodies with superior
expertise. Extradition necessarily implicates treaty obligations with a foreign
state, traditionally viewed as a matter of executive competence and exper-
tise. 30 It now seems plain that the executive's greater degree of institutional
competence does not immunize extradition from judicial review because
there is no subject entitled "foreign relations" within which executive action
126. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 14, at 269.
127. Seeid. at267.
128. It is debatable whether as a matter of policy it is preferable to have the courts or the
executive do this.
129. See Chan v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, 631-32 (Can.) (La Forest, J.,
dissenting).
130. See In re McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, 518-20 (Can.).
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is unreviewable.' 3' A long Anglo-Canadian jurisprudential history to the
contrary is now discredited. 132 The executive's degree of expertise does sug-
gest, however, that a degree of judicial deference to both the executive's
factual and legal analyses of the foreign relations dimensions of the case is
appropriate.
33
Some have argued against a domestic threshold standard on the grounds
of institutional capacity, claiming that the courts are less competent than the
executive to make determinations about the quality of foreign criminal justice
systems without jeopardizing any policy interests of the United States.M The
alleged inability of the courts to make determinations about foreign law and
conditions is illusory, however. The courts regularly review such determina-
tions in the immigration, refugee, and asylum context. 35 There are, admit-
tedly, important differences between immigration and extradition'36 that sug-
gest that a more deferential standard of review is appropriate for the latter.
37
Nonetheless, as a matter of theory, it is not at all clear that courts are inca-
pable of making determinations as to the treatment to which the fugitive is
likely to be subjected in the requesting state. Thus, although there are a
number of strong arguments against the adoption of the domestic threshold
standard, the alleged incapacity of the courts to evaluate foreign legal sys-
tems is not one of them.
131. See Operation Dismantle v. R. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441,459 (Can.).
132. See, e.g., The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] App. Cas. 256, 264 (H.L.) (Eng.) ("Our State can-
not speak with two voies ... the judiciary saying one thing, the executive another.").
133. Deference is appropriate for the same reasons that deference is accorded to administrative
tribunals on appeals or judicial review, namely, and primarily, because of their relative expertise. See Can-
ada v. Southam, Inc. [1997] 144 D.L.R.4th 1, 11 (Can.); Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301
v. Montreal [1997] 1 S.C.R. 793, 810-11 (Can.); Bell Canada v. Canadian Radio-television & Tele-
comms. Comm'n [1989] 60 D.L.R.4th 682, 699 (Can.). Thus, deference is accorded both to the execu-
tive's factual and legal judgment as to the legality of its own actions. But cf Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d
1450, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ruling that U.S. federal judiciary owes no deference to executive's legal in-
terpretation of statute), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
134. See Semmelman, supra note 92, at 1229-30.
135. See Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, ch. 1-2, § 114(1)(s) (Can.); LORNE WALDMAN,
IMMIGRATiON LAW AND PRACtiCE § 8.25 (1992); see also Chan v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593,
594-95 (reviewing determination of whether appellant was Convention refugee); Canada (A.G.) v. Ward
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 693 (Can.) (holding that appellant did not meet criteria of Convention refugee).
136. First, extradition, unlike immigration, is a creature of treaty and involves requests made by
foreign states under such treaties. (Refugee status determination is, of course, an exception to this in that it
is largely a response to treaty obligations.) Second, time is of the essence in extradition matters in a way
that it usually is not in immigration cases. Third, deportation is permanent, whereas extradition is not: A
fugitive may always return after a foreign trial, either after an acquittal or after serving his sentence there.
But see United States v. Bums [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 534 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (noting that extradition
will be permanent if extradited fugitive is put to death). Fourth, only non-citizens may be deported,
whereas extradition applies to both citizens and non-citizens.
137. The appropriate standard of judicial review in immigration and refugee cases is the subject of
open debate. See, e.g., Hathaway & Neve, supra note 14, at 269 (arguing against "deflection scheme"
standards while favoring standards based on Canadian "core values"). The point here is only that a more
deferential standard of review is appropriate in extradition cases. See, e.g., Chan [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 627-
29 (La Forest, J., dissenting) (identifying Refugee Convention obligations).
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Further evidence refuting the argument that courts should not engage in
review of ministerial surrender decisions is that in some countries (although
not in Canada) the political offense exception to extradition, whereby extra-
dition will be refused for so-called "political offenses,"138 is administered by
the courts. 139 This indicates that courts are able to investigate ministerial sur-
render decisions using a more intrusive standard of review than the non-
inquiry standard.' Some have argued that the executive possesses consid-
erably more expertise in extradition matters than does the judiciary and that
the standard of judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions should ac-
cordingly reflect this disparity in expertise."' Yet the expertise argument is
unconvincing as an argument barring the courts from reviewing ministerial
surrender decisions. Although the executive is probably better informed
about developments in foreign states, this same degree of relative expertise
may not exist in individual cases. 2 Nevertheless, over the range of cases, it
is the executive whose expertise is relatively greater. It follows that the stan-
dard of review should be deferential but not abdicationist.
The true issue is not whether the courts could exercise judicial review
on a domestic threshold standard but rather the prudence and appropriateness
of doing so. It is neither feasible nor desirable for courts to conduct intrusive
examinations of foreign criminal justice systems in all cases. The courts
speak of "judicial self-restraint" in the extradition context. 143
It is also unpersuasive to argue that the adoption of any standard other
than the non-inquiry standard is likely to embroil Canada in international
controversy by making determinations as to the conditions facing a fugitive
abroad. In Canada, the courts interpret the State Immunity Act'"-deciding
138. On the operation of the political offense exception in Canada, see In re MeVey [1992] 3
S.C.R. 475, 516 (Can.); LA FOREST, supra note 3, at 81-98; and J.G. Castel & Marlys Edwardh, Political
Offences: Extradition and Deportation-Recent Canadian Developments, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 89
(1975).
139. For example, the United States is one such country. The operation of the doctrine is contro-
versial. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying
the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 258-
59 (1988) (arguing against application of inquiry provisions of treaty on prudential grounds).
140. Canadian courts play a limited role in the operation of the political offense exception. See
Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-23, § 21 (1985) (Can.); In re Wisconsin & Armstrong [1973] 10 C.C.C.2d
271, 297 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.). To date, the Canadian position has been that the allegation that a prosecution
is motivated by political reasons in the requesting state is a consideration for the executive, not the courts.
See Extradition Act § 22(1) (Can.); United States v. Liebowitz [1987] 3 W.C.B.2d 169 (Ont. Dist. Ct.)
(Can.). Under the approach proposed in this Article, this position would change.
141. See, e.g., Semmehnan, supra note 92, at 1240-41.
142. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1213, 1237 (1996) ("Inquiry issues associated with extradition can be handled better by a court than
by the executive branch because the required inquiry involves factual issues with legal elements.").
143. See Gervasoni v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1996] 72 B.C.A.C. 141, 147 (B.C. C.A.)
(Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 2 S.C.R. vii (Can.).
144. State Immunity Act, R.S.C., ch. S-18 (1985) (Can.). It should be noted, however, that the
record of courts under this legislation has been highly deferential to the executive, in the sense that the
courts have adopted an expansive interpretation of the scope of immunity accorded by the Act, so that fo r-
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whether foreign states and their agencies should be subject to domestic law-
without embroiling the country in international political controversies. An
independent judiciary, skilled at protecting individual rights, is less likely to
be swayed by considerations of political expediency than the executive.'45
There is always a concern that the executive may extradite a fugitive despite
human rights concerns in order to mollify or curry favor with the requesting
state. Given the pervasive pressure upon the executive to maintain good in-
ternational relations, it can plausibly be argued that it would be less contro-
versial to have the courts make politically sensitive extradition decisions in
part because the executive would be insulated from political responsibility.
146
The residual threshold standard strikes an appropriate balance between def-
erence to the foreign relations expertise of the executive and the need to re-
tain a residual power in the courts to quash surrender decisions in compel-
ling cases.
5. A Margin of Appreciation
In the extradition context, Canadian courts must make allowance for
something akin to a margin of appreciation regarding Canada's treaty part-
ners and the domestic executive. The goal is to project the Charter outward
while simultaneously restraining it within a web of international human
rights law. The result should be a generally deferential standard of review
that reserves to the courts a residual ability to intervene to quash surrender
orders where the margin of appreciation was exceeded.
The idea may at first appear controversial. Professor Beatty, for exam-
ple, disagrees vehemently with what he regards as an overly deferential
standard of constitutional review that the Supreme Court of Canada has
adopted in extradition cases. 47 Beatty's criticism of the Supreme Court's
adoption of a residual threshold standard of review in extradition cases is
misplaced; nevertheless, his thesis does impel its critics to provide a more
sophisticated theoretical response to the argument that constitutional judicial
review in extradition cases should be exercised on a domestic threshold stan-
dard. An important potential source of such a response-the European Con-
vention's concept of the "margin of appreciation"-is addressed at some
eign states are largely insulated from litigation in Canadian courts. See Walker v. Bank of New York
[1994] 16 O.R.3d 504, 507-08 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
145. See Hughes, supra note 72, at 317; John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition
Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441, 1485 (1988); Morrison, supra note 90, at 368; Quigley, supra note 142, at 1237,
1240.
146. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POIMCAL QUESnONs/JutDICALANswERs 104-06 (1992).
147. Beatty's criticism of the extradition cases is but part of a larger critique of the Court's
contextual approach to constitutional judicial review. Beatty argues that the contextual approach to judicial
review leads to a subversion of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy and an erosion of the principles of
rationality and proportionality which, he contends, infuse constitutional review of legislative and executive
acts. See BEATry, supra note 99, at 92.
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length in Professor Beatty's own book. 14 The margin of appreciation doc-
trine provides a valuable theoretical base upon which to build a Canadian
standard of review of ministerial surrender decisions in extradition cases.
The margin of appreciation originated in the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. 149 It embodies the observation that the distinct
national systems of law of the various European Convention states allow
Convention rights to be vindicated through different means. The Convention
does not necessarily mandate uniformity among Convention states, but it
does protect fundamental values. The margin of appreciation stems from a
combination of principled judicial self-restraint and pragmatic recognition
that national authorities are, as a general rule, better placed to address the
national protection of Convention rights than a distant international body.
The margin of appreciation is largely grounded in a judicial awareness of the
international context, given that the European Court interprets a treaty-the
European Convention-that applies human rights standards to a variety of
states.
In practice, the margin of appreciation provides Convention states with
some leeway in designing statutory and administrative regimes to implement
Convention rights. 150 The doctrine arises most often in cases in which there
is no consensus in the law and practice of the Convention states, meaning
that the Court will tolerate a certain degree of diversity in legal and admin-
istrative practice among the Convention states. Where, however, the practice
of Convention states is more uniform-indicating that commonly shared fun-
damental values are at stake-the margin of appreciation is very narrow and
a strict standard of review will apply.'51
The margin of appreciation has been influential in Canadian constitu-
tional law, particularly in relation to the minimal impairment element of the
Oakes test, which enumerates the steps that the government must take in or-
der for an otherwise unconstitutional statute or practice to be upheld under
section 1 of the Charter.'52 By interpreting the minimal impairment branch of
the Oakes test to mean that an impugned law or practice must infringe the
Charter right as little as reasonably possible in order to be upheld under sec-
tion 1, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed legislatures some leeway
in designing statutory and administrative regimes. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court will not always insist upon its own view of the least possible restric-
tive means. The law or practice under review will satisfy this element of the
Oakes test as long as it is within a reasonable zone of "least restrictiveness."
148. See id. at 138-40, 146-48.
149. See J.G. MERRLLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 7 (2d ed. 1993); R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 83.
150. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSrn~nONAL LAW OF CANADA 35-31 to 35-35 (1997).
151. See Graham Zellick, The European Convention on Human Rights: Its Significance for Char-
ter Litigation, in CHARTER LIGATON 97, 103 (Robert J. Sharpe ed., 1987).
152. See R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135-40 (Can.).
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It may be helpful to transpose the margin of appreciation concept to the
international extradition context. Of course, the analogy is not exact. A Ca-
nadian court that exercises constitutional judicial review of ministerial sur-
render decisions does not exercise a review power granted to it by treaty,
nor does it apply the terms of an international treaty to other signatory states.
Many of the issues that must be addressed, however, are similar.
In making this proposal, I should explain why the margin of apprecia-
tion concept was not invoked in Soering itself. The primary reason seems to
be that the margin of appreciation doctrine historically has been invoked in
cases involving disagreement among Convention states over fundamental
values, not between Convention states and non-Convention states. A closer
analysis suggests, however, that the analogy between the margin of appre-
ciation doctrine in Convention jurisprudence and the standard of review to be
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in reviewing decisions in extradi-
tion cases is a good one. Indeed, its application may be even more appropri-
ate in the truly international context of extradition than in the intra-
Convention states context. This is because internationally, there is even less
consensus on "fundamental values" and greater disagreement over the range
of punishments considered to be appropriate than exists among the Conven-
tion states. Moreover, the "subsidiarity or local conditions" argument ap-
plies with even greater force in the international extradition context. Ac-
cordingly, a theory similar to the margin of appreciation doctrine plays an
important role in determining the appropriate standard of review of ministe-
rial surrender decisions in extradition cases.
6. Trust in the Requesting State
The adoption of a residual threshold standard of review rather than a
domestic threshold standard is further supported by the argument that there
should be a certain degree of trust in the requesting state's ability and will-
ingness to grant the fugitive both procedural and substantive due process.'53
It should not be forgotten that the fugitive is protected by existing procedural
and substantive requirements, including the political offense exception," as
well as by the rules of specialty155 and double criminality. 56 Reciprocity
153. See, e.g., Argentina v. Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 554-55 (Can.); DesFosss v. Canada
(Minister of Justice) [1996] F.C.J. No. 1325, 22 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.). This trust in the essential fair-
ness of the requesting state's criminal justice system pervades the extradition system. See Extradition Act,
R.S.C., ch. E-23, § 16 (1985) (Can.) (requiring no proof with respect to foreign affidavits); In re McVey
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, 526 (Can.) (holding that extradition judge must not examine foreign law or question
good faith of foreign authorities).
154. See Extradition Act §§ 21-22 (Can.).
155. The rule of specialty provides that a fugitive who has been surrendered for extradition may
not be prosecuted by the requesting state for an offense committed before his or her surrender, other than
the offense for which he or she was surrendered, without the consent of the surrendering state. See Extra-
dition Act § 33 (Can.); McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. at 526-28; R. v. Parisien [1988] 1 S.C.R. 950, 956-57
(Can.).
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between Canada and foreign states requires that some measure of respect be
accorded the fairness of the different rules of a foreign criminal justice sys-
tem,157 and it should be presumed (subject to cogent evidence to the contrary)
that foreign states will honor their treaty obligations.
Moreover, the courts also must exhibit a degree of trust in the Minis-
ter's willingness to protect fugitives' interests.'58 The Minister is entitled to a
certain leeway in making surrender decisions. It should be presumed (and,
for the most part, experience indicates) that Canada will not negotiate an ex-
tradition treaty with a foreign state if it has no confidence in the integrity of
the foreign state's criminal justice system. 5 9 This presumption should, of
course, be subject to rebuttal in individual cases on the basis of cogent evi-
dence. Some states do have dubious human rights records. Although there
have been few actual cases involving such states, it is not difficult to imagine
a scenario that would present Canadian courts with a serious dilemma."6° Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada has not developed clear guidelines
to distinguish the cases in which intervention is warranted from those in
which it is not.
7. Executive Discretion Not to Extradite or to Require Assurances
An additional factor in favor of a residual threshold standard of review
is the existence of executive discretion not to extradite a fugitive or to re-
quire assurances from the requesting state. Within the framework of existing
extradition treaties, the Canadian Government habitually reserves the right
not to extradite a fugitive in particular circumstances. 6 ' The right may be
exercised in cases in which the Canadian Government has lost confidence in
156. The rule of double criminality provides that a fugitive may not be surrendered for extradition
unless the offense for which extradition is sought is a crime in both the requesting state and the state from
which extradition is sought. See Washington v. Johnson [1988] 1 S.C.R. 327, 340 (Can.).
157. See United States v. Manno [1997] 112 C.C.C.3d 544, 559 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), leave to
appeal refused, [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.). This is especially important, given that extradition is
treaty-based. See Zingre v. R. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392, 409-10 (Can.).
158. See R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 522-23 (Can.); Doyer v. Downs (Juge) [1992] 51
Q.A.C. 1, 11 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Doyer [1993] 4
S.C.R. 497 (Can.). The Canadian executive is presumed to have acted in accordance with the Constitution.
See Slaight Communications, Inc. v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1079-80 (Can.). Of course, this
presumption is rebuttable.
159. See Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 522-24. Canada has fewer extradition treaties with a nar-
rower range of states than does the United States.
160. See, e.g., Mexico v. Hurley [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 414 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (involving extra-
dition of Canadian citizen to Mexico); see also Canada (M.E.I.) v. Satiacum [1989] 99 N.R. 171, 176
(Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (stating that "[iun the case of a nondemocratic state, contrary evidence [to the assump-
tion of a fair and independent judicial process] might be readily forthcoming").
161. For recent examples of Canadian practice, see Extradition Treaty, Mar. 19, 1996, Can.-
Switz., art. 3, 1996 Can. T.S. No. 15; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 29, 1995, Can.-S. Korea, art. 4, 1995
Can. T.S. No. 22; Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 1, 1991, Can.-Neth., art. 5, 1991 Can. T.S. No. 32;
Treaty of Extradition, Nov. 12, 1990, Can.-Phil., art. 4, 1990 Can. T.S. No. 36; Treaty of Extradition,
supra note 120, art. 4; and Treaty of Extradition, May 31, 1989, Can.-Spain, art. 4, 1990 Can. T.S. No.
39.
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the general condition of the requesting state's criminal justice system because
of recent events in that state. 62 The decision not to extradite also may be re-
lated more directly to the individual case. 63 The ministerial discretion to ref-
use to surrender a fugitive is not merely a paper tiger. Although it never has
been invoked,"6 this may be because Canada has not entered into extradition
treaties with states that it feels would not accord an extradited fugitive fair
treatment or that have failed to provide sufficient assurances on the basis of
which the executive may surrender a fugitive. 65 More use probably could be
made of assurances in the extradition process, 1" although it remains an open
question whether such assurances would satisfy Charter requirements. 
16
162. The danger that political circumstances may have changed in the requesting state has been
noticed in the immigration and refugee context. See Cheema v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1991] 15 Immig. L.R.2d
117, 120-21 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.) (finding deportee entitled to hearing to present claims that return
would violate section 7 rights due to changing political circumstances); see also Hughes, supra note 72, at
319 (stating that "courts would no longer accept the mere existence of a treaty as an indication of a coun-
try's integrity when evidence to the contrary exists"). At the same time, however, the mere fact that the
government of a foreign state has been replaced is insufficient in itself to enable a fugitive to advance such
an argument. Courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States were faced with this issue in
the context of extradition or rendition of fugitives to Hong Kong in the months leading up to the transfer of
sovereignty to the People's Republic of China. In each case, the fugitive contended that if he were extra-
dited and convicted upon his return, he would be forced to serve his sentence under Chinese rule, despite
the fact that China does not have an extradition treaty with any of the three extraditing states. In each case,
the argument was dismissed as speculative. See United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997);
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] 1 W.L.R. 839 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.);
Chan c. Directrice de ]a Maison Tanguay [1996] R.J.Q. 335 (Que. Super. Ct.) (Can.), aftd, [1996] 113
C.C.C.3d 270 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), Leave to appeal refused, [1997] 114 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.). The logical
consequence of such an argument, of course, would eventually be to suspend or terminate the extradition
treaty when the Canadian Government felt that the foreign state was no longer a suitable extradition part-
ner. See RFSrATvmENT, supra note 104, § 477 (stating that extradited person will not be given punishment
more severe than that provided by applicable law at time of extradition request).
163. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 837 (Can.) (holding that
extradition of fugitive to United States for murder is not arbitrary); United States v. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R.
564, 572-73 (Can.) (holding that surrender of fugitives should not infringe on fundamental justice); Ar-
gentina v. Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 555-58 (Can.) (holding that decision to extradite is compatible
with principles of fundamental justice).
164. There have been no known Canadian cases in which such discretion has been exercised. Cf.
Kester, supra ncte 145, at 1481 (suggesting that there are no known U.S. cases).
165. See Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 558-59 (finding that executive is able to obtain sufficient as-
surances from foreign country to ensure compliance with requirements of fundamental justice); Hurley
[1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 423-26 (discussing surrender of fugitive to face trial in Mexico on basis of assu r-
ances by Mexican government).
166. Many commentators advocate a much greater use of assurances. See, e.g., Shea, supra note
118, at 126-27.
167. See Barrera v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 99 D.L.R.4th 264, 279 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (sug-
gesting that assurances would be sufficient); Gervasoni v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1996] 72 B.C.A.C.
141, 25-29 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (same), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 2 S.C.R. vii (Can.); Garcia v.
Canada (Minister of Justice) [1997] F.C.J. No. 453, 30 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.) (same); DesFoss~s v.
Canada (Minister of Justice) [1996] F.C.J. No. 1325, 46 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.) (same). The Ontario
Court of Appeal recently expressed concern that the Minister of Justice should receive assurances from the
requesting state in a formal, final, and written form before the Minister surrenders the fugitive. See Chong
v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1996] 91 O.A.C. 319, 320 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused,
[1997] 99 O.A.C. 79 (Can.). Also, where a federal state seeks extradition, there may be some issue as to
the value of assurances given by the government of a sub-federal unit. The federal government of the fo r-
eign state may, as a matter of its own domestic law, be unable to provide (or enforce) such assurances even
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Nevertheless, the determination of whether assurances are necessary or ap-
propriate in a given case is one for the executive. In the absence of demon-
strated bad faith, these executive decisions should be afforded considerable
deference. A requesting state is unlikely to renege on assurances provided to
the Canadian Government concerning individual fugitives, because this
would risk disruption of the extradition relationship between the two
states. "t
I. TREATMENT OF THE FUGITIVE IN THE REQUESTING STATE
A. Introduction
Although there are strong arguments in favor of the residual threshold
standard, it is not yet clear how it should be applied. In a series of cases,
16 9
the Supreme Court of Canada adumbrated some general principles, but their
implementation has proven remarkably problematic. This difficulty in appli-
cation is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the residual threshold stan-
dard. The lower courts have interpreted Schmidt as establishing a relatively
high threshold for judicial interference with executive surrender decisions.'
It seems clear that subsequent cases have not altered the Schmidt test.' The
central question remains: How should Canadian courts determine whether
foreign punishment or treatment that falls short of torture violates section 7
of the Charter? The Supreme Court in Schmidt, Kindler, and Ng identified
several factors for consideration, upon which the judges favoring surrender
for extradition at the court of appeal level in Jamieson I, Ross, and Whitley
relied. They are discussed in turn.
though it is nominally the requesting state for the purposes of the extradition treaty. This issue was ad-
dressed in Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 69, at 28 (1989). See also Ronan Do-
herty, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal Law Implicates Federal Responsibility
Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REv. 1281 (1996) (discussing how federal allocation of jurisdiction
creates difficulties in extradition cases).
168. See Hurley [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at 426.
169. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.); In re Ng Extradi-
tion [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Can.); United States v. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564 (Can.); R. v. Schmidt
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (Can,).
170. See Soffitt v. United States [1993] 36 B.C.A.C. 155 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (denying habeas
corpus application); United States v. Langlois [1989] 50 C.C.C.3d 445 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (holding fugi-
tive could not demonstrate that he had been subject to harassment in foreign state so oppressive that his
surrender would violate principles of fundamental justice); United States v. Vanasse [1995] O.J. No. 3666
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (assessing fitness of fugitive to stand trial). But see United States v. Turner [1992]
75 C.C.C.3d 150 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (quashing extradition due to violation of fugitive's section 7
rights).
171. See supra notes 7-10.
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B. Difficulty in Applying the "Shocks the Conscience" and "Simply Unac-
ceptable" Tests
The existing tests for determining whether courts should intervene to
quash a ministerial surrender decision in extradition cases are unsatisfactory.
The "shocks the conscience" or "simply unacceptable" formulations are
merely attempts to articulate a form of the residual threshold standard.172 The
test as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada is not wrong, but its articu-
lation is awkward. Thus, the rhetorical power of the existing tests is out-
weighed by their lack of precision and clouded by their apparent reference to
subjective considerations."n The majority judges' post-Schmidt cases ex-
pressed displeasure with the section 7 tests set out by the Supreme Court of
Canada on the grounds that they are vague and difficult to apply. These tests
have variously been called criminal penalties or proceedings that are "simply
unacceptable,"174 would "sufficiently shock the conscience," or "offend
against the basic demands of justice."175 Of course, the Supreme Court did
attempt to flesh out these more general tests by reference to specific factors,
which are examined in this Section.
In a pluralistic country such as Canada, concepts of criminal sentencing
such as "shocking," "outrageous," or "unacceptably harsh" are often too
ambiguous, subjective, or controversial to be of much use. The difficulty
with the existing tests is best demonstrated by the conflicting decisions in the
Jamieson case itself. In Jamieson I, two judges found that Michigan's man-
datory minimum sentence did not "shock the conscience," whereas one dis-
senting judge stated that it did.176 Conversely, in Jamieson II, two judges
172. The origin of the "shocks the conscience" test is unclear; no authority is provided for it in
Schmidt. The test appears to originate in the Frankfurter-Black incorporation debate in the United States
over whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had the effect of applying the Bill of
Rights to the states. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states. Thus, the
Court had to decide whether a more limited set of "fundamental rights" contained in the Bill of Rights
should apply to the states; they determined that it did. The test adopted by the Court for the purpose of d e-
termining whether a fundamental right had been violated by state action was whether the violation "shocks
the conscience." See id. at 172; id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring). The test was much criticized, and the
U.S. Supreme Court abandoned it when it later reversed itself and applied the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710-
11 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, it is strange that the Supreme Court of Canada should adopt this language. This
Article takes the position that for the present purposes, the problem with the "shocks the conscience" test is
that it is imprecise, not that it embodies the principle that the scope of constitutional rights can vary ac-
cording to the particular context at issue.
173. But see Klndler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 850 ("In determining whether, bearing all these factors in
mind, the extradition in question is 'simply unacceptable,' the judge must avoid imposing his or her own
subjective views on the matter, and seek rather to objectively assess the attitudes of Canadians on the issue
of whether the fugitive is facing a situation which is shocking and fundamentally unacceptable to our soci-
ety.")
174. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 572 (Can.).
175. R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 522 (Can.).
176. See Jaiieson I [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 467 (Que. C.A.) (Can.); id. at 473-75 (Proulx, J.,
dissenting).
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found that the mandatory minimum sentencing regime in Michigan "shocks
the conscience" and was "unacceptable," whereas the third judge dis-
sented. 
177
This does not mean that there never could be a foreign penalty that
would be sufficiently outrageous or disproportionate to meet the test. But if
reasonable people-and more particularly, appellate court judges-could
disagree about its nature, then the foreign penalty could not properly be said
to "shock the conscience." The majority in Ross, like Justice La Forest in
Schmidt, identified torture as an example of an unequivocably unacceptable
punishment. The Ross court held, however, that the torture example demon-
strated that "it must be a clear case on which there is unanimity, or some-
thing very close to it" in order to ground a finding of "shocking the con-
science. " "' These difficulties emphasize the need for more objective factors
to demonstrate the incontrovertible nature of the "shock." To some extent,
international human rights law provides a more objective footing upon which
to establish such factors. As seen below, however, it provides few useful
guidelines for a proportionality analysis.
The minority position, represented by Justice Proulx dissenting in
Jamieson I, Justice Lambert dissenting in Ross, and the majority in Jamieson
II, was that it would shock the conscience, be simply unacceptable, or be
fundamentally unjust to extradite the fugitives to face the foreign mandatory
minimum sentencing regimes for the respective offenses.179 Although these
judges did not adopt a test different from that of the majority, they reached
contrary results, giving their views the appearance of being subjective and
impressionistic. In Ross, Justice Finch noted that although in applying the
tests judges purport to ascribe the views therein to a majority of Canadian
citizens, "[oin my reading of the cases it seems to come down to a question
177. See Jamieson II [1994] 93 C.C.C.3d 265 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), rev'd, Canada (Minister of
Justice) v. Jamieson [1996] 1 S.C.R. 465 (Can.); see also Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 856 (McLachlin, J.,
concurring). Justice McLachlin compared the decision by the European Commission of Human Rights in
Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, in which extradition to the United States to face the death penalty was per-
mitted, to that of the European Court in Soering, in which extradition was refused, to illustrate "the com-
plexity of the issue" and to support a deferential judicial stance towards executive extradition decisions. See
Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 856. Professor Schabas is right to criticize Justice McLachlin's use of the
European Convention jurisprudence here: Soering overruled Kirkwood. But the inconsistency that Justice
McLachlin identified is not irrelevant, as Professor Schabas argues. See Schabas, supra note 86, at 922
n.69. The very fact that the Commission could come to the opposite result in a reasoned decision illustrates
that extradition to face the death penalty is not "beyond the pale" or "shocking" in the same way that e x-
tradition to face torture would be. See Altun v. Germany, App. No. 10308/83, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611
(1983) (Commission report) (discussing risk of torture to which fugitive may be subjected if extradited to
Turkey). In any event, the inconsistencies between the results and reasoning in the two Jamieson cases
cannot be explained away in the same manner: The same court (the Quebec Court of Appeal) decided both
cases.
178. United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 372 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.).
179. See Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 359 (Lambert, J., dissenting); Jamieson II [1994] 93
C.C.C.3d at 265; Jamieson I [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d at 474-75 (Proulx, J., dissenting).
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of whether the judges are shocked, outraged, or find unacceptable the for-
eign law or sentencing regime. " "'
Another unsettled issue is the role that public opinion should play in the
determination of whether surrender for extradition would "shock the con-
science" or be "simply unacceptable." Both the majority and minority judges
attempted to support their decisions by reference to public opinion, as the
Supreme Court had done in Kindler.I"1 In his dissenting opinion in Kindler,
Justice Sopinka expressed concern that "[p]rinciples of fundamental justice
not be limited by public opinion of the day.""ea This is certainly a valid con-
cern. ' 3 Justice Sopinka's approach suggests that he would resist a public
opinion-based definition of "shock the conscience," although it is unclear
what he would propose as a substitute."s The more plausible explanation,
however, is that the majority of the Kindler Court invoked public and legis-
lative opinion merely as evidence to demonstrate that the foreign sentence in
the circumstances was not "incontrovertibly shocking."
The existing "shock the conscience" and "simply unacceptable" stan-
dards are too vague to be useful. The better approach is to establish a high
threshold so that conduct must be "incontrovertibly shocking" for a ministe-
rial surrender order to be quashed. As suggested above, this minimal base-
line may be established by reference to international human rights law." 5 At
present, this baseline would be limited to a few incontrovertible proposi-
tions, such as the prohibitions against torture, slavery, inhumane prison con-
ditions, unfair trials, and discrimination. These are the "core of elementary
human rights ... ."11 The category of "incontrovertibly shocking" punish-
ments is not complete. As new international conventions arise, and interna-
tional opinion and practice solidifies into customary international law, the
180. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 371 (emphasis added).
181. See Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 832, 852; see also United States v. Whitley [1994] 119
D.L.R.4th 693, 713 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) ("I do not think that the majority of reasonably well-informed Ca-
nadians would find that the appellant faces a situation in the State of New York that shocks the conscience
or that is simply unacceptable."); Jamieson I [1994] 93 C.C.C.3d at 284 ("In short, it is my view that the
majority of (though of course not all) reasonably well-informed Canadians would consider that appellant
faces a situation in Michigan that shocks the conscience and is simply unacceptable.").
182. Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 791 (Sopinka, J., dissenting); see also Ross [1994] 119
D.L.R.4th at 344 (Lambert, J., dissenting) (stating that assessment of Canadian public opinion "is not a
matter for polls").
183. See Klinck, supra note 71, at 206-07.
184. Perhaps Justice Sopinka had in mind something similar to the test for exclusion of evidence
under section 24 of the Charter, which seeks to avoid bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.
See R. v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 280-88 (Can.). Note that the threshold is not the same in the two
situations. Collins indicates a lower threshold for the exclusion of evidence than the "shock the conscience"
standard in extradition cases.
185. See Chan v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, 635 (Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting)
("The essential question is whether the persecution alleged by the claimant threatens his or her basic human
rights in a fundamental way .... Such rights transcend subjective and parochial perspectives and extend
beyond national boundaries.").
186. Theo Vogler, The Scope of Extradition in Light of the European Convention on Human
Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 663, 668 (Franz Matscher & Herbert
Petzold eds., 1988).
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category will grow, and the protection afforded to fugitives gradually will
increase.
Amanda Spencer has contended that the current tests under section 7
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada are too vague and imprecise to pro-
vide workable guidelines."S She proposes instead that the content of section
7 rights afforded to a fugitive should be explained by reference to the rights
enumerated in sections 8-14 of the Charter. In this way, she argues, the
rather ethereal concepts of "shock the conscience" and "simply unaccept-
able" can be brought down to earth and given form. But even she acknowl-
edges that a fugitive facing extradition would not enjoy the full protections of
sections 8-14. The Court's standard of review would have to be "modified
somewhat to reflect the international context of extradition cases.""' She
does not explain, however, exactly how this process of "modification"
should take place. Presumably, more leeway would have to be given the
modifying words in sections 8-14. For example, what is "reasonable"' or
"arbitrary""9 in the domestic sphere might not be so in the extradition con-
text. 191
Spencer is of course right to point to sections 8-14 of the Charter as
more specific indicia of what Canadians consider to be the elements of fun-
damental justice under section 7. The residual threshold standard demands
that fugitives not be accorded the full protections of sections 8-14 on a do-
mestic level. Denying a fugitive full rights under sections 8-14 does not
mean throwing him or her to the wolves, however. Canadian judges can,
when possible, look to international human rights standards, many of which
are similar to, indistinguishable from, or even the basis of rights under sec-
tions 8-14. Although this distinction may seem academic, it only emphasizes
the point that some Charter rights overlap with international human rights
law norms, while others do not.
Section 7 review is guided by a number of factors, the most important
of which are sections 8-14, international and comparative law, and the
common law."9 The key concern is to dispel the notion of Charter univer-
187. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 79.
188. Id.; see also Etats-Unis c. Tavormina [1996] R.J.Q. 693, 707 (Que. C.S.) (Can.) (stating
that sections 8-14 of Charter are inapplicable to extradition proceedings), aff'd on other grounds, [1996]
112 C.C.C.3d 563 (Que. C.A.) (Can.).
189. Charter §§ 8, 11(a), 11(b), 11(e).
190. Charter § 9.
191. See Kindler v. Canada [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 844 (Can.) (McLachlin, J.) ("While our con-
ceptions of what constitutes a fair criminal law are important to the process of extradition, they are nece s-
sarily tempered by other considerations.").
192. This does not mean that rights under sections 8-14 are subsumed under section 7. See In re
ss. 193 & 195.1 of the Criminal Code (Man.) [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, 1178 (Can.) (stating that it is neither
wise nor necessary to subsume all other rights in Charter under section 7). Section 7 may provide a sort of
"residual protection" to the interests that otherwise would be protected by a specific right under sections 8-
14. See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Director of Investigation & Research [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 537
(Can.). On the application of the more flexible criteria of section 7 where section 11 does not apply, see R.
v. Shubley [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, 23-24 (Can.).
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salism. Important rights exist independently of the Charter, international
human rights law being a prime example. In many cases, these rights may
overlap or merge into existing Charter rights. The protection granted by
many Charter rights is in most cases greater than that required under inter-
national human rights law. 93 The standard for some Charter rights may be
set at a level closer to the more minimal requirements of international law.
In the extradition situation, the pressing needs of a functioning extradition
system may provide the proper context for the determination of the rights of
fugitives and suggest that those rights are best set at a level that corresponds
to an international, rather than a purely domestic, standard.
C. Procedural Elements of Review
1. Degree of Scrutiny of Foreign Law and Evidence of Human Rights
Violations in the Requesting State
To exercise judicial review of the ministerial discretion to surrender a
fugitive for extradition, courts must examine foreign criminal justice systems
to see how the fugitive would be treated.' 94 This surely will result in a cer-
tain degree of expense and delay. 95 Moreover, there are also concerns about
the negative implications of evaluating the "fairness" of a foreign legal sys-
tem, although these concerns are easily exaggerated. That said, there is no
viable alternative to conducting such an examination; otherwise, the court
will have adopted a de facto rule of non-inquiry. Once the decision has been
made to examine the conditions that the fugitive might face in the requesting
state, the real question becomes what the standard of review should be for
this narrow purpose.
Courts are already familiar with the need to examine foreign legislation
in the extradition context.'96 Indeed, some courts have indicated that they
would refuse to permit surrender of a fugitive for extradition where foreign
law was not complied with, although perhaps this is going too far."9 The
193. See Slaight Communications, Inc. v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056 (Can.).
194. This would likely take place by way of an affidavit of an expert witness. See, e.g., Chan c.
Directrice de ]a Maison Tanguay [1996] 113 C.C.C.3d 270, 300-02 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal
refused, [1997] 114 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.). In that case, a fugitive sought to adduce evidence that her
extradition to Hong Kong on a murder charge would violate section 7 of the Charter and section 16 of the
Fugitive Offenders Act, in part because the transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese control after July 1, 1997
would imperil her rights. The court allowed evidence to be presented on the point but was of the view that
the fugitive had not met her burden of proof. On a habeas corpus application concerning extradition, a
court may hear expert evidence by affidavit on the law and practice of a friendly foreign state to determine
whether that state has a law or practice constituting cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v.
Berladyn (No. 1) [1992] 14 B.C.A.C. 302, 303 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.).
195. See United States v. McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, 528-29 (Can.) (stating that extradition
judge must not examine foreign law).
196. See McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. at 514.
197. See United States v. Knox [1995] 28 W.C.B.2d 362 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (holding that
Charter protects fugitive from being surrendered to face sentence that is illegal under foreign law). This
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majority judges at the court of appeal in Jamieson I, Ross, and Whitley were
prepared to examine foreign law. But, as the Supreme Court had admonished
in Kindler,19 they were careful not merely to apply Charter norms directly to
the foreign sentencing regimes. Clearly, the standard of review is a crucial
consideration.
The court of appeal judges who held that surrender for extradition was
unconstitutional undertook a more intrusive examination of the foreign case
law to determine how the foreign sentencing regimes were likely to apply to
the fugitives. Justice Proulx's review of Michigan state law in Jamieson I led
him to the conclusion that there were no factors in the case amounting to
"substantial and compelling reasons" under Michigan law that would enable
a Michigan court to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence.' This
indicates, perhaps not surprisingly, that the more deeply the court delves into
the details of foreign law, the more the foreign legal system is likely to ap-
pear different and, in many cases, incompatible with Charter norms. Moreo-
ver, one wonders how far Canadian courts should go in coming to their own
determinations as to how foreign courts would apply foreign law, particu-
larly in an area of law as complicated and dependent upon a range of factors
as sentencing.' This is not to say that there will not be a few clear cases
that warrant intervention by the courts. But Canadian courts should have a
healthy skepticism about their own abilities to navigate the intricacies of for-
eign law. 2 '
Some degree of evaluation of foreign law by courts engaging in judicial
review of ministerial surrender decisions is unavoidable, 2a albeit likely on a
different standard than that employed in a purely domestic context. Justice
La Forest indicated in Schmidt that in the extradition context, "judicial inter-
vention must be limited to cases of real substance." 2 3 A better understanding
of what it might mean to look at the foreign criminal justice system "as a
whole" can be gained by examining a U.S. case, United States ex rel.
Bloomfield v. Gengler.2' U.S. citizens were charged in Canada for conspir-
acy to import, export, and traffic in hashish. The case against them was dis-
missed at trial. Although the Crown appealed with the full knowledge of the
defendants, they returned to the United States. The Crown's appeal was al-
seems to be an anomalous decision, according to the logic of McVey. See McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. at 528
(holding that courts are not to receive evidence of foreign law).
198. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 844-45 (Can.).
199. See Jamieson 1 [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 473 (Que. C.A.) (Can.).
200. See R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 533-34 (Wilson, J., concurring). Similarly, in con-
flict of laws cases, there seems to be an increasing tendency to regard the fact that a cause of action or case
will be governed by foreign law as one reason to stay proceedings in favor of trial abroad according to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Agnew [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 585
(Eng. C.A.); Charm Maritime, Inc. v. Kyriakou [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 433 (Eng. C.A.).
201. See United States v. LUpine [1994] 1 S.C.R. 286, 296 (Can.); McVey [1992] 3 S.C.R. at
528-29.
202. See James W. O'Reilly, Case Comment, Ng and Kindler, 37 McGiLL L.J. 873, 885 (1992).
203. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 523.
204. United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
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lowed and a conviction entered against the defendants in their absence. At
the instigation of Canadian authorities, the defendants were arrested in the
United States, and the Canadian Government then sought their extradition.
The fugitives sought to resist extradition to Canada on the grounds that
the Canadian legislation that allowed the Crown to appeal from an acquittal
at trial did not accord with U.S. law.2 5 The court held that although the cir-
cumstances of the case bore an initial resemblance to conviction in absentia,
on closer examination it was apparent that the defendants voluntarily had
chosen to leave Canada before the final resolution of the case against them.
The court conceded that there might be situations in which extradition would
offend its sense of decency but ruled that this was not such a case.2 's Gengler
illustrates that U.S. courts have determined that extradition will be allowed
even where the requesting state's criminal justice system differs from the
domestic one, so long as the court is confident that the fugitive will receive a
fair trial in the requesting state. The lesson for Canadian courts is that a
"fair trial" need not be identical to a domestic one. A foreign trial may be
fair even though its procedural rules deviate from Canadian constitutional
norms.
207
2. What Must the Fugitive Demonstrate?
The residual threshold standard necessarily entails a debate over the
proper evidentiary threshold that the fugitive must surmount to invoke suc-
cessfully the aid of the court. Once the courts indicate that there are circum-
stances in which they are prepared to intervene, the question arises as to
what a fugitive must demonstrate to place his or her case within the residual
category. Too low a threshold risks submerging the courts in a sea of
meritless applications for judicial review; too high a threshold is blind to the
reality that the fugitive has been assigned a task that is almost inevitably
speculative.
The willingness of the European Court in Soering to advance a doctrine
that would enable it to quash surrender decisions where a fugitive faces ob-
jectionable treatment or punishment abroad required it to define the circum-
stances in which such discretion would be exercised.2 8 A court exercising
review of a surrender decision makes a prospective determination of the risk
205. C. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 279-84 (1969) (discussing Crown's ability
to appeal from acquittal).
206. Cf. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that extradition of person con-
victed in absentia did not violate federal court's sense of decency).
207. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 845 (Can.) ("We require a
limited but not absolute degree of similarity between our laws and those of the reciprocating state."); Zin-
gre v. R. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392, 408 (Can.) ("One should be wary of analysing the Swiss judicial system
using our model.").
208. Regrettably, some commentators who advocate an expanded role for the judiciary in extradi-
tion cases sidestep this issue. See Quigley, supra note 142, at 1222 n.65.
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that the fugitive faces in the requesting state,2 and the prospective nature of
the exercise compounds the already difficult task facing the court.210 What
degree of risk must the fugitive establish-certainty, likelihood, a possibil-
ity? The Soering court was satisfied with a "substantial grounds" test.
21'
John Pak, however, advocates a "certainty" test, although it becomes a
"likely" test at points in his discussion.
212
The fugitive's burden of proof is important for another reason: If the
fugitive discharges the burden, he or she will have established a nexus be-
tween the action of the Canadian Government in surrendering a fugitive for
extradition and the actions of the government of the requesting state in sub-
jecting the fugitive to punishment. The Supreme Court of Canada in Kindler
contended that section 12 of the Charter has no application to judicial review
of ministerial surrender decisions because "the effect of any Canadian law or
government act is too remote from the possible imposition of the penalty
complained of to attract the attention of s. 12."213 Thus, the question of re-
moteness is intimately connected with questions of state responsibility and
Charter application. It is essential, therefore, that a fugitive be required to
demonstrate a sufficient level of certainty that he or she will face a constitu-
tionally objectionable form of treatment or punishment in the requesting state
in order to implicate both Canada's responsibility on the international plane
and the application of the Charter at the domestic level.
What, then, must the fugitive demonstrate? On the one hand, it seems
unlikely (except in cases where he or she has already been convicted in the
requesting state but has fled and is sought by the requesting state for pun-
ishment) that a fugitive will be able to demonstrate that it is "certain" that he
or she will face objectionable treatment or punishment. On the other hand,
something more than the mere "possibility" of facing such treatment or
punishment should be required to allay causation and remoteness concerns.
The immigration context supplies a helpful analogy: Canadian courts have
interpreted the "well-founded fear of persecution" test to determine whether
an individual is a Convention refugee.2"4 A "well-founded fear of persecu-
209. Cases where the fugitive has already been convicted abroad, and is being sought by the re-
questing state for punishment, may present fewer difficulties, but even then many questions remain.
210. See Chan v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593,618-19 (Can.).
211. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91, at 35 (1989).
212. See John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assur-
ance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239, 273 (1993) ("Only where the fugitives' return to the United
States would likely result in the imposition and execution of the death penalty, would such extradition vio-
late the Charter.").
213. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 846. There is nothing wrong
with such an approach in theory, but it may be simply too weak in its application. At the very least, it begs
the question of when the penalty would not be too remote. On this point, see Pak, supra note 212, at 259,
which asks: "Would the degree of physical proximity or degree of exigency determine the required re-
moteness necessary to trigger Section 12's constitutional protection?"
214. The Federal Court of Appeal interpreted "well-founded fear" to mean a "reasonable chance"
in Adjei v. Canada (M.E.L) [1989] 57 D.L.R.4th 153 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.). Thus, an individual claiming
refugee status need not demonstrate a probability (more than 50% likelihood) of persecution but need only
establish (on a balance of probabilities) that there is a reasonable chance of persecution. See Ponniah v.
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tion" test also would be appropriate in the extradition context.215 Such an ap-
proach would dovetail with the test adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Chan,21 6 in which the Court held that a claimant must demonstrate a "se-
rious possibility" of persecution in the foreign state in order to resist depor-
tation there.217 The Supreme Court of Canada has used similar language in
addressing anticipated violations of the Charter more generally.2 8
The fugitive will not satisfy the burden of proof merely by reciting evi-
dence of isolated human rights violations in the requesting state, if only be-
cause no state in the world has a spotless human rights record. The more
democratic the government of the requesting state, the more difficult the fu-
gitive's task. Moreover, the risk of which the fugitive complains must exist
at the time of surrender for extradition, not merely at some earlier point.219
3. Application of Section 12 of the Charter
In Kindler, the Supreme Court of Canada took the controversial view
that section 12 of the Charter' does not apply to judicial review of ministe-
rial decisions in extradition cases."' The Kindler Court denied that section
12 applied to the treatment that a fugitive would face in the requesting state
after surrender for extradition because any such punishment would not be
Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 32 N.R. 32, 34 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (explaining Adjei test as requiring something
more than minimal possibility but not as high as a greater-than-50% probability); see also Chichmanov v.
Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] F.C.J. No. 832 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (applying Ponniah standard). The Adjei court
rejected the "substantial grounds for thinking" test adopted by the Law Lords in R. v. Secretary ofStatefor
the Home Dep't [1988] 1 All E.R. 193, 198 (H.L.) (Eng.). Note, however, that the Supreme Court of
Canada in Chan seems to have preferred this latter "serious possibility" test to the "reasonable possibility"
standard set forth in Adjei, see Chan [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 659, although a close reading of Sivakumar v.
Canada (M.C.L) [1996] 2 F.C. 872 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) indicates that the two tests are probably the same.
215. See INTERNATIONAL LAw ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SIXm CONFERENCE 158-59 (1994).
216. See Chan [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 659 (holding that appellant seeking status as Convention refu-
gee must demonstrate well-founded fear of persecution stemming from political opinion or membership in
particular social group).
217. Similarly, in Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), the European
Court of Human Rights observed: "The question remains whether the extradition of a fugitive to another
State where he would be subjected or be likely to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment would itself engage the responsibility of a Contracting State under Article 3." Id. 88,
at 34 (emphasis added). By comparison, article 3 of the Torture Convention requires " substantial grounds
for believing that [the fugitive] would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, art. 3, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (emphasis added).
218. See Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Comm'n of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy) [1995] 124
D.L.R.4th 129, 174 (Can.) (equating test of "high degree of probability" with that of "real and substantial
risk" and observing that "relief will only be granted in circumstances where the claimant is able to prove
that there is a sufficiently serious risk that the alleged violation [of a Charter right] will in fact occur").
219. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 83-86
(1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
220. Charter § 12 ("Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual punish-
ment or treatment.").
221. See, e.g., Ian Lee, La regle du ,tiers pays sar, au regard de l'article 12 d la charte can a-
dienne, 73 CAN. B. REV. 372, 377 (1994).
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imposed by the Canadian Government. 2 It thus rejected the approach to
state responsibility that the European Court of Human Rights had adopted in
Soering.
The court of appeal judges who found surrender for extradition uncon-
stitutional in Jamieson I, Ross, and Whitley argued that the mandatory mini-
mum sentences in question would not pass muster in Canada because they
would violate section 12 of the Charter.' In Jamieson H1, Justice Fish con-
tended that the Supreme Court in Kindler had determined that, although it
has no direct application to the ministerial surrender decision, section 12
provides guidance for determining appropriate standards under section 7,
which does apply to the surrender decision. He concluded that the foreign
punishment in Jamieson II was so excessive as to "shock the conscience"
and thus violate section 7. It is difficult, however, to distinguish this analysis
from the actual application of section 12 according to a domestic standard to
the extradition decision.
The essential problem faced by the majority in Kindler was this: The
court had indicated in previous decisions that section 7 and section 12 viola-
tions are almost impossible to uphold under section 1.224 Accordingly, the
majority could have adopted one of three interpretative strategies in deter-
mining whether the ministerial surrender decision in that case contravened
section 7, section 12, or both. First, the Court might have conceded that the
fugitive's section 7 and/or section 12 rights had been violated. According to
existing case law, this would, of course, effectively have precluded recourse
to section 1 and thus rendered surrender for extradition unconstitutional.
2
75
Given that the majority sought to uphold the constitutionality of surrender for
extradition in the circumstances, it saw two alternatives: either conclude that
section 12 and/or section 7 do not apply to extradition at all or conclude that
section 12 and/or section 7 must be defined contextually so that they are not
necessarily violated by surrender for extradition.
In the end, the Court combined the two strategies, finding that section
12 simply did not apply to extradition but defining section 7 in a contextual
fashion so that it was not violated by the surrender decision. This result was
both murky and unsatisfactory. The values embodied in section 12 cannot be
222. For example, Justices La Forest and McLachlin agreed in separate opinions that actions
taken by the United States do not implicate Canada in violations of section 12. See Kindler v. Canada
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 831 (La Forest, J., concurring); id. at 846 (McLachlin, J., concurring).
223. See R. v. Smith [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1061 (Can.) (discussing section 12 and relying upon
international human rights conventions to flesh out its meaning). The Smith test for review of sentences
under section 12 is one of "gross disproportionality." Id. at 1072-73.
224. Note, however, that in Smith [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 1079-81, Justice Lamer went through a
section 1 analysis. Although he concluded that the minimal impairment element of the Oakes test was not
satisfied, he did not indicate that a section 12 violation could never be upheld under section 1. Id. There
seems to be no inherent reason why violations of section 7 cannot be upheld under section I in appropriate
circumstances. See HEmRI BRtN & Guy TRMMLAY, DRorr CONSTVrtMONNEL 915 (2d ed. 1990). Admit-
tedly, the circumstances in which such violations could be upheld would be rare.
225. An argument based upon an international public interest rationale might be successful under
section 1. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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ignored because they infuse section 7226 and because the section 12 and sec-
tion 7 tests are practically indistinguishable. 7 The point advanced here is
simply that section 12 values are important, but that there are a number of
other factors to be considered under section 7 as well.' It would have been
preferable for the Kindler Court to have adopted a contextual approach to
section 12 as well as to section 7. According to this approach, section 7 and
section 12 both would apply to the surrender decision, but they would not
necessarily have been violated by it.
Instead, the Kindler majority was forced to contend that section 12 did
not apply to ministerial surrender decisions because the Charter does not
have extraterritorial effect. Needless confusion has resulted. First, strictly
speaking, it is not clear that the principle advanced by the Court is accurate.
The Supreme Court was careful to leave the question open in R. v. Harrer,229
and even Justice McLachlin's own opinion for the Court in the recent R. v.
Tery ° decision does not require such a conclusion. The more accurate
proposition is that the Charter does not govern the acts of foreign govern-
ments. Whether the Charter governs the acts of Canadian Government offi-
cials outside Canada is a distinct question that remains open, and there is
good reason to believe that the answer is yes, at least in certain circum-
stances.yl
226. See Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 847; In re The Constitutional Question Act [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, 487 (Can.) (holding that interpretation of "principles of fundamental justice" in section 7 must be in-
formed in part by section 12). It seems hard to imagine that a section 12 violation could ever be upheld u n-
der section 1, because "it is difficult to conceive of a penalty that is shocking to the conscience [section 7],
that would not also constitute cruel and unusual punishment [section 12]." LA FOREST, supra note 3, at
203; see also HOGO, supra note 150, at 35-38 (providing overview of rights protected by section 7). The
factors used to determine whether there has been a violation of section 12 bear a remarkable resemblance
to the section 7 test in the extradition context (e.g., (i) gravity of the offense; (ii) circumstances of the case;
(ili) personal characteristics of the offender; (iv) effect of the sentence on the offender). Thus, section 12
seems at least somewhat relevant to the section 7 inquiry. See United States v. Dibben [1996] A.Q. No.
1340, 26 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (Fish, J., concurring) (stating that section 12, although itself insufficient to
quash an extradition order, is relevant to a determination under section 7), leave to appeal refiused, [1996]
3 S.C.R. vii (Can.).
227. See Lee, supra note 221, at 383.
228. See Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 847; Donald K. Piragoff & Marcia V.J. Kran, The Impact of
Human Rights Principles on ETtradition from Canada and the United States: The Role of National Courts,
3 CRiM. L.F. 225, 252-53 (1992) (identifying several other values). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the principles of fundamental justice involve a balancing of a variety of societal and indi-
vidual interests. See, e.g., R. v. O'Connor [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411,458-59 (Can.).
229. [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, 570-71 (Can.).
230. [1996] S.C.R. 207 (Can.).
231. See Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General) [1996] 108 C.C.C.3d 208 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.)
(applying Charter to Canadian official's request to search Swiss banking documents), aff'd, [1997] 144
D.L.R.4th 711 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.), Leave to appeal granted, [1997] 149 D.L.R.4th vii (Can.); R. v. Cook
[1996] 112 C.C.C.3d 508, 520-21 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (applying Charter to interrogation by Canadian po-
lice officers of accused person in United States regarding offense committed in Canada), leave to appeal
granted, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.).
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Second, the extraterritoriality debate is a red herring."2 On the one
hand, it is clear that section 12 does not apply directly to the punishment that
would be inflicted by the requesting state because it would not be inflicted by
the Canadian Government. Yet at the same time, it cannot be denied that the
Canadian Government's decision to surrender a fugitive to face punishment
or treatment abroad gives rise to state responsibility in international law if
that treatment violates international human rights norms. This is the grava-
men of Soering.23" An administrative decision in Canada that foreseeably
leads to punishment or treatment abroad must be subject to Charter scrutiny.
The proper question is whether the acts performed in Canada by the
Canadian Government, such as ordering the surrender of a fugitive for ex-
tradition to face possible rights violations in the requesting state, constitute
punishment or treatment for the purposes of section 12. Despite the state-
ments of Justices McLachlin and La Forest on this point in Kindler, it is dif-
ficult to see how extradition to face such treatment is not itself treatment or
conduct imputable to the Canadian Government, at least where, as discussed
above,' the fugitive demonstrates a "serious possibility" that he faces such
treatment or conduct." How is it that section 12 is not implicated by the
surrender of a fugitive for extradition, but section 7 is? The extraterritorial-
ity and remoteness issues are identical."5 The real issue is whether section
12 applies as a domestic standard when the punishment or treatment is to be
rendered abroad, not whether section 12 applies at all.
Justice McLachlin's implicit assumption seems to have been that sec-
tion 12 concerns only the criminal process, and since extradition is not
strictly criminal in nature, section 12 consequently did not apply. But the
Supreme Court of Canada has on other occasions indicated that deportation
might be "treatment" for the purposes of section 12, 7 and a number of
232. See Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 799 (Cory, J., dissenting) (arguing that extradition decisions
are subject to Charter scrutiny despite problem of extraterritoriality); R. If Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500,
532-33 (Can.) (Wilson, J., concurring); Allan Manson, Kindler and the Courage to Deal with American
Convictions, 8 C.R.4th 68, 69-71 (1992) (arguing that extraterritoriality is not obstacle to enforcing Char-
ter).
233. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91, at 35 (1989).
234. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
235. See Mark Anthony Drurnbl, Canada's New Immigration Act: An Affront to the Charter and
Canada's Collective Conscience?, 24 R.D.U.S. 385, 402 (1994) (arguing that extraterritoriality is consis-
tent with Charter's purpose); Lee, supra note 221, at 376; Andr6 Morel, Les garanties en matitre de pro-
c6dure et depeines, in THE CANADiAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 12-1, 12-61 (G6rald-A. Beau-
doin & Errol Mendes eds., 3d ed. 1996).
236. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 14, at 241.
237. See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 608-12 (Can.). The lan-
guage that Justice Sopinka uses to describe deportation could apply equally to extradition. Though not pe-
nal in nature, deportation is the result of the enforcement of "a state administrative structure" so that "any
'treatment' was still within the bounds of the state's control over the individual within the system set up by
the state." Id. at 610; see also Chiarelli v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, 735 (Can.) (suggesting,
without deciding, that deportation might be included within definition of treatment).
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lower courts have followed suit. 38 Indeed, at least one lower court has pro-
ceeded on the basis that section 12 might apply to extradition, although it de-
clined to find a violation on the facts3 9 The European Court in Soering
framed the issue more appropriately by looking at the foreseeability of pun-
ishment or treatment abroad.?'
The operation of section 12 of the Charter in the context of a residual
threshold standard of review is a delicate matter. Even in purely domestic
cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has experienced some difficulty in
evaluating the constitutional status of mandatory minimum sentences under
section 12 of the Charter. In R. v. Smith," the Court adopted a test that
subjected mandatory minimum sentences to evaluation using a hypothetical
set of facts: If circumstances could be imagined in which the mandatory
minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate, it would not withstand
constitutional scrutiny. On this basis, the Court struck down a seven-year
sentence for importation of narcotics, even though on the facts of the case it
was difficult to identify gross disproportionality. The upshot of Smith's hy-
pothetical approach to constitutional adjudication was that few, if any, man-
datory minimum sentences could withstand constitutional challenge.
Perhaps troubled by this result, the Supreme Court backed away from
the Smith test in R. v. Goltz. 4' There, the Court upheld a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of seven days' imprisonment for driving while prohibited
from doing so. The Goltz Court indicated that the hypothetical test pro-
pounded in Smith must be based on facts that are "reasonable" and not "far
fetched." Thus, a sentencing provision should be struck down under section
238. See Sivakumar v. Canada (M.C.I.) [1996] 2 F.C. 872 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (stating that de-
portation of non-Convention refugee to state where he would face serious risk of harm presents "serious
issue" to be tried and may violate section 7 and/or section 12); Nguyen v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1993] 100
D.L.R.4th 151, 160 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (finding that deportation of refugee to face possible torture and
death would violate section 7 and probably section 12 as well); Grewal v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1991] 85
D.L.R.4th 166, 171 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (holding that deportation of permanent resident implicates section
7 rights without violating them); see also Barrera v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 99 D.L.R.4th 264, 273-79
(Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (stating that deportation of Convention refugee to homeland could violate section 12,
but section 7 not engaged); Hoang v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1990] 13 Immig. L.R.2d 35 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.)
(holding that deportation of Convention refugee does not engage section 7 rights but not addressing ques-
tion of whether deportation could be cruel and unusual "treatment" as opposed to "punishment"). But see
Canepa v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 93 D.L.R.4th 589 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (denying that deportation is pun-
ishment under either section 7 or section 12); Said v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1992] 91 D.L.R.4th 400, 407-08
(Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.) (denying that section 12 applies to deportation of non-Convention refugee claimant
to country of origin).
239. See Waddell v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1995] B.C.J. No. 2641 (B.C. Sup. Ct.) (Can.),
aff'd, Doc. Vancouver CA021408, Apr. 25, 1996 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3
S.C.R. xiv (Can.); see also R. v. Campbell [1996] 91 O.A.C. 204, 207-08 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to
appeal refused, [1997] 1 S.C.R. vi (Can.) (stating that Minister must be "alive" to section 12 of Charter
when making surrender decision).
240. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39-75, at 20-30 (1989) (ex-
amining potential treatment and punishment of fugitive if extradited to Virginia).
241. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (striking down seven-year minimum sentence for importing seven and
a half ounces of cocaine into Canada).
242. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (Can.) (holding that general test under section 12 is one of gross dis-
proportionality).
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12 only where its actual effects on the accused are grossly disproportionate
or where they would be so in reasonable hypothetical circumstances. 4 3 The
distinction between "disproportionate" and "grossly disproportionate" treat-
ment or punishment is an important one.2' Foreign mandatory minimum
sentences might be considered disproportionate but not grossly dispropor-
tionate. In domestic cases, appellate courts are to exercise a deferential stan-
dard of review in sentencing. In extradition cases, courts should grant a
greater margin of appreciation or deference to foreign legislative sentencing
decisions and practices.245
4. Procedural Due Process in the Requesting State
A court exercising judicial review of a ministerial surrender decision
must be satisfied that the fugitive will receive procedural due process in the
requesting state.246 Proportionality in sentencing is not often thought of as an
issue related to procedural fairness; indeed, it is viewed as the quintessential
example of substantive due process. 7 Nonetheless, a court exercising judi-
cial review of ministerial surrender decisions must examine the procedural
framework of the foreign criminal justice system in order to satisfy itself that
the fugitive will be treated fairly if extradited. If the fugitive can demonstrate
that he or she would not (or did not) receive a fair trial in the requesting
state, the court should quash the ministerial surrender order.
Again, there should be no doctrinal barrier to intervention by the
courts. The key issue is what constitutes a "fair trial" for this purpose. Re-
quiring Canadian domestic standards will not do. If foreign criminal justice
systems had to satisfy the specific procedural requirements of Canadian do-
mestic law, no fugitive could ever be extradited. The Soering Court indi-
cated that extradition should be refused when the fugitive would suffer a
"flagrant denial of a fair trial."24 Reference may be made to international
human rights law in order to specify what is meant by a "fair trial" in these
circumstances.249 Mere differences between the criminal procedure of the fo-
243. See id. at 505-06; Zachary v. Canada (Procureur G6nfral) [1996] R.J.Q. 2484, 2486 (Que.
C.A.) (Can.).
244. See R. v. Lyons [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 344-45 (Can.) (emphasizing that use of word
"grossly" in "grossly disproportionate" suggests more exacting standard).
245. See R. v. McDonnell [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, 966 (Can.) (holding that "in the absence of an
error of principle, fhilure to consider a relevant factor, or overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a se n-
tence should only be overturned if the sentence is demonstrably unfit"); R. v. M. (C.A.) [1996] 1 S.C.R.
500, 564-65, 567 (Can.) (stating that "courts of appeal must still exercise a margin of deference before
intervening in the specialized discretion that Parliament has explicitly vested in sentencing judges").
246. Thus, the majority judges in Jamieson II, Leon, Whitley, and Ross evaluated the procedural
protections that the fugitive would enjoy under the foreign legal system upon surrender for extradition.
247. See In re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 502-03 (Can.) (stating that sections
8 to 14 of Charter embody principles of fundamental justice beyond what could be characterized as "pro-
cedural").
248. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 113, at 45 (1989).
249. A similar approach was advocated in Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
rev'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
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rum and that of the requesting state will not amount to denial of a fair trial.
International human rights law, by contrast, establishes a floor below which
the criminal justice system of the requesting state may not fall."
A number of international human rights instruments, including the
1990 United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition,"sl address this question.
The Model Treaty was explicitly developed and adopted in the hope that it
would serve as a model for the future development of national legislation, as
well as bilateral and multilateral treaties. Although the Model Treaty has no
binding force,"s2 domestic courts may use it to inform domestic extradition
standards, particularly in the absence of other controlling domestic or inter-
national norms. Canadian courts faced with the otherwise daunting task of
applying broadly worded constitutional guarantees to specific contexts, such
as surrender for extradition, may find such sources particularly helpful.
A Canadian court must be prepared to entertain allegations by a fugi-
tive that he or she would not be accorded a fair trial in the requesting state,
or was subjected to an unfair trial if already convicted of the offense, as de-
termined by the following criteria, enunciated in international human rights
instruments:
(a) a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court;'
(b) the presumption of innocence;'
(c) the presence of the fugitive before the court (no extradition to face a
judgment imposed in absentia); 5
(d) nondiscrimination; 6
250. This Article does not suggest that domestic courts should apply international human rights
norms because they necessarily form part of domestic law. The distinction between domestic and interna-
tional law is not as rigid as it might appear at first, however. International law norms, either customary or
conventional, may prove useful as an interpretative tool when domestic courts are faced with the task of
articulating the scope of broadly worded domestic constitutional provisions. For further discussion of this
point, see Michell, supra note 53, at 386-87, 447. Of course, in some situations there may simply be no
applicable international norms, but this does not negate the general proposition that they should be invoked
when relevant.
251. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess., 68th mtg. Agenda Item 100, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/116
(Dec. 14, 1990), 30 I.L.M. 1407 (1991) [hereinafter Model Treaty].
252. Professor Quigley argues that the ICCPR and the Torture Convention, which the United
States ratified in 1994, are self-executing treaties with direct effect under U.S. federal law, with the result
that the traditional rule of non-inquiry adopted by U.S. federal courts in extradition cases should be aban-'
doned. See Quigley, supra note 142, at 1236-37. The argument made in this Article does not go this far,
because it is difficult to argue that the ICCPR and the Torture Convention have direct effect in Canadian
domestic law, although there can be little doubt that the drafting of the Charter was informed to a substan-
tial degree by the ICCPR and other international human rights instruments. This Article does argue, how-
ever, that the ICCPR and other unincorporated international human rights conventions can play an impor-
tant interpretative role in assisting domestic courts to articulate the scope of domestic constitutional guar-
antees. I have developed this argument at greater length elsewhere. See Michell, supra note 53, at 445-47.
253. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(1); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (II), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 10 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Model Treaty, supra note
251, arts. 3(0, 4(g).
254. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(2); UDHR, supra note 253, art. 11.
255. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(3); Model Treaty, supra note 251, art. 3(g).
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(e) protection against double jeopardy; z 7
(f) protection against undue prescription by passage of time or delay;s
(g) no retroactive application of criminal law. 9
These factors are internationally recognized as essential elements of
procedural fairness. When the fugitive can demonstrate that any one of these
elements would not be afforded him or her in the requesting state, courts can
quash surrender for extradition. In considering these claims, however, it is
important that the Canadian judiciary not mistake differences in foreign
criminal procedure with the absence of procedural fairness. Where the re-
questing state is a liberal democracy, the fugitive is likely to face an uphill
battle because he will be fighting a strong presumption of procedural ade-
quacy."
256. See Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec.
19, 1988, U.N. Doc. EICONF.82/15, art. 6(6), 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) (promulgating provision based upon
language of European Convention on Extradition); Model Treaty, supra note 251, art. 3(b); see also
ICCPR, supra note 83, arts. 3, 26 (stating equal right of men and women in enjoyment of civil and
political rights and that all persons are equal before the law). There may be some overlap between this
factor and the political offense exception. In a recent Ontario case, a black fugitive sought to resist
extradition to New Jersey on murder charges by claiming that he faced a significantly greater risk of being
subjected to capital punishment in that state than would a white defendant. The Ontario Court of Appeal
seemed willing to entertain this line of argument but in the end rejected it, noting that since there had been
no recent executions in New Jersey, the argument was not susceptible to proof. See R. v. Campbell [1996]
91 O.A.C. 204 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 1 S.C.R. vi (Can.); see also Garcia v.
Canada (Minister of Justice) [1997] F.C.J. No. 453 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.) (rejecting similar claims
regarding discrimination against Hispanics in application of death penalty on jurisdictional grounds).
Accordingly, Canadian courts may be prepared to entertain similar arguments about racial or other
discrimination in punishment in the requesting state, and in appropriate circumstances, this would provide
grounds for quashing a surrender order. It seems, however, that a court would intervene only where strong
evidence of discrimination was before it.
257. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(7); Model Treaty, supra note 251, art. 3(d). This princi-
ple has been incorporated into many of Canada's existing extradition treaties. See Williams, supra note 14,
at 397-98.
258. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(3); Model Treaty, supra note 251, art. 4(e).
259. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 15(1); UDHR, supra note 253, art. 11.
260. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 841, 849-50 (Can.); see
also Canada (M.E.I.) v. Satiacum [1989] 99 N.R. 171, 176 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (noting difficulty of
impeaching U.S. judicial process). The more democratic the requesting state, the more difficult it will be
for the fugitive to demonstrate fundamental unfairness in extradition to face trial there. When the
requesting state is a liberal democracy, its political system may be viewed by the reviewing court as a
reasonable proxy for the fairness of trial procedures. By contrast, the less that the foreign state resembles a
liberal democracy, the more vigilant the court must be, and the more likely it will be to intervene. A
similar argument has been made in the context of the ability of individual fugitives to invoke the doctrine of
specialty as a bar to extradition. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine
of Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 U. Cm. L.
R v. 1187 (1995).
Extradition Under the Canadian Charter
D. Substantive Elements of Review
1. Introduction
In addition to protecting the fugitive's right to procedural due process,
courts also must intervene to prevent him or her from being denied substan-
tive due process in the requesting state. As with procedural due process, Ca-
nadian courts exercising judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions
may refer to international law norms in fleshing out the structure of domestic
constitutional rules in the extradition context. In so doing, Canadian courts
should adopt a deferential standard of review, recognizing that in only a few
cases are international human rights norms clear enough to warrant judicial
intervention.
In certain circumstances, international human rights law is either non-
existent or too abstract to assist in the interpretation of domestic constitu-
tional norms. This is not surprising; questions of proportionality, sentencing,
and the death penalty are as controversial on the international level as they
are in the domestic context. Two other sources that may guide courts apply-
ing the residual threshold standard to extradition cases are addressed in the
following sections. The first is the existing jurisprudence under the Fugitive
Offenders Act,"6 the statute that governs rendition from Canada to other
Commonwealth states. The second is the treatment accorded to foreign law
and foreign tribunals in conflict of laws jurisprudence, which gives rise to
similar questions about the proper standard of review for cases involving
foreign law and the appropriate weight of decisions of foreign tribunals.
2. Proportionality
The extent to which Canadian courts should evaluate the surrender for
extradition of fugitives to face foreign sentences on proportionality grounds
is the most vexing substantive due process question.262 International norms in
the field are non-existent. Domestic constitutional principles are unhelpful.
There must be proportionality between the offender's wrongful conduct and
the sentence imposed, 3 but this principle does not take a decisioumaker
very far.
261. R.S.C., ch. F-32 (1985) (Can.).
262. In Mndler, the fugitive argued that the death penalty was "arbitrarily and indiscriminately
imposed." Kandler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 837-38. Justice La Forest accepted that this would support a Charter
challenge under appropriate circumstances but noted that the allegation was not made out on the facts of
that case. See id. He also referred to the "nature of the offence" as a factor to be weighed in the equation.
See id. at 835.
263. See R. v. M. (C.A.) [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 529 (Can.) ("It is a well-established tenet of our
criminal law that the quantum of sentence imposed should be broadly commensurate with the gravity of the
offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.").
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The leading case on the proportionality requirement in the extradition
context is Kindler.2" A U.S. citizen was convicted in Pennsylvania of first
degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. The jury rec-
onimended the death penalty. Before sentencing, the fugitive escaped to
Canada. He was arrested, and the United States requested his extradition.
The extradition judge committed him for extradition, and the Minister of
Justice decided that he should be surrendered. The fugitive sought judicial
review of the ministerial decision, however, arguing that extradition to face
the death penalty for first degree murder violated sections 7 and 12 of the
Charter and could not be upheld under section 1. A majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada, over a vigorous dissent,26 found no Charter violation and
dismissed the appeal. 2'
The central question in Kindler was whether the Minister of Justice's
decision under section 25 of the Extradition Act to extradite the fugitive
without first seeking assurances from the Pennsylvania authorities that the
death penalty would not be imposed or carried out violated the fugitive's
Charter rights under sections 7 and 12. Justices La Forest and McLachlin, in
separate opinions for the majority, each held that section 12 was inapplicable
to extradition proceedings.6 7
At issue, then, was whether the Minister's decision violated section 7.
The majority held that it did not. Justice La Forest accepted that the proper
interpretation of "fundamental justice" in section 7 would be influenced by
section 12. The Court previously had held that extradition must be refused if
surrender would place the fugitive in a position that is so "unacceptable" or
"outrageous" as to "shock the conscience." 2" But extradition to face the
death penalty did not fail this test. The very fact that there had been a recent
vote on capital punishment in the House of Commons indicated that the sub-
ject was not beyond rational discussion, as a debate over torture would be.269
Reasonable people could disagree. Justice La Forest held that it would not
shock the conscience of Canadians to extradite a fugitive to face the death
penalty when he had been accused of horrible crimes ("the worst form of
murder").27 In the other majority opinion in Kindler, which commanded the
support of two other judges, Justice McLachlin adopted a similar position. 271
264. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. Identical issues were raised in a companion case, In re Ng Extradition
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Can.).
265. See Kndier [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 789-829.
266. See id. at 830-57.
267. See id. at 831, 846.
268. Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 831-32 (La Forest, J., concurring) (citing R. v. Schmidt [1987]
1 S.C.R. 500 (Can.)).
269. Cf. at 851-52 (McLachlin, J., concurring) (stating that legislation granting executive discre-
tion is supported by uncertainty over whether surrender of fugitive to face death penalty may "sufficiently
shock" national conscience).
270. Id. at 839.
271. Justice McLachlin held that:
At the end of the day, the question is whether the provision or action in question o f-
fends the Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just, bearing in mind the nature of the o f-
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In the Jamieson cases, in Ross, and in Whitley, the defendant attacked
the length, not the type, of punishment.272 In each case, the fugitive alleged
that the foreign mandatory minimum sentences were disproportionate. Many
of the court of appeal judges began their analyses by estimating the sentence
that the fugitive would receive if he were convicted of similar offenses in
Canada. This estimate was then compared to the punishment to which the
fugitive was subject in the United States. Justice Baudonin, dissenting in
Jamieson 11, determined that the penalties imposed upon the fugitive by
Michigan law were proportionate to the offenses in question. The length of
the sentence was related to the type and quantity of the drug involved.
Moreover, in theory, the Michigan law allowed a judge to modify the sen-
tence for "substantial and compelling reasons," even if in practice this rarely
took place. Although the foreign mandatory minimum sentences were harsh,
they were not arbitrary.
In Ross, Justice Taylor adverted to evidence indicating that the fugitive
in that case was not facing a disproportionate punishment, given the potential
sentence of life imprisonment in Florida for the same offense. Justice Lam-
bert, dissenting in Ross, expressed concern that the sentencing judge pos-
sessed no discretion to modify the sentence to take into account the circum-
stances of the offense. The best that the fugitive could hope for upon convic-
tion in Florida on both counts would be two concurrent fifteen-year sen-
tences and the possibility of receiving reductions for good behavior while in-
carcerated. By comparison, Justice Lambert felt that the fugitive could ex-
pect a sentence of about five years' imprisonment for each offense, to be
served concurrently, had he been convicted in Canada of the same crimes.
This might be reduced to as little as one and three-quarters years of actual
imprisonment.27 The difference between the sentences of each jurisdiction
suggested to Justice Lambert (dissenting in Ross) that the Florida sentence
was disproportionate to the offense, so that extradition would violate section
7.
Clearly, there was wide variation in the estimates made by the judges
as to how long the respective fugitives would serve if convicted abroad. Not
surprisingly, the variation in the estimates affected the result in each case. In
Ross, the disparity between the foreign sentences and those that would apply
to the same offense in Canada (which Justice Taylor held to be the difference
fence and the penalty, the foreign justice system and considerations of comity and security,
and according due latitude to the Minister to balance the conflicting considerations.
Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 850. Amanda Spencer notes that "no reference was made to the... rights of
the [fugitive]" in this enumeration of factors. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 66.
272. In a number of similar cases, mandatory minimum sentences were to be imposed for of-
fenses involving very large quantities of drugs, so the proportionality issue was not as stark. See Bouthillier
v. Downs (Juge) [1993] 51 Q.A.C. 31 (Que. C.A.) (Can.); Chouinard v. Downs (Juge) [1993] 51 Q.A.C.
26 (Que. C.A.) (Can.); Doyer v. Downs (Juge) [1993] 51 Q.A.C. 1 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Doyer [1993] 4 S.C.R. 497 (Can.).
273. See United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 348 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd, [1996]
1 S.C.R. 469 (Can.).
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between two years in Canada and slightly over six years in Florida) was such
that the fugitive did not face a situation that was "simply unacceptable."
Justice Taylor distinguished the Jamieson cases in Ross, noting that there the
fugitive faced a minimum sentence of twenty years, which would have to be
served in full. Unlike Ross, there was no possibility in Jamieson that the
mandatory minimum sentence could be reduced on the basis of good behav-
ior or other factors. In Ross, by contrast, Justice Taylor assumed that the fu-
gitive would face a fifteen-year sentence subject to reduction to just over six
years for good behavior in prison, with the possibility of transfer to Can-
ada.274 Thus, comparisons were made even as between the four cases under
discussion.
These contrasting approaches highlight the often speculative nature of
the enterprise of engaging in a prospective determination of the sentence that
a fugitive would face if convicted abroad. Foreign sentencing regimes are le-
gal regimes, so that estimating a potential sentence in the requesting state in-
variably requires the domestic court to examine questions of foreign law. It
may be unclear what punishment the requesting state will impose. Even if
the type of sentence is certain, debate will rage over the likelihood that a
particular sentence will be imposed in the requesting state. Foreign sentenc-
ing regimes are likely to be just as complicated as domestic ones. Of course,
the main objection to the foreign mandatory minimum sentencing regimes at
issue in the cases under discussion is that they were not sufficiently compli-
cated, at least by Canadian domestic standards. Rather, the concern was that
they are too simple, in that they ignored relevant factors in the sentencing
process.
Two distinct senses of proportionality were at work in these cases. The
first is a comparative or ordinal conception of proportionality; the judges
who believed that surrender for extradition was unconstitutional considered
the U.S. mandatory minimum sentences to be disproportionate because they
were longer-perhaps much longer-than their Canadian counterparts. The
comparative or ordinal conception of proportionality is premised on the as-
sumption that there is a universal metric of proportionality. On this theory,
the same offense should receive the same sentence no matter where it is
committed. Not surprisingly, Canadian sentencing practices are considered
the standard against which foreign sentences are to be measured. Foreign
mandatory minimum sentences, it seems, may offend this concept of propor-
tionality simply because they are longer than their Canadian counterparts.
Justice Proulx, dissenting in Jamieson I, considered the "objective
gravity" of the offense and the personal characteristics of the offender to be
274. See id. at 334-35; see also Transfer of Offenders Act, R.S.C., ch. T-15 (1985) (Can.).
Note, however, that a Charter challenge to such legislation also could be made, particularly if it was al-
leged that Canada was enforcing a foreign prison sentence that might raise constitutional issues under Ca-
nadian law. Transfer of offenders treaties have proven controversial in the United States. See JORDAN J.
PAUST, The Unconstitutional Detention of Prisoners by the United States Under the Exchange of Prisoner
Treaties, in INTORNnoNALLAW AS LAW OFTHE UNrrFD STATES 421,424-29 (1996).
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the proper measure of the proportionality of the foreign sentence.275 Dis-
senting in Ross, Justice Lambert relied upon the domestic constitutional con-
ception of proportionality in arguing that the sentence that would be imposed
in Canada should be used as a yardstick by which to measure the proportion-
ality of the foreign punishment. On this basis, he maintained that the sen-
tence that the fugitive faced in Florida was "markedly disproportionate."276
Essentially, adoption of the comparative or ordinal conception of proportion-
ality leads to the application of domestic constitutional norms directly to the
foreign sentence, so that if the foreign sentencing regime is found to violate
the Charter, extradition is refused.
Similarly, some commentators have proposed that requested states
should refuse to surrender a fugitive to face a foreign sentence that would be
more severe than that which would be imposed under the law of the re-
quested state.2' Under this approach, extradition would be permitted only on
the assurance of the requesting state that the fugitive, if convicted, would not
be subjected to a sentence more severe than the maximum sentence that
could be imposed under the law of the requested state. Yet nothing in the
prior cases suggests that the mere fact that punishment abroad would be
more severe than in Canada renders extradition contrary to the Charter. The
comparative conception of proportionality provides no useful guideposts to
courts in extradition cases, and indeed, it collapses into a domestic threshold
standard of review. 8
The second sense of proportionality is a more process-oriented one. It
examines the elements of proportionality in Canadian sentencing law (such
as the age of the offender, the seriousness of the offense, and the moral
blameworthiness of the offender), 79 in addition to other factors such as de-
terrence requirements and the seriousness of the crime problem in the juris-
275. See Jamieson I [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460,475 (Que. C.A.) (Can.).
276. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 349 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
277. See, e.g., Van den Wyngaert, supra note 96, at 768-69.
278. In Zimmerman v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1995] 66 B.C.A.C. 143, 146 (B.C. C.A.)
(Can.), Justice Southin suggested that a foreign sentence would be unlikely ever to violate any "principle of
fundamental justice," observing that "every country creates its own scale, so to speak, of terms of impri s-
onment according to its own opinion of what is a serious or not-so-serious crime. A country changes its
scale in accordance with changing perceptions of the damage which any particular crime does to the com-
munity." This seems to go too far, but it does suggest that the comparative conception of proportionality is
of limited utility.
279. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 835 (Can.); see also So-
ering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 108, at 43 (1989). For a discussion of age, see R.
v. M. (C.A.) [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 552-53 (Can.) (holding that sentence must take into account age and
generally should not "surpass any reasonable estimation of the offender's remaining natural life span").
Both Justices La Forest and McLachlin indicated in Kindler that the personal circumstances of the fugitive
must be considered in determining whether a foreign treatment or punishment was excessive or dispropor-
donate, and in Witley, Ross, Jamieson, the majority adopted this approach. See United States v. Whitley
[1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 693, 712-713 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (noting fugitive's extensive criminal record in de-
termining proportionality of punishment to crime), aft'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 467 (Can.); Ross [1994] 119
D.L.R.4th at 346-49 (examining circumstances of offender in determining proportionality of punishment to
wrongful conduct); Jamieson I [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d at 465-69 (examining proportionality of 20-year
minimum sentence for drug offense).
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diction,uo and it determines whether those elements would be (or have been)
properly addressed by the foreign sentencing regime for the particular fugi-
tive. This second sense of proportionality assumes that there is no single
sentence that is uniquely appropriate. Rather, it focuses on whether the proc-
ess of determining the proper sentence addressed the relevant factors. It is
the mandatory nature of mandatory minimum sentences-the danger that the
foreign sentences will be imposed mechanistically without regard to the fac-
tors that animate Canadian sentencing decisions-that is more likely to of-
fend this second conception of proportionality. As long as a foreign sen-
tencing decision appears to have taken into account the same sort of consid-
erations that would enter a Canadian sentencing decision, it will be unobjec-
tionable even if the sentence imposed is considerably different from that
which would be imposed by a Canadian court.
In Waddell v. Canada,"' therefore, Justice Tysoe compared the sen-
tences that the fugitive was likely to face in Arizona with Canadian sentences
for comparable offenses. Although the Arizona penalties were slightly
higher, Justice Tysoe found them not to be "significantly different" from
their Canadian counterparts.' He also noted that the Arizona sentences were
not "grossly disproportionate having regard to the offence and the of-
fender."' This approach reflects Justice Lamer's view in Smith that "[w]e
should be careful not to stigmatize every disproportionate or excessive sen-
tence as being a constitutional violation. . . ."'
Although the comparative and process-oriented conceptions of propor-
tionality are related, they are not identical. The second conception's re-
quirements can be met without necessarily fulfilling those of the first. A Ca-
nadian court might well find that a foreign court would consider the relevant
factors in making a sentencing decision and find that it satisfied the propor-
tionality requirements of Canadian constitutional law without necessarily
agreeing with the length of the foreign sentence. For example, the difference
280. This factor breaks down into two separate elements. First, circumstances may be different in
the requesting state, and the foreign sentencing regime simply may be a response to those unique circum-
stances. Even the Canadian Parliament might adopt a similar sentencing regime to that operating in the re-
questing state were the circumstances of the foreign state present in Canada. Second, foreign legislatures
and courts must be given some leeway to decide what the appropriate punishments for serious criminal o f-
fenses should be because their expertise and knowledge of local conditions is likely to be far superior to
that of a Canadian court. As a result, there can be legitimate differences of opinion as to what is appropr i-
ate or proportionate. The margin of appreciation doctrine and related conceptions of federalism and sub-
sidiarity support a deferential standard of review. Sentences may and should vary by region and country.
Cf M. [1996] 1 S.C.R. at 567 ("As well, sentences for a particular offence should be expected to vary to
some degree across various communities and regions in this country, as the 'just and appropriate' mix of
accepted sentencing goals will depend on the needs and current conditions of and in the particular commu-
nity where the crime occurred.").
281. [1995] B.C.J. No. 2641 (B.C. S.C.) (Can.), aft'd, Doe. Vancouver CA021408, Apr. 25,
1996 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), reprinted in 33 W.C.B.2d 20, 22 (1996) (Can.), leave to appeal refised, [1996]
3 S.C.R. xiv (Can.).
282. Id. 33.
283. Id. 30.
284. R. v. Smith [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1072 (Can.).
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in sentence might well be attributable to the different conditions in the for-
eign state. Each conception of proportionality has a role to play. The com-
parative conception allows some absolute boundaries to be set, whereas the
process-oriented conception allows domestic courts to give some measure of
deference-a margin of appreciation-to foreign courts.
Accordingly, Canadian courts exercising constitutional judicial review
of ministerial surrender decisions in extradition cases in which the fugitive
faces lengthy imprisonment in the requesting state should concern themselves
with the process-oriented conception of proportionality rather than.the com-
parative approach. In this way, Canadian courts can retain a residual form of
judicial review while at the same time deferring to the legitimate sentencing
decisions of foreign courts and legislatures. Yet the possibility should remain
that extradition could, in rare cases, be considered unconstitutional simply
because the length of the sentence alone would be "so excessive as to out-
rage standards of decency.""
Professor Schabas and others have criticized the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Kindler and Ng for not setting out an objective test for determining
the threshold of severity. They lament the court's reliance on subjective ac-
counts of public opinion and contend that it was inappropriate for the court
to take judicial notice of certain supporting facts (for example, a recent Par-
liamentary vote on capital punishment). They prefer that the Court directly
rely upon international human rights norms to establish such "objective"
criteria.2"
This is fine so far as it goes-there are international human rights
norms on torture, prison conditions, and slavery, for example.' Where an
extradited fugitive would face such treatment in violation of international
human rights standards, a Canadian court should quash a surrender order on
the grounds that it would "shock the conscience" to do otherwise. Note,
however, that there must be near-universal agreement at the international
level in order for this approach to function, because otherwise it will prove
285. Id. (citation omitted); see also H.C. Debates, 34th Parl., 3d Sess., Nov. 7, 1991, at 4781
(statement of Mr. George S. Rideout) ("We must have some concerns with countries where penalties
associated with the crimes are so serious that we wonder whether there is in fact justice in those
countries."). Even the majority judges in Witley, Ross, and Jamieson I conceded that at some point
"excessive" severity in sentencing would violate the principle of proportionality and "shock the
conscience," violating section 7 in a manner that could not be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. See
United States v. Whitley [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 693, 712-13 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R.
467 (Can.); United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 343-49 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aftd, [1996] 1
S.C.R. 469 (Can.); Jamieson I [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460, 465-69 (Que. C.A.) (Can.).
286. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Kindler and Ng: Our Supreme Magistrates Take a Frighten-
ing Step into the Court of Public Opinion, 51 REv. DU BARR. 673, 686-91 (1991) (suggesting that Kindler
and Ng appeal to international bodies).
287. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 217, art. 3 (stating that no state shall extradite
where there are "substantial grounds" to believe that the fugitive would be in danger of being subjected to
torture in the requesting state); ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 7; UDHR, supra note 253, art. 5 (stating that
no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman punishment). Some states have incorporated such norms
into their domestic extradition legislation. See, e.g., Extradition Act, 1988, § 22(3)(b) (Austi.) (forbidding
extradition unless Attorney General is assured that there is no risk of torture).
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impossible to identify any pertinent international human rights norms. Extra-
dition to face torture is unthinkable, but this demonstrates only that torture is
an easy case.
In the absence of near-unanimity of world public opinion as reflected in
international human rights law, the appeal to so-called "objective factors" is
largely illusory. Relying upon international human rights norms sounds at-
tractive, and it is useful for a court in determining whether Canada's state
responsibility would be implicated by a particular surrender decision. But
those who suggest that human rights norms should play a greater role in the
extradition process must indicate how relevant norms should be identified
and applied outside of clear cases such as those involving torture.288 The re-
ality, at present, is that there are few such norms. An examination of surren-
der for extradition to face the death penalty illustrates the problem.
3. The Death Penalty
Canadian courts should look to international human rights standards to
inform their interpretation of section 7 of the Charter. It must be acknowl-
edged, however, that in some fields there simply are no recognized interna-
tional standards. Thus, there is little merit to the argument that an approach
to constitutional interpretation that relies, in part, on international human
rights norms to inform the meaning of Charter provisions means that extra-
dition to face capital punishment would "shock the conscience." This is pre-
cisely because the international legal status of capital punishment is highly
equivocal.8 9 For example, the imposition of the death penalty for murder
288. For example, Shea argues in favor of injecting international human rights norms into the ex-
tradition process, but concedes that "[i]f Soeing-style jurisprudence is to become a model for national
courts in extradition cases, more specific criteria for judging the judicial and penal systems of foreign
countries are needed." Shea, supra note 118, at 128 n.247 (citation omitted); see also M. CHERIF
BAssioum, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACICE 645 (3d ed. 1996) ("The
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment can be said to constitute a general principle of interna-
tional law because it is so regarded by the legal systems of civilized nations. But that alone does not give it
a sufficiently defined content bearing on identifiable applications capable of more than general recogni-
tion.").
289. There is no consensus against the death penalty per se in international human rights law, al-
though there are signs indicating that such a consensus may one day emerge. See, e.g., Sharon A. Wil-
liams, Ertradition to a State That Imposes the Death Penalty, 28 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 117, 150-51 (1990)
(discussing death penalty as potential violation of prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment in in-
ternational law). Even Professor Schabas conceded, in commenting on Kindler and Ng, that at most there is
"a growing trend in human rights law toward abolition of the death penalty." William A. Schabas, Can-
ada-Extradition-Death Penalty-International Hwnan Rights Treaties, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 130
(1993). If and when such a consensus evolves, Canadian law can evolve with it. On the status of the death
penalty in international human rights law, see generally WniAM A. SCHABA, THE ABoLrION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1997); and WIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY
AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD's COURTs
(1996).
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does not violate international law.29' A residual threshold standard of review
would counsel that in the absence of clear international norms on capital
punishment, surrender for extradition to face capital punishment may, but
will not always, implicate the Charter. Extradition to face particular forms of
the death penalty, or its imposition for particular offenses, might do so,
however.
This can be seen from recent determinations of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee. Following the rejection of their claims by the Su-
preme Court of Canada, the fugitives in both Kindler and Ng brought appli-
cations before the Committee under the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol
challenging the legality of the surrender decisions. In Kindler v. Canada,291
the Committee held that extradition to the United States to face the risk of
the death penalty by lethal injection and the death row phenomenon did not
violate the ICCPR. The fugitive had argued that the death penalty was per se
cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment; therefore, extradition implicated
article 7 of the ICCPR, and Canada was obliged to seek assurances under the
Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty that the death penalty would not be im-
posed.2' The issue before the Committee was whether Canada exposed the
fugitive to a real risk of the violation of his rights under the ICCPR by sur-
rendering him for extradition to the United States. State responsibility would
attach to Canada if the fugitive had been exposed to such a risk. The Com-
mittee held that the imposition of the death penalty by lethal injection for
murder did not in itself amount to a violation of the ICCPR, however. The
Committee distinguished Soering v. United Kingdom29 on the ground that an
extradition request had been made in that case by a country besides the
United States-Germany-and that, unlike Kindler, there were mitigating
factors present, namely the youth and mental irregularity of the fugitive.2 4
Accordingly, the Committee found no violation of the ICCPR or its Optional
Protocol.295 A subsequent decision concerning another fugitive reached the
same conclusion. 96
The Committee's views in Kindler left open the possibility that par-
ticular forms of the death penalty could violate the ICCPR. Soon after, in Ng
v. Canada,29" the Committee expressed the view that extradition to Califor-
290. In Kindler, the dissenting Justice Cory suggested only that there was an international trend
towards the abolition of capital punishment. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779,
807. This point was emphasized by the majority. See id. at 833-34 (La Forest, J., concurring).
291. Decision of July 30, 1993, Concerning Comm. No. 470/1991, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs.
L.J. 307 (1993).
292. See id. 3, at 308.
293. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
294. See Kindler 15.3, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307, 314 (1993).
295. See id. 16, reprinted in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307, 314 (1993).
296. See Cox v. Canada, Decision of Oct. 31, 1994, Concerning Comm. No. 539/1993, re-
printed in 15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 410 (1994) (holding that extraditing U.S. citizen to face possible imposition
of death penalty in Pennsylvania does not violate ICCPR).
297. Ng v. Canada, Decision of Nov. 5, 1993, Concerning Comm. No. 469/1991, reprinted in
15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 149 (1994).
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nia to face death by cyanide gas asphyxiation would violate article 7 of the
ICCPR. Reiterating its earlier views in Kindler, the Committee held that ex-
tradition to face the death penalty did not necessarily implicate Canada in a
violation of the ICCPR, but that under the circumstances, the method of exe-
cution would amount to "cruel and inhuman treatment" in violation of article
7 of the ICCPR.28 Thus, it was not the death penalty itself, but the particular
method of execution, that placed Canada in violation of the ICCPR. While
the Committee disagreed with the Supreme Court of Canada as to whether a
particular method of execution amounted to "cruel and inhuman treatment,"
it did not hold that extradition to face the death penalty constitutes a per se
violation of international human rights norms.29
Professor Schabas neglects the central issue at stake in the Supreme
Court's decisions in Kindler and Ng: proportionality.3t ° The cases were not
about the death penalty per se (although dissenting judges and academic
commentators have focused largely upon this issue), but rather the question
of the constitutionality under section 7 of extraditing a fugitive to face a par-
ticular form of the death penalty for first degree murder."0 Justices La For-
est and McLachlin in Kindler never suggested that the death penalty was an
appropriate punishment in all circumstances, only that it did not "shock the
conscience" in the particular cases; in their view, the death penalty was a
proportionate response to the situations in question. Indeed, both Justices in-
dicated that extradition to face the death penalty might well violate section 7
if certain (unspecified) conditions were met."t But the constitutional status of
the death penalty in Canada and the Canadian Government's views expressed
in international fora on the death penalty in domestic law are simply irrele-
vant.
30 3
Similarly, it is difficult to agree with James O'Reilly's suggestion that
the majority judges in Kindler and Ng were wrong to consider the gravity of
the offense as a factor in section 7 review because the death penalty is im-
posed in the United States only for the most serious crimes, so that any con-
298. Seeid. 16.1-18, reprinted in 15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 149, 157 (1994).
299. See id. 16.1-16.2, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 149, 157 (1994).
300. Pak, supra note 212, and Manson, supra note 232, likewise neglect the issue of proportion-
ality.
301. See United States v. Garcia [1994] O.J. No. 1027, 34, 52-53 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.),
appeal dismissed, [1996] 31 W.C.B.2d 458 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 34
W.C.B.2d v (Can.).
302. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 835-36 (Can.) (La Forest,
J., concurring); id. at 852 (McLachlin, J., concurring).
303. The Supreme Court's decision in Kindler suggests in dicta that the death penalty might well
be unconstitutional under section 7 of the Charter. See Kindler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 833 (La Forest, J., con-
curring). This does not of itself affect the position under discussion here, however. Canada's opposition to
the death penalty at the international level presents a more interesting question, although it does not have as
much force as Professor Schabas has argued. See R. v. Hanson [1994] O.J. No. 102 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.)
(holding that letter by Canadian ambassador, indicating Canada's opposition to imposition of death penalty
as punishment by International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, does not render extradition
to face death penalty for murder unconstitutional).
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sideration of this factor by the Canadian court on judicial review would be
"superfluous. " " In these cases, the state legislation that imposed the death
penalty required the trier of fact to take into account a number of factors, an
exercise that only reinforces the majority's view that the death penalty was
proportionate to the offense. If the law of the requesting state were to impose
the death penalty for lesser offenses, or without taking circumstances into
account, or in the absence of appropriate procedural protections, or where
the death penalty was imposed in a particularly cruel manner, then extradi-
tion would, in all likelihood, be refused because it would be so seriously dis-
proportionate as to violate sections 7 and 12. By analogy, the same holds
true for extradition in non-capital cases.
The example of extradition to face the death penalty demonstrates that
using international human rights standards as a benchmark for deciding when
to quash a ministerial surrender decision sets a relatively high threshold.
This is as it should be. The essence of the residual threshold standard is that
it attempts to balance the rights of fugitives against the public interest in
having an effective extradition system. As part of this equation, domestic
courts must afford a margin of appreciation to decisions of the executive and
the operation of foreign criminal justice systems. It necessarily follows that
fugitives will be extradited to face foreign procedures or punishments that
might not meet Canadian constitutional standards. Yet at a certain point, Ca-
nadian courts must intervene, and that point should be defined, in part, by
reference to international human rights standards. Where such standards ex-
ist, they may be invoked by courts as the appropriate minimum standards
that the requesting state must observe. By contrast, where no such standards
exist, domestic courts should be highly circumspect about intervening.
4. The Fugitive Offenders Act
Given disagreement over appropriate punishments for crime, both
within Canada and in the international community, it is unsurprising that ex-
cept in clear cases such as those involving torture, international human rights
instruments provide no useful "objective criteria" for determining whether a
foreign sentence is proportionate. Certainly, they yield nothing more specific
than do domestic norms."'0 In the absence of sufficiently certain and detailed
international human rights norms, reference to other sources of domestic law
may prove helpful in establishing proper guidelines for review of surrender
decisions for fugitives facing severe mandatory minimum sentences abroad.
304. O'Reilly, supra note 202, at 883.
305. See Sheleff, supra note 19, at 337 (suggesting that international human rights norms might
be used to place some limits upon disproportionate foreign prison sentences but not indicating how this
would occur); Williams, supra note 14, at 409-10 (observing that decisions of European Commission of
Human Rights indicate that international human rights law provides no guidelines that would bar extradi-
tion to face lengthy foreign prison sentences).
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One such source of domestic law is the existing jurisprudence under the
Fugitive Offenders Act. In general, the Act's rendition system is premised
on the idea that Commonwealth states possess a common legal, political, and
cultural heritage.3" The implication is that they may trust each other to do
justice to fugitives. Whether this assumption remains valid is debatable,
given the diversity of states within the Commonwealth, the doubtful human
rights standards of some of them, and the advent of the requirements of sec-
tion 7 of the Charter."e7 In any event, the existence of a distinct apparatus for
returning fugitives to requesting Commonwealth states illustrates that the
procedural protections for a fugitive who faces removal from Canada are in-
versely related to the trust afforded to the criminal justice system of the re-
questing state.
On the theory that the Extradition Act should (and generally does) pro-
vide greater procedural protections to fugitives than does the Fugitive Of-
fenders Act, Charter review of a ministerial surrender decision under the
Extradition Act could be informed by reference to the procedural protections
accorded to fugitives under the Fugitive Offenders Act. Section 16 of the
Fugitive Offenders Act provides that a Canadian court may decline to sur-
render a fugitive for rendition:
Whenever it appears to the court that by reason of the trivial nature of the case or by
reason of the application for the return of a fugitive not being made in good faith in the
interests of justice, or that, for any other reason, it would, having regard to the dis-
tance, to the facilities for communication and to all the circumstances of the case, be
unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to return the fugitive either at all or
until the expiration of a certain period, the court may
(a) discharge the fugitive, either absolutely or on bail;
(b) order that he shall not be returned until after the expiration of the period
named in the order; or
(c) make such other order in the premises as to the court seems just.na
There is no equivalent to section 16 in the Extradition Act. Although at
first it may seem anachronistic, this provision may be helpful in interpreting
306. See Argentina v. Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 552 (Can.) ("Commonwealth countries are
heirs to the British criminal justice system."); R. v. Harrison [1918] 29 C.C.C. 420, 422 (B.C. S.C.)
(Can.) (stating that "some additional care ought to be taken in the case of extraditing persons to foreign
[i.e., non-Commonwealth] countries more than in facilitating criminal proceedings in the various parts of
the Empire to which alone the Fugitive Offenders Act applies").
307. See LA FoRESr, supra note 3, at 237, 241-42; see also Chan c. Directrice de la Maison
Tanguay [1996] R.J.Q. 335 (Que. Super. Ct.) (Can.) (allowing rendition to Hong Kong despite defendant's
claim that standards of treatment would not meet Canadian constitutional norms), aft'd, [1996] 113
C.C.C.3d 270 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 114 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.); Common-
wealth of Australia v. Cousins [1992] O.J. No. 598 (Ont. Prov. Div.) (Can.) (noting that Fugitive Offend-
ers Act is "an anachronism, which now applies colonial law to an independent Canada").
308. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C., ch. F-32, § 16 (1985) (emphasis added). A fugitive may in-
voke section 16 of the Fugitive Offenders Act before a surrender decision has been made. See Chan [1996]
113 C.C.C.3d at 289.
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the scope of protection for fugitives facing extradition under the Extradition
Act. Specifically, it should be understood as a floor. Certainly, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 7 of the Charter in the extradition context
has been used by courts in their interpretation of section 16 of the Fugitive
Offenders Act.3 9 This would be particularly helpful when the fugitive faces
a mandatory minimum sentence abroad, because the Fugitive Offenders Act
specifically identifies excessive severity of the foreign punishment as a
ground for discharging the fugitive or pursuing other alternatives, such as
imposing conditions upon surrender.1 Professor Anne La Forest notes that
section 16 of the Fugitive Offenders Act appears to provide stronger protec-
tion for fugitives' rights than the Charter does under the Extradition Act. She
explains this discrepancy by noting that extradition is based upon interna-
tional treaty commitments, whereas rendition is not.3" Whatever the expla-
nation, it would be both surprising and incongruous if the relatively informal
procedures of rendition provided stronger protection to fugitives than extra-
dition legislation.
Accordingly, judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions under
the Extradition Act should be structured at least in part by reference to the
protections granted a fugitive under the Fugitive Offenders Act. Although
this standard would not require that the sentence imposed by the foreign state
for a particular offense be exactly the same as that likely to be handed down
by a Canadian court for the same crime, a high degree of disproportionality
could violate section 7. The nub of the issue is to define this attenuated pro-
portionality.
5. Conflict of Laws Jurisprudence
The proper role of courts under the residual standard of inquiry in ex-
tradition cases may be illuminated by comparison to the function of courts in
conflict of laws cases. In civil cases, courts often must engage in what
amounts to an evaluation of the integrity of foreign judicial systems in de-
ciding whether to recognize or enforce foreign judgments. For example, do-
mestic courts will decline to enforce a foreign judgment where it is shown to
309. See Chan [1996] R.J.Q. at 348-49. But see Mellino [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 552 (distinguishing
cases interpreting what is now section 16 of Fugitive Offenders Act, on theory that Parliament can impose
higher evidentiary demands on requesting state in absence of treaty).
310. No court has yet declined to surrender a fugitive for rendition on the grounds of severity of
the foreign sentence pursuant to section 16 of the Fugitive Offenders Act or analogous provisions in its
British predecessors. But the power of the courts under section 16 and its analogues is very broad. See
Chan [1996] 113 C.C.C.3d at 286; In re Fai & R. [1979] 48 C.C.C.2d 173, 175 (Que. Super. Ct.) (Can.);
see also Great Britain v. Taylor (No. 2) [1990] O.J. No. 2015 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (noting that pre-
siding judge possesses wide discretion to review committal decision), aff'd, Doc. CA 1046/90, Mar. 18,
1991 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.); R. v. Delisle [1896] 5 C.C.C. 210, 222, 223-224 (Que. Q.B., Crim. Side)
(Can.) (discussing extent of court's powers).
311. See LAFoR.Sr, supra note 3, at 251-52.
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have been rendered through fraud 2 or in a manner contrary to natural jus-
tice, 3'3 or where enforcement of the foreign judgment would be contrary to
Canadian public policy. 314 In such decisions, the concept of public policy
plays an increasingly important role. The conflict of laws jurisprudence indi-
cates how a residual threshold standard operates. In general, deference is
given to the operation of foreign law and tribunals: The mere fact that the
foreign law is different does not render it inapplicable. It is only where the
effects of foreign law would violate Canadian public policy, which is con-
ceptualized relatively narrowly, that Canadian courts will decline to give it
effect.
Thus, when a party seeks to have a foreign judgment recognized or en-
forced in Canada, a question arises as to whether Canadian public policy
would be violated as a result. In Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf, t5 the
respondent had traveled to Atlantic City, incurred gaming debts, and re-
turned home to Ontario without paying them. The casino operator obtained a
default judgment against the respondent in New Jersey and sought to enforce
it in Ontario. The respondent resisted enforcement on the ground that such a
foreign judgment would offend public policy in Ontario.3"6
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the foreign judgment to be en-
forced, even though the debt would be unenforceable (and illegal) under the
Gaming Acte 7 had the debt arisen in Ontario. Justice Carthy did not doubt
that courts could decline to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment on pub-
lic policy grounds. In his view, however, the scope of public policy was
relatively narrow: It did not extend to all of the statutory provisions or
common law rules of the forum. The mere fact that a foreign judgment was
rendered under legislation or a cause of action that is unknown in the forum
(or indeed, even technically unlawful under it) does not of itself preclude its
recognition or enforcement in Canada. 38 Rather, the public policy defense
should encompass only the "essential morality" of the forum, which "must
be more than the morality of some persons and must run through the fabric
of society to the extent that it is not consistent with our system of justice and
general moral outlook to countenance the conduct."" 9 Gambling, though il-
312. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Beaver [1908] 17 O.L.R. 496 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (setting forth scope of
fraud defense).
313. See United States v. Ivey [1995] 26 O.R.3d 533, 553 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.), aff'd, [1996]
30 O.R.3d 370 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 33 O.R.3d xv (Can.); cf. Bank Melli
Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding due process objection to enforcement of
foreign judgment).
314. See Ivey [1995] 26 O.R.3d at 553-54 (outlining scope of public policy defense to recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment).
315. Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf [1992] 6 O.R.3d 737, 741-46, 748-51 (Ont. C.A.)
(Can.) (describing public policy issue).
316. The doctrine of ordre public fulfills the same function in Quebec law. See ETHEL GROFFIER,
PMcIs DE DROrT INTERNATIONAL PR'v- QuuBtcois 326 (2d ed. 1982).
317. See Gaming Act, R.S.O., ch. 183, §§ 1, 4-5 (1980) (Ont.) (Can.).
318. See Boardwalk Regency [1992] 60.R.3d at 742.
319. Id. at743.
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legal in Ontario at the time, was not "tainted by immorality" in this way, so
public policy afforded no defense to enforcement of the judgment.32 Justice
Lacourci~re, in a concurring opinion, stated that "the contemporary Cana-
dian standard of morality would prefer that personal responsibility be at-
tached to Canadians who engage in licensed ganing activities abroad and
that those citizens not be sheltered from enforcement proceedings where
debts result."32' It is not a stretch of logic to apply these same words to judi-
cial review of ministerial surrender decisions in extradition cases.
Accordingly, Canadian courts will recognize and enforce foreign judg-
ments even where they may seem incompatible with domestic legislation, as
long as it would not offend "essential morality" to do so. Such an approach
serves several goals. It is generally deferential to foreign courts, thus fulfill-
ing the requirements of comity; ensures reciprocal and effective recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments; addresses voluntary submission and
safe haven concerns; and also retains a residual ability to deny effect to for-
eign judgments where the Canadian forum's essential public policy concerns
would be affected. The analogy with the extradition context should be clear.
In both contexts, the concern is with giving effect to the decisions of foreign
courts while at the same time protecting individual rights.322
Admittedly, where the issue is whether to recognize a foreign judgment
that already has been rendered, the task of the Canadian court is simplified
in that it is engaging in a retrospective analysis of a case, rather than guess-
ing at the outcome. By contrast, a court reviewing the executive decision to
surrender a fugitive for extradition must engage in a prospective evaluation
of the quality of the foreign criminal justice system. Nonetheless, there are
parallels between these types of analysis.
Moreover, at times civil courts must judge the fairness of foreign legal
systems, such as when determining whether to stay proceedings on the basis
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and requiring a plaintiff to bring her
claim in a foreign forum. In such cases, courts adopt the general presump-
tion that justice will be done in the foreign state, a presumption that may be
rebutted by cogent evidence.3"a Such decisions are admittedly somewhat im-
320. See id. at 745.
321. Id. at 750-51 (Lacourci~re, J., concurring).
322. A similar analogy may be drawn with the approach adopted by courts in giving effect to let-
ters rogatory (letters of request) for judicial assistance from foreign courts. So long as the procedural and
substantive requirements are met, a foreign request is to be given full force and effect unless it can be
shown to be contrary to the public policy of the forum "or otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the
citizens of that jurisdiction." Zingre v. R. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 393, 401 (Can.). Courts take a broader ap-
proach to the doctrines of public policy and sovereignty with respect to letters rogatory, largely because
they are being requested to exercise their coercive powers against persons resident in the jurisdiction,
which involves a much more obvious exercise of extraterritorial power by the requesting state than in cases
involving foreign judgment. It should be noted that in Canada, letters rogatory are not generally given e f-
fect by treaty, another distinction from the extradition context.
323. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Bd.) [1993] 1
S.C.R. 897, 917 (Can.) (holding that court must consider whether "substantial justice will be done in the
appropriate forum"); Safari v. The Iran Afzal [1996] 2 F.C. 954, 970-71 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (Can.) (stating
19981 ,207
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pressionistic.3 Ultimately, however, the question in both civil litigation and
in extradition cases is the same: Will justice be done in the foreign court?
The mere fact that the procedural and substantive law in the foreign forum
might differ from that of the domestic forum will not prevent a stay on the
basis of forum non conveniens doctrine. In both extradition and conflict of
laws cases, domestic courts must invoke a conception of justice that at once
guarantees fairness to the litigants and is not too parochial.
The key question is not whether the foreign law that determines the
punishment the fugitive will face in the requesting state would fail Charter
scrutiny, but how it fails. The Supreme Court suggested in Schmidt that it is
the fairness of the foreign system as a whole that should be evaluated; the
details invariably will differ. 31 It might be better to view the Charter as ap-
plying to the results of the foreign criminal justice process rather than the
particular elements of foreign procedure, which are bound to seem strange to
Canadians. This is where section 7 fits in, with its focus on substantive
rather than merely procedural due process. Charter review of ministerial sur-
render decisions should be primarily concerned with substance, not proce-
dure. 326 At a certain point, demonstrably arbitrary or unfair foreign proce-
dure would transgress international human rights law norms and thus run
afoul of the Charter in the extradition context. But within these confines,
some measure of latitude should be granted to foreign criminal justice sys-
tems to accommodate procedural and, to a certain degree, substantive diver-
sity.
327
that party's claim that he will be denied substantial justice in the foreign court must be backed up by ev i-
dence); Frymer v. Brettschneider [1994] 19 O.R.3d 60, 67 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (Weiler, J., dissenting on
other grounds) (stating that as part of forum non conveniens determination, court will consider "cogent
evidence" that "plaintiff will not obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction"); The Abidin Daver [1984] App.
Cas. 398, 411 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that party must support allegations that fair trial is
not possible in foreign state with "positive and cogent evidence," and not mere allegations); Muduroglu
Ltd. v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi [1986] Q.B. 1225, 1248 (Eng. C.A.) (holding that in deciding whether to or-
der stay in favor of foreign proceedings, court will consider whether party can receive fair trial in foreign
state and also will consider party's personal safety).
324. See Connelly v. R.T.Z. Corp. [1996] 2 W.L.R. 251, 259 (Eng. C.A.), rev'd on other
grounds, [1997] 3 W.L.R. 373 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("It will seldom be possible or desirable to
undertake more than an impressionistic survey of the competing features of the two regimes.").
325. See R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 527 (Can.); see also Chan c. Directrice de la Mai-
son Tanguay [1996] 113 C.C.C.3d 270, 300 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (finding that although Hong Kong mens
rea element for murder is lower than Canadian counterpart, rendition to face trial in Hong Kong does not
violate fugitive's rights in Canada), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 114 C.C.C.3d vi (Can.); Soffitt v.
United States [1993] 36 B.C.A.C. 155, 158 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (holding mere differences between foreign
practice and Charter standards are insufficient to violate principles of fundamental justice under section 7);
cf. Derby & Co. v. Weldon (No. 6) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139, 1156 (Eng. C.A.) (Staughton, L.J., concur-
ring) ("[Olne can still conclude (as I do) that the Swiss rule as to the enforcement of foreign judgments,
although different from our own rule, is one which can reasonably be adopted by a civilised system of
law.").
326. This approach is supported by Soffitt [1993] 36 B.C.A.C. at 158.
327. See Amchem [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 912 ("In this climate, courts have had to become more tol-
erant of the systems of other countries.")
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E. Policy Considerations: The Safe Haven Argument
The so-called "safe haven" argument,a one of the main pillars of Jus-
tice La Forest's decision in Kindler, is also an essential consideration in es-
tablishing the appropriate standard of review. 329 Although there are strong
arguments in its favor, it may seem a disreputable slippery slope argument if
not properly articulated. The extradition process cannot function properly if
courts allow the standard of review of ministerial surrender decisions to drift
away from the residual threshold standard and instead permit it to become
intrusive and subjective. Undue delay and a de facto subjection of foreign
law to Charter scrutiny will result; neither is desirable.
The safe haven concern arises in two distinct situations. The first in-
volves cases in which the fugitive cannot be prosecuted in Canada because
the Canadian authorities lack prescriptive jurisdiction over the offense, most
likely because it was committed abroad with no harmful effects in Canada.
In these cases, the fugitive must either be surrendered for extradition to the
requesting state or be freed because he or she could not be prosecuted in
Canada. There is also the possibility of deportation if the fugitive is not a
Canadian citizen and has entered the country illegally, although deportation
is itself subject to legal controls and is not a true substitute for extradition.
3 1
But generally, in these cases-including Kindler, Ng, Jamieson, and proba-
bly Ross-the safe haven problem is stark, in the sense that the courts were
forced to choose between allowing the fugitive to be surrendered for extradi-
tion or setting him or her free.
The second situation involves cases in which the offense at issue was of
a transnational nature-that is, where elements of the offense were commit-
ted both in Canada and elsewhere-so that the Canadian authorities can
choose whether to press charges in Canada or to extradite the fugitive to face
prosecution abroad. Although it technically may be possible to prosecute the
fugitive domestically, other factors may indicate that the foreign jurisdiction
is the better place to bring charges and indeed that a prosecution in Canada
would be unlikely to succeed. Obviously, the safe haven problem probably
only will arise where there is a disparity in the sentences imposed by each
state, so that the fugitive is resisting extradition by arguing that he or she
328. See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 836 (Can.); see also Idziak
v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 662 (Can.) ("The state from which a fugitive is re-
quested has a legitimate interest in seeing that it does not become a haven for criminals."). As outlined in
Subsection II.B.1, these concerns might be better addressed by way of a section 1 analysis through a
broader definition of "public." See Libman v. R. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (Can.).
329. For the reasons outlined in Subsection II.B.1, this Article argues that the safe haven argu-
ment is more appropriately considered under section 1 of the Charter than under section 7.
330. See HUGH M. KINDRED Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED IN CANADA 489-90 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing legal controls on deportation); Michell, supra note
53, at 391 (distinguishing deportation from extradition).
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should be prosecuted domestically. I am primarily concerned here with the
first situation; the second is considered in more detail in Part V.11'
Justice Taylor in Ross claimed that the extradition system would be un-
dermined if Canadian citizens could simply return to Canada after having
committed offenses in a foreign state there and effectively resist extradition
solely on the basis of Canadian nationality or because the punishment they
would face in the requesting state would not technically meet Charter scru-
tiny. Something more would be required to justify judicial intervention.332
Such counterbalancing factors are best considered according to an interna-
tional public interest argument under section 1 of the Charter.
F. Conclusion
This Part has addressed the thorny question of how the residual thresh-
old standard of review should operate in practice. Notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court of Canada's indication that courts should intervene only in the
most compelling circumstances, the existence of a residual threshold stan-
dard requires as clear an indication as possible of the circumstances in which
the courts will intervene. The Court has attempted to illustrate the high
threshold for intervention by invoking the language of "shocking the con-
science," suggesting that intervention will be appropriate only where it
would be "simply unacceptable" to surrender a fugitive for extradition. Al-
though this language is powerful, it is also amenable to multiple interpreta-
tions. Not surprisingly, commentators and courts alike are uncomfortable
with a test that does not appear to be moored to more objective elements.
More generally, courts must examine both the substantive law and
criminal justice system in the requesting state when the fugitive alleges that
his or her section 7 Charter rights would be violated by extradition. At the
same time, the courts must be cognizant of their limited ability to evaluate
foreign law and legal systems, and that this awareness should direct them to
intervene only in obvious and extreme situations. Moreover, the courts must
331. The relevance of Canadian citizenship to the safe haven problem is unclear. The impact of
Canadian citizenship on the extradition process is addressed in more detail in Part IV, but it also has sp e-
cific relevance here. In Kindler, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that the fugitive in that case was
a U.S. national, perhaps implying that Canadian nationality might raise different considerations. See Kin-
dler [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 831, 834-35, 836 (La Forest, J., concurring); id. at 853 (McLachlin, J., concur-
ring). This distinction was alluded to by Justice Lambert, dissenting in United States v. Ross [1994] 119
D.L.R.4th 333, 345, 350 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (Lambert, J., dissenting), and explicitly noted by the major-
ity in United States v. Burns [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 535 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.). It is not clear, however,
why the safe haven argument ought to be structured in this manner. Although Canada should not be a safe
haven for foreign citizens who commit offenses abroad and then escape to Canada, neither should it be a
safe haven for Canadian citizens who commit serious offenses abroad and then return. The international
public interest argument developed above would not distinguish between the two situations.
332. See Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 367 (Taylor, J., concurring); id. at 373 (Finch, J., con-
curring) ("The Charter right to remain in Canada could surely not have been intended to create a safe h a-
ven for Canadian citizens minded to commit criminal acts abroad.").
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require fugitives to advance cogent evidence-not merely allegations-that
they face a real risk of being subjected to unconstitutional treatment in the
requesting state.
In an effort to ground the residual threshold standard in more objective
factors, this Article endorses an approach that would see domestic courts
make greater reference to and use of international human rights law to in-
form the interpretation of the requirements of the open-textured language of
the Charter. In several circumstances, there are widely recognized human
rights norms that could be invoked by a domestic court as tangible evidence
that anticipated treatment or punishment in the requesting state would "shock
the conscience." Yet it must also be recognized that there are a number of
fields in which no human rights norms are evident on the international plane,
or else the extant norms are as broad as the domestic constitutional provi-
sions. Domestic courts should view the absence of international human rights
norms with reference to a particular subject as evidence that no consensus
exists on the subject in the international community, suggesting that extradi-
tion to face such treatment or punishment would not violate the Charter.
Even in the absence of international human rights norms, courts may
wish to guide the operation of the residual threshold standard by reference to
the Fugitive Offenders Act, on the theory that fugitives facing extradition
under the Extradition Act should be accorded at least the same degree of
procedural protection that is provided to fugitives under the Fugitive Offend-
ers Act. Though such differences are often minor, there are distinctions be-
tween the two Acts that may aid a domestic court in articulating the opera-
tion of the residual threshold standard in a particular case. A review of the
approach adopted by the courts in civil conflict of laws cases is instructive
for courts exercising constitutional judicial review of ministerial surrender
decisions. As the conflict of laws jurisprudence demonstrates, courts should
adopt a generally deferential approach to foreign laws and legal systems and
should intervene only in exceptional circumstances.
IV. CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE EXTRADITION PROCESS
A. Introduction
The relevance of Canadian citizenship to the extradition process re-
mains uncomfortably uncertain. As a general matter, Canada historically has
followed the practice of other common law countries in extraditing its own
citizens as well as foreigners. Section 6(1) of the Charter, however, indicates
that "[e]very citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada. " "' In Ross, Whitley, Leon, and Burns, each of the fugitives argued
that in the circumstances of his case, extradition to the United States would
333. Charter § 6(1).
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violate his rights under section 6(1) of the Charter and that the violation
could not be upheld under section 1.
Such an argument is based on three related propositions.334 First, the
relevance of Canadian citizenship to the extradition process has not yet been
settled. The Charter's section 6(1) guarantee is explicitly limited to Canadian
citizens and might appear to subject the extradition of Canadian citizens to
heightened constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the section might suggest that Ca-
nadian citizens cannot be extradited at all. The Supreme Court has not de-
termined conclusively what benefits flow from Canadian citizenship in the
extradition context. It would be surprising if there were none at all.335 Yet
there is reason to doubt that the scope of section 6(1) of the Charter can be
stretched as broadly as the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
did in Bums, where the court held that section 6(1) prevents the extradition
of a Canadian citizen to face the death penalty.336
The second issue is the relevance of the fugitive's amenability to prose-
cution in Canada to judicial review of ministerial surrender decisions. This
issue arises only where the offense in question is of a transnational nature
(i.e., drug trafficking cases such as Ross and Whitley, but not Jamieson, and
arguably not Leon) where two or more states (of which Canada is one) have
prescriptive jurisdiction over the crime. Where the fugitive is a Canadian
citizen who could be charged in more than one state with an offense stem-
ming from the same transaction, section 6(1) might indicate a presumption in
favor of trial in Canada. If section 6(1) means anything in the extradition
context (and even United States v. Cotroni suggests that it must provide some
measure of protection for Canadian citizens),337 it may place an obligation
upon the Canadian authorities to proceed with charges against the fugitive in
Canada rather than surrender him for extradition, unless they can demon-
strate that extradition and trial abroad is more appropriate under the circum-
stances.338
334. See United States v. Swystun [1987] 50 Man. R.2d 129, 132-3 (Man. Q.B.) (Can.) (asking
similar questions); Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Etra-
dition: Striking the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191, 200 (1992) (framing issue of refusing extradition on basis
of Canadian citizenship as consisting of three questions).
335. C. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL CO-
OPERATION: LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WrTH RESPECT TO
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION AND oTER MATTERs 34 (1987) ("The Canadian Charter of
Rights may, in certain circumstances, prevent the extradition of a Canadian citizen."); John B. Laskin,
Mobility Rights Under the CGarter, in 4 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEw 89, 93 (E.P. Belobaba & E. Gert-
ner eds., 1982) (asserting that "section 6(1) may call for a more careful exercise of the discretion to su r-
render Canadian citizens").
336. SeeBurns [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d at533-36.
337. See United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, 1480 (Can.).
338. This proposition is premised on the assumption that in most cases a fugitive who is a Cana-
dian citizen would prefer to be prosecuted in Canada rather than abroad, in part due to cultural factors, but
largely because penalties in Canada will often-although not invariably-be less severe than punishment
abroad. See, e.g., United States v. D'Agostino [1997] 41 C.R.R.2d 325, 327 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.).
This position raises the question of what would happen in a transnational offense case in which a Canadian
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The third issue, closely related to the second, concerns judicial review
of prosecutorial discretion in transnational offense cases. The issue was
raised in Leon, although ultimately the Ontario Court of Appeal held that
Leon was not truly a transnational offense case, an opinion that the Supreme
Court of Canada apparently shared. The issue revolves around the existence
and scope of a constitutional right of Canadian fugitives to be prosecuted in
Canada where it is possible or reasonable to do so. If there is such a right
implicit in section 6(1) of the Charter, then by necessity the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion must be amenable to judicial review where charges
are either stayed or not commenced in Canada so that a fugitive may be sur-
rendered for extradition to a requesting state.
In the sections that follow, this Article contends that the Supreme Court
of Canada has been right not to elevate the protection provided by section
6(1) of the Charter to a level of importance such that it would seriously in-
terfere with the ability of the government to extradite Canadian citizens. It
follows from this argument that the British Columbia Court of Appeal erred
in Burns. Although the Supreme Court of Canada reached the right result in
Cotroni, the leading case, its process of reasoning-and in particular, its
section 1 analysis-is open to criticism.
B. The Relevance of Canadian Citizenship to the Extradition Process
1. Cotroni and Its Aftermath
The leading case on the impact of section 6(1) of the Charter upon the
extradition process is United States v. Cotroni.3 9 In two conjoined appeals,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the surrender of a Canadian citizen
for extradition violated his section 6(1) right to remain in Canada and that
the violation could be upheld under section 1. Justice La Forest's majority
opinion conceded that the extradition of a Canadian citizen would constitute
a prima facie violation of section 6(1) but held that "the infringement to s.
6(1) that results from extradition lies at the outer edges of the core values
sought to be protected by that provision."' 4 In Justice La Forest's view,
section 6(1) was intended to provide constitutional protection against such
practices as expulsion and banishment, not extradition."4
citizen faces a more lenient sentence abroad; presumably, it might then be argued that there is a right to be
extradited.
339. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (Can.).
340. Id. at 1481. In support of this view, Justice La Forest relied upon the European Convention
experience to that point in time. The subsequent decision in Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1989), however, indicates that European jurisprudence has evolved since Cotroni and actually
seems to undermine the proposition that Justice La Forest advanced.
341. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1481-83.
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Justice La Forest held that any violation of section 6(1) occasioned by
extradition could be upheld under section 1.Y2 In contrast to the discussion
above of the section 7 issue, section 1 plays the lead role in section 6(1)
cases, in that section 6(1) violations have been upheld under section 1. In-
deed, given that section 6(1) violations may be upheld under section 1, it is
difficult to see under the existing case law what protection section 6(1) pro-
vides to Canadian citizens facing extradition (other than placing the onus on
the government to justify the violation of the section 6(1) right under section
1).
Justice La Forest indicated that even where it was technically possible
to prosecute a fugitive in Canada for a transnational offense, it would in
many cases be more appropriate to extradite the fugitive to face trial in the
state where the harm of the crime was felt. 3 This is not merely a matter of
convenience, although that is also an important consideration.' Rather, the
state where the harm was suffered has a greater interest in exercising the so-
cial functions of assuring justice and imposing punishment. 5 In transna-
tional offense cases, however, as in conflict of laws cases involving multi-
jurisdictional torts, it is often difficult to isolate the harm caused by a crime
to a single jurisdiction, and indeed, it is unclear why it must be so iso-
lated. 6 There was some disagreement on this point in the cases under dis-
cussion. 7 Justice Lambert, dissenting in Ross, suggested that because the
ultimate harm in that case-the distribution of drugs-presumably would
have taken place in Ontario if the drug trafficking scheme had succeeded,
Canada had a greater interest in prosecuting the offense than did Florida. 8
The transnational nature of drug trafficking, with various elements of
the offense scattered across two or more states, suggested to Justice La For-
est that the physical location of the crime rarely could be confined to only
one state in order to establish criminal jurisdiction. Justice La Forest indi-
cated that although the physical location of an offense was a relevant consid-
eration for jurisdictional purposes, courts must adopt a more flexible ap-
proach to jurisdictional questions in cases of transnational crime." 9 As the
342. This approach had also been taken in a number of early cases in lower courts. See supra
note 29.
343. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1488.
344. See Bert Swart, Refusal of Extradition and the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition,
23 NErn. Y.B. INT'LL. 175, 190 (1992).
345. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1488, 1495; see also Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice)
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 662 (Can.).
346. See Libman v. R. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 209 (Can.); Morgan, supra note 102, at 271.
347. See, e.g., United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 358 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aff'd,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 469 (Can.).
348. See id.
349. This course was taken by the Court in Libman, which held that courts may exercise subject
matter jurisdiction when there is a "real and substantial link" between the offense and Canada. See Ubman
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 178. For example, where a fugitive is accused of involvement in a trafficking scheme to
import drugs from Canada to the United States, it might be thought that the United States would have a
stronger interest in prosecuting the fugitive, given that the harm of the offense did (or would have) o c-
curred there. This would not suggest, however, that Canada would be unable to prosecute the fugitive, and
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place of wrongdoing was not the decisive factor for criminal law jurisdiction
over transnational crime, neither should it be accorded undue weight for the
purposes of domestic constitutional law, especially under section 6(1). It is
the physical presence of the fugitive in Canada, not the place of alleged
wrongdoing, that implicates section 6(1) in the extradition context where the
fugitive is a Canadian citizen. 0
2. The Alleged Interrelationship Between Section 6 and Section 7 of
the Charter and the Obligation to Prosecute in Canada
Justice Lambert in Ross advanced an interesting but ultimately imprac-
tical argument based upon what he called the intertwined application of sec-
tions 6 and 7. He thought that the fugitive's willingness to plead guilty to
charges in Canada that .would arise on the evidence removed the significance
of a number of the elements of the Cotroni equation (i.e., the forum non
conveniens-type test set out in United States v. Swystun) and was decisive of
the issue as to whether a prosecution in Canada would be realistic. When
combined with the mandatory minimum sentence argument, Justice Lambert
held that the Florida punishment was disproportionate and so weighed heav-
ily against surrendering the fugitive to Florida, particularly given his consti-
tutional right under section 6(1) to remain in Canada. Other courts also have
identified the citizenship of the fugitive as a factor in determining whether
there has been a section 7 or section 12 violation.351 Yet it is difficult to es-
cape the conclusion that Justice Lambert intermingled the two grounds (sec-
tions 6 and 7) because neither of them would have survived independently.35
it could not be denied that such activities cause a certain harm to the Canadian public as well. Both states,
therefore, possess a valid interest in seeking the presence of the fugitive for prosecution.
350. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1493. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Wilson argued that
under the circumstances, the violation of section 6(1) could not be upheld under section 1. See id. at 1501-
16. The primary factor influencing her decision was the fact that elements of the offense had been commit-
ted in Canada:
I emphasize that we are dealing in these cases with a very narrow issue. We are not
dealing with circumstances in which a Canadian citizen who has committed an offence in a
foreign country seeks to resist extradition on the basis of his right under section 6(1) of the
Charter to remain in Canada. Such a claim would, in my opinion, fail.
Id. at 1510. Justice Wilson thus disagreed with Justice La Forest's view that the locus of the offense was
irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Moreover, extradition of a Canadian citizen where prosecution in
Canada was an option violated section 6(1) and could not be upheld under section 1 because it violated the
minimal impairment element of the proportionality branch of the Oakes test. See R. v. Oakes [1986] 1
S.C.R. 103, 135-40 (Can.). Justice Sopinka also dissented and would have found a violation of section
6(1) that could not be upheld under section 1. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1517-20.
351. See United States v. Garcia [1994] O.J. No. 1027, 52-53 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (sug-
gesting that section 12 affords fugitive no relief from extradition to United States because of fugitive's
American citizenship), appeal dismissed, [1996] 31 W.C.B.2d 458 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal
refused, [1997] 34 W.C.B.2d v (Can.).
352. But see United States v. Dibben [1996] A.Q. No. 1340, 21 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (Fish, J.,
concurring) ("Section 6(1) of the Charter does not grant persons who commit offences triable both here and
abroad the right to choose the jurisdiction in which they will be prosecuted."), leave to appeal refused,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. vii (Can.).
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The British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in Burns pushed Jus-
tice Lambert's reasoning in Ross to its logical extreme and highlighted its de-
ficiencies. In Burns, the Court held that section 6(1) of the Charter prohibits
the extradition of a Canadian citizen to face the death penalty in a requesting
state and that the violation of section 6(1) could not be upheld under section
1. The constitutionality of surrendering a Canadian citizen to face the death
penalty abroad was a matter of first impression. Constrained by the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Kindler and Ng, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
rejected the fugitives' argument that the decision to surrender them to face
the death penalty in Washington violated either section 7 or section 12 of the
Charter. 3 But in both Kindler and Ng, the fugitives were foreigners. In
Burns, by contrast, the fugitives were Canadian citizens and thus were enti-
tled to section 6(1) protection. The majority held that this was a distinction
with a difference.
The Burns majority observed that Cotroni had concluded that the sur-
render of a Canadian citizen for extradition constitutes a violation of section
6(1) of the Charter. The Cotroni court also held, however, that the violation
of section 6(1) could be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. The majority
in Burns interpreted Justice La Forest's reasoning in Cotroni to be based on
the view that extradition could be distinguished from exile and banishment-
the primary evils sought to be addressed by section 6(1)-on the basis that a
Canadian citizen always could return to Canada after trial and punishment (if
any) in the requesting state. In short, extradition was not permanent. 354 Yet
where the death penalty was a possibility, Justice Donald held, extradition
could be permanent. As such, it amounted to permanent exile or banishment,
and thus the violation of section 6(1) that it occasioned could not be upheld
under section 1 of the Charter because it did not only minimally impair the
fugitives' rights.355 Without an assurance that they would not be executed,
the extradition of Canadian citizens violated the Charter.
35 6
It would appear to follow that extradition of a Canadian citizen to face
a mandatory life sentence in the requesting state would also be unconstitu-
tional, because it too would be "permanent." Justice Donald recognized this
counterargument and attempted to deflect it by claiming that mandatory life
imprisonment could be distinguished because of the possibility of release,
clemency, or return to serve the remainder of the sentence in Canada under
transfer of prisoners treaties and legislation. 7 Yet this rejoinder proves too
much, both because the possibility of release or clemency also exists for fu-
gitives who face the death penalty in the requesting state and because there is
353. See United States v. Burns [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524,529,536 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.).
354. See id. at 534-37; id. at 543 (McEachern, C.J., concurring).
355. This decision was made under the Charter section 1 test outlined in Oakes. See id. at 534-
35.
356. See id. at 544.
357. See id. at 535.
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no obligation upon the Minister to allow a fugitive imprisoned abroad to be
transferred to serve the remainder of his or her sentence in Canada.
The Minister argued that while the age of the fugitives should be taken
into account, it was not a determinative factor in his decision to surrender
the fugitives or to seek assurances that the death penalty would not be im-
posed or executed. Similarly, the Minister indicated that the citizenship of
the fugitives was merely another factor to be considered, not a trump card
prohibiting surrender or requiring assurances that the death penalty would
not be imposed or executed. Justice Donald held that the Minister had erred.
In so holding, he stated that the "safe haven" argument upon which Justice
La Forest had relied in Kindler applied only to foreign fugitives, and not to
Canadian citizens."' This argument cannot withstand scrutiny, however, be-
cause it ignores the international public interest argument developed above.
Canada has a strong interest in ensuring that it does not become a safe haven
for foreign citizens who commit offenses abroad and then enter Canada
hoping to escape responsibility for the consequences. Yet Canada has an
equally important interest in ensuring that it does not become a refuge for
Canadians who commit crimes abroad. 9
The reasoning of the majority in Bums, and of Justice Lambert in
Ross, is based on a fundamental misconception. In Ross, Justice Lambert as-
serted that the fugitive, as a Canadian citizen, should not be required to pay
what Justice Lambert regarded as a disproportionate penalty in Florida. He
did so on the unusual argument that there was no relationship between the
fugitive and Florida. Had the fugitive been a citizen of Florida, Justice Lam-
bert held, then "under the democratic process he would be responsible for
the legislation in Florida and the legislators in Florida would be responsible
to him."" An element of Justice Lambert's argument rings true: The legiti-
macy of a state's application of its law (criminal or otherwise) to an individ-
ual or transaction always depends upon the strength of the connection be-
tween the state and the individual or transaction. Consent in some form is the
primary type of legitimate connection for jurisdictional purposes.3 6' For ex-
ample, when courts are faced with the question of whether to enforce a for-
eign judgment, they must satisfy themselves that the foreign court properly
exercised jurisdiction over the case. Whether on the new test ("real and sub-
358. See, e.g., id. at 541; Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 835-839,
853 (Can.).
359. See supra note 331.
360. United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 358 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd, [1996] 1
S.C.R. 469 (Can.).
361. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1297-1303
(1989). Even the "effects doctrine" can be explained on this basis, because the effects of criminal activity
must have been foreseeable by the defendant, so that he or she may be considered to have chosen to subject
him- or herself to foreign law. See United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (Can.) (allowing extra-
dition of Canadian citizen to United States even though offense was committed in Canada because it had
foreseeable effects in United States).
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stantial connection")362 or the old one (presence, submission, or explicit con-
sent),3 63 the consent, implicit or otherwise, of the defendant to the application
of foreign law to him or her is a central consideration.
But it is a far cry from the rather general proposition that there must be
a legitimate connection between a state and an individual in order for the
state to apply its law to the individual, to argue that it is illegitimate for a
state to apply its criminal law to an individual who is not a citizen of the
state. Consent can manifest itself in many forms. One such important form
of consent is voluntary submission. The territorial theory of jurisdiction, a
bedrock principle of Canadian law, indicates that the substantive law that
will apply to an individual or transaction is determined by the state in whose
territory he or she is located, a view recently reaffirmed with vigor by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the conflict of laws context.
3 4
Yet this view is not the whole story. Where an individual voluntarily
acts in such a way as to cause foreseeably harmful effects in a foreign state,
that foreign state legitimately may subject the individual to criminal prosecu-
tion. Given a territorial nexus or voluntary creation of harmful effects, the
nationality of the individual is simply irrelevant. The fugitive in Ross had
traveled voluntarily to Florida and must have known that Florida law would
apply to him3 5 Taken to its logical conclusion, Justice Lambert's "consent"
argument would have undesirable consequences and would be unworkable in
practice. It is blind to the reality of transnational crime and smacks of the
splendid isolationism that the Supreme Court of Canada has decried.Y In-
deed, as argued above, the courts properly take jurisdiction over an offense
even when many of the elements of the crime occurred outside the coun-
try.
367
Justice Lambert readily acknowledged that his decision would confer
greater rights upon Canadian citizens than upon foreigners. Yet he suggested
that what he proposed for Canada was no different from what civil law
countries had done for themselves under their extradition treaties. Those
countries, however, had negotiated such provisions under their treaties and
also habitually prosecute on the basis of nationality rather than territorial-
ity.3" Nothing in international law indicates that states may not extradite
362. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1106-07 (Can.).
363. See Emanuel v. Symon [1908] 1 K.B. 302, 309 (Eng. C.A.).
364. See Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 1049-50 (Can.); see also Harrer v. R. [1995]
3 S.C.R. 562, 589 (Can.) (applying Charter). A possible exception may exist for cases of involuntary pres-
ence in the territory, see Michell, supra note 53, at 390 n.23 (listing several forcible abduction cases), but
this would have no application on the facts of the cases under discussion here. Mere citizenship alone does
not establish a real and substantial connection to the forum in the civil context. See Nicholas v. Nicholas
[1996] 94 O.A.C. 21, 25 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
365. See Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 368-70.
366. See Morguard [1990) 3 S.C.R. at 1095 (stating that states cannot exist in "splendid isola-
tion"); Libman v. R. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 214 (Can.) (discussing international public interest).
367. SeeLibman [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 178.
368. See Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R. 4th at 558; see also LA FORES, supra note 3, at 99-100 (dis-
cussing state's discretion to refuse extradition on basis of nationality).
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their own nationals. Justice Lambert's proposal is radical and extravagant. It
and the British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in Burns, which flows
from it, should be rejected.
C. Relevance of Citizenship in Cases Where the Fugitive Could Be Prose-
cuted in Canada
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Cotroni, the Canadian
Government's ability to prosecute a Canadian citizen in Canada for an of-
fense is not a bar to his extradition to face charges in the requesting state
arising out of the same circumstances. Two types of cases must be distin-
guished: first, those where the fugitive could be prosecuted in Canada; and
second, those where he or she could not. The main issue in Cotroni was
whether section 6(1) conferred a right on a Canadian citizen to be tried in
Canada rather than surrendered for trial abroad where possible. Justice La
Forest denied that section 6(1) conferred any such right. As a general propo-
sition, this seems appropriate for the second type of case, but probably goes
too far for the first.369
In this section, I argue that section 6(1) of the Charter could be ac-
corded an appropriate degree of weight in the extradition context by impos-
ing a forum non conveniens-type test in transnational offense cases. That is,
in cases involving a fugitive who is a Canadian citizen charged with an of-
fense of a transnational nature and who is amenable to prosecution for that
offense in more than one state, section 6(1) of the Charter should require that
the Canadian authorities satisfy the court on a civil burden of proof that
prosecution in Canada (rather than extradition to face prosecution abroad) is
not a realistic option.
The fugitives in Cotroni argued that the particular circumstances of
their case took it outside the operation of the general principle that Canadian
citizenship was essentially irrelevant to the extradition process. Justice La
Forest disputed the fugitives' characterization as colorable because the of-
fenses in question were essentially "transnational in nature."37 So although
the fugitives technically had not been physically present in the United States,
it was clear that they had, in a sense, acted there by causing harm there.
This also seems correct: The fugitives were involved in efforts to ship drugs
into the United States for distribution there, so the harmful effects of the of-
fense were mostly (though not entirely) manifested in the United States. Of
369. Cotroni was complicated by the fact that the fugitives in that case, Canadian citizens, were
sought by the U.S. government for offenses which seemed to have been committed entirely within Canada,
although with harmful effects in the United States. See United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469,
1477 (Can.); see also United States v. Swystun [1987] 50 Man. R.2d 129, 133-34 (Man. Q.B.) (Can.)
(discussing rationale of lower court decision in Cotrom).
370. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1493.
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course, the fugitives' activities also may have had harmful effects in Canada
that would have justified their prosecution in Canada.
In the second kind of case, where the fugitive could not be prosecuted
in Canada for either jurisdictional or practical reasons, the only alternatives
would be to attempt to prosecute the fugitive on the basis of nationality juris-
diction or to set him or her free. Obviously, the latter alternative would be
unpalatable in the vast majority of cases, although adoption of the residual
threshold standard necessarily leads one to take the view that allowing the
fugitive to go free still would be preferable to sending a fugitive to face tor-
ture or other "incontrovertibly shocking" punishments in the requesting
state. Such a result is inevitable, however, if Canadian citizens can rely upon
section 6(1) to resist extradition for offenses committed abroad, because Ca-
nadian authorities have no general power to prosecute Canadians for foreign
offenses solely on the basis of their Canadian nationality.371 If Canada is to
decline to surrender fugitives for extradition where they would face viola-
tions of their human rights in the foreign state, it would be desirable to enact
legislation enabling the fugitives to be prosecuted in Canada for the offenses
in question.372
Yet even this would not be an entirely satisfactory situation. First, such
legislation could apply only to Canadian citizens. Canada could not prosecute
foreign citizens for crimes committed outside Canada that had no effects in
Canada, which would lead to anomalous results in cases involving both Ca-
nadian and non-Canadian fugitives. Second, even in the case of the prosecu-
tion of Canadian citizens under legislation that provided for the exercise of
Canadian criminal jurisdiction over them on the basis of the nationality prin-
ciple, the practical obstacles to an effective prosecution would often prove
overwhelming, as Justice La Forest stressed in Cotroni1 3 Indeed, it is pre-
371. Unlike many civil law states, which couple their refusal to extradite their own nationals with
an ability to prosecute their nationals on the basis of the nationality principle of jurisdiction, Canadian law
makes only limited provision for the exercise of nationality-based prescriptive jurisdiction. This does not
mean that under public international law, Canada could not exercise such jurisdiction over its nationals,
only that historically it has not chosen to do so. With exceptions in a very narrow range of offenses, there-
fore, there is no basis in domestic law for exercising nationality-based jurisdiction. Canada has chosen to
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality principle only for offenses akin to treason,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See KiNDRED Er AL., supra note 330, at 432. Recent legislation
has amended the Criminal Code to endow Canadian courts with what is in effect extraterritorial jurisdiction
to combat "child sex tourism" and related offenses abroad by Canadian citizens and permanent residents.
See An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Child Prostitution, Child Sex Tourism, Criminal Harassment
and Female Genital Mutilation), ch. 16, 1997 S.C. (Can.) (allowing for prosecution of Canadian citizens
and permanent residents for acts or omissions committed outside of Canada that would constitute sexual
offense against children if committed in Canada). Of course, Canadian legislation also allows Canadian
courts to prosecute individuals under the universality principle, regardless of the nationality of the defen-
dant or the location of the offense, although this jurisdiction may be invoked only in the most unusual ci r-
cumstances. See R. v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 807 (Can.).
372. See Crime Knows No Country, GLOBE & MAI. (Toronto), Feb. 17, 1996, at D6.
373. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1496-97. Nationality-based jurisdiction is strongly criticized
in Sharon A. William, Recent Developments in Extradition: Interstate Co-Operation and Individual Rights
in Extradition Law: Can the Two Exist?, HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 95 (1993); and E.P. AUGTEmRSON,
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cisely these practical obstacles that have given rise to the forum non con-
veniens doctrine in civil litigation.
Even in transnational cases in which it is technically possible to charge
the fugitive in Canada, Justice La Forest rejected the contention that section
6(1) of the Charter imposes a general requirement that Canadian citizens be
prosecuted in Canada.374 He emphasized that the Canadian authorities "must
in good faith direct their minds to whether prosecution would be equally ef-
fective in Canada, given the existing domestic laws and international coop-
erative arrangements. They have an obligation flowing from s[ection] 6(1) to
assure themselves that prosecution in Canada is not a realistic option. " "
Should it be established that this discretion had been exercised for improper
or arbitrary motives, the fugitive would have a remedy under section 24 of
the Charter. Otherwise, the ministerial surrender decision would have to
stand.
The majority judges at the court of appeal in Jamieson II, Ross,
Whitley, and Leon followed Justice La Forest's lead in Cotroni. Justice
Taylor in Ross did not accept that the extradition of a Canadian citizen to
face charges in the United States violated section 6(1) of the Charter, even
though bringing charges in Canada was not a realistic alternative to extradi-
tion:
I understand that expression ["realistic alternative"] to mean that the laying of charges
in Canada would constitute a good reason for refusing extradition, and I do not under-
stand how this could be said when the only justification for dealing with the matter in
Canada would be so as to enable the appellant to secure a less severe punishment than
that likely to be imposed in the only place where he is said to have actually sought to
carry his unlawful plan into execution, and where he was arrested and committed for
trial.
376
EXTRADITION: AUSrRAUiAN LAw AND PROCEDURE 129 (1995), which observes that the principle of non-
extradition of nationals is based upon "suspicion of foreign justice and legal systems."
374. Justice La Forest argued that
[a] general exception for a Canadian citizen who could be charged in Canada would, in my
view, interfere unduly with the objectives of the system of extradition .... To require j u-
dicial examination of each individual case to see which could more effectively and fairly be
tried in one country or the other would pose an impossible task and seriously interfere with
the workings of the system.
Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1494.
375. Id. at 1498. It is unclear whether the reverse proposition holds-that Canadian officials
might be obliged to seek extradition of Canadian citizens from abroad or their return under transfer of pris-
oners treaties and legislation. This position was suggested by the fugitive's argument in Mackie v. Drum-
heller Institution [1995] 2 W.W.R. 369, 377 (Alta. Q.B.) (Can.), aff'd, [1996] 111 C.C.C.3d 333 (Alta.
C.A.) (Can.), and seems a logical extension from the fugitive's argument in Wong v. Canada (Minister of
Justice) [1996] 37 C.R.R.2d 355 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.). In Mackie, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the
Canadian Government is under no obligation to seek extradition of a fugitive who flees Canada before
serving his sentence to ensure that the Canadian sentence will be served concurrently with foreign sen-
tences imposed for crimes committed while at large in the foreign jurisdiction.
376. United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 369 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd, [1996] 1
S.C.R. 469 (Can.).
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What, then, does "realistic option" mean? Regrettably, this question
has not been adequately addressed. The Supreme Court in Cotroni set out the
relevant factors for a review of the Minister's decision to either prosecute a
fugitive domestically or to surrender him for extradition:
(a) where the impact of the offense was felt or likely to have been felt;
(b) which jurisdiction has the greater interest in prosecuting the offense;
(c) which police force played the major role in the development of the
case;
(d) which jurisdiction has brought charges;
(e) which jurisdiction has the most comprehensive case;
(f) which jurisdiction is ready to proceed to trial;
(g) where the evidence is located;
(h) whether the evidence is mobile;
(i) the number of accused involved and whether they can be gathered
together in one place for trial;
(j) in what jurisdiction most of the acts in furtherance of the crime were
committed;
(k) the nationality and residence of the accused; and
(1) the severity of the sentence the accused is likely to receive in each
jurisdiction."
The origin of these factors is unclear. The Supreme Court of Canada
adapted them from the trial decision in Swystun, but there is no indication in
that case as to their provenance. Nonetheless, their resemblance to the fac-
tors in a forum non conveniens determination in civil litigation is unmistak-
able.378 Similar factors are outlined in article 17 bis of the Canada-United
States Extradition Treaty. 79 There are close parallels between conflict of
377. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1498-99 (identifying these factors as those "that will usually
affect" decision whether to prosecute in Canada or to surrender individual for extradition and prosecution
abroad).
378. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Bd.) [1993] 1
S.C.R. 897, 915-22 (Can.) (outlining elements of forum non conveniens test); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd. [1987] App. Cas. 460, 474-78 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (same).
379. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, Can.-U.S., Can. T.S. No. 3. The treaty was amended
in 1988:
If both contracting Parties have jurisdiction to prosecute the person for the offense
for which extradition is sought, the executive authority of the requested State, after con-
sulting with the executive authority of the requesting State, shall decide whether to extradite
the person or to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
In making its decision, the requested State shall consider all relevant factors, including but
not limited to:
(i) the place where the act was committed or intended to be committed or the injury
occurred or was intended to occur;
(ii) the respective interests of the Contracting Parties;
(ii) the nationality of the victim or the intended victim; and
(iv) the availability and location of the evidence.
Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 11, 1988, Can.-U.S., 1991 Can. T.S. No. 37. For a
discussion of judicial review of the Minister's surrender decision under art. 17 bis, see United States v.
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laws principles and those that should guide courts in extradition cases. In
both situations, the principal issue is the determination of the most appropri-
ate forum for the trial of the action in order to provide justice to the par-
ties.
380
Admittedly, the rights of the fugitive in the extradition context have a
more obvious constitutional dimension. The differences between extradition
and civil litigation, however, should not be exaggerated. The Supreme Court
of Canada has in recent years emphasized that the principles that underlie ju-
risdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments are order and fairness, principles that possess quasi-constitutional
status.38' The importance of comity, which looms large in the extradition
context, has also been emphasized in conflict of laws cases .3' The same
principles, I suggest, should guide extradition: Courts must ensure that fair-
ness to the fugitive is balanced against the need to maintain order in the form
of a smoothly functioning international extradition network.
Where an application is made for a stay of proceedings in civil litiga-
tion on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the general pre-
sumption is that the forum is appropriate for trial of the action. The party
seeking the stay in favor of trial abroad must demonstrate that some other fo-
rum is both available and clearly more appropriate.383 A mere balance of
convenience is insufficient. 384 This rule ensures that, as between the forum
and the foreign state, the trial will take place in the most appropriate juris-
Giannini [1994] O.J. No. 3268 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), which rejects the argument that the Minister had fhiled
to satisfy himself that domestic prosecution was not a realistic option.
380. See Amchem [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 919; Gu~rin c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice) [1996]
R.J.Q. 1457, 1465 (Que. C.A.) (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [1996 3 S.C.R. ix (Can.); Spiliada
[1987] App. Cas. at 476.
381. See Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.) (discussing choice of law in tort);
Amchem [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (discussing anti-suit injunctions); Hunt v. T&N pic [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289
(Can.) (discussing constitutionality of provincial business records legislation); Morguard Investments Ltd.
v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.) (discussing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
To date, the issues raised by Morguard and its progeny have been considered as constitutional limitations
upon the jurisdiction of provincial superior courts and legislatures to proscribe and enforce. Underlying
much of this discussion, however, is a strain of constitutional due process analysis, focusing upon the con-
stitutional (i.e., section 7 of the Charter) implications of the exercise of jurisdiction over a person, rather
than the federalism form of constitutionalism with its focus upon the ability of a particular province to ex-
ercise jurisdiction. A more American-style approach to jurisdictional issues might suggest that Morguard
implicitly requires that courts observe due process limits to their exercise of jurisdiction.
382. See Amchem [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 930; Morguard [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096-97; The Abidin
Daver [1984] App. Cas. 398, 411 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
383. See Frymer v. Brettschneider [1994] 19 O.R.3d 60, 67 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.); Spiliada [1987]
App. Cas. at 476. Where the defendant is served exjuris, it is the plaintiff who must demonstrate that the
forum is convenient. In the extradition context, might citizenship be considered analogous to being served
exjuris? Where the fugitive is Canadian, it could be argued that the government should bear the burden on
a civil standard of demonstrating that it would be more appropriate that the fugitive be tried in the request-
ing state. If the fugitive is a foreign citizen, then he or she bears the responsibility of showing that trial in
Canada would be more appropriate.
384. See Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Foster Yeoman Ltd. [1993] 14 O.R.3d 548, 570-71 (Ont.
Gen. Div.) (Can.); Banco Atlantico S.A. v. British Bank of the Middle East [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 504,
508 (Eng. C.A.).
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diction. The court must weigh a number of factors in making its determina-
tion,385 and the higher courts are reluctant to intervene in the weighing proc-
ess." 6 A similar approach, suitably modified to take into account the section
6(1) rights of the fugitive, also should apply in the extradition context.
Put simply, the place where the crime was committed may not always
be the most appropriate place to prosecute it. As in conflict of laws cases ad-
dressing the location of a tort, there may be a certain degree of arbitrariness
in the determination that the offense "took place" in only one state.38 7 In
transnational offense cases, which could give rise to prosecution either in
Canada or abroad, the Supreme Court's requirement that prosecution take
place in Canada when it is a realistic option to do so could be given sub-
stance by invoking a forum non conveniens-type test. The government
would be required to demonstrate that, according to the factors outlined in
Swystun, the fugitive should be tried in the foreign state.388 The length of the
sentence that the fugitive would face, either in Canada or abroad, would not
be a consideration in this equation. If the Canadian Government could not
discharge this burden, surrender for extradition should be quashed.
D. Review of the Surrender Decision and the Good Faith of the Executive
The third issue, judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in the extra-
dition context, was not entirely resolved by Leon. The Supreme Court of
Canada suggested in R. v. Power that it will only be in extreme circum-
stances ("the clearest of cases")389 that the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion will be quashed on judicial review and reiterated this view in Leon.3" In
theory, there are two distinct discretions being exercised: first, whether to
prosecute the fugitive in Canada; and second, whether to surrender the fugi-
tive for extradition.' In practice, however, the two issues are connected.
Moreover, a process of consultation takes place between the various authori-
ties, so that there is really only one exercise of discretion, in that one deci-
sion naturally follows from the other.Y The discretion operates only in
transnational offense cases, where the fugitive could be charged in more than
385. See Amchem [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 917 (holding that court must look at factors to determine
whether dispute has connections with one forum rather than another in order to determine where dispute
should be litigated); Spiliada [1987] App. Cas. at 477-78 (same).
386. See Spiliada [1987] App. Cas. at 485-86.
387. See Moran v. Pyle Nat'l (Canada) Ltd. [1974] 43 D.L.R.2d 239, 242-50 (Can.) (examining
various tests for determining location of tort); Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc. [1990] 1 Q.B. 391, 443 (Eng. C.A.) (discussing problem of locating multi-jurisdictional torts).
388. See United States v. Swystun [1987] 50 Man. R.2d 129, 133-34 (Man. Q.B.) (Can.).
389. R. v. Power [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, 615.
390. See United States v. Leon [1996] 1 S.C.R. 888, 892.
391. Moreover, the functions of the Minister of Justice are distinct from those of the Attorney
General. See Gu~rin c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice) [1996] R.J.Q. 1457, 1464 (Que. C.A.) (Can.),
leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3 S.C.R. ix (Can.).
392. See Swystun [1987] 50 Man. R.2d at 134.
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one state with offenses stemming from the same transaction. Thus, the do-
mestic authorities decide either to prosecute domestically -and refuse to ex-
tradite or decline to prosecute domestically in favor of surrender for extradi-
tion.
In Leon, the fugitive sought material relating to the Minister's decision
to surrender him for extradition rather than pursue charges against him in
Canada. He argued that this material was necessary to vindicate his rights
under section 6(1) of the Charter, and therefore the Minister was obliged to
provide it to him. The Ontario Court of Appeal did not doubt that the Min-
ister owed a duty of fairness to the fugitive and was obliged to observe the
requirements of natural justice in making the surrender decision. The scope
of the duty of fairness was closely related to the nature of the proceedings
and the consequences of the decision for the fugitive.3"
The Court held that the Minister's surrender decision was political
rather than judicial in nature. Although the Minister was obligated to dis-
close the case against the fugitive and provide him with a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond, there was no obligation to hold an oral hearing or to pro-
vide further disclosure. The fugitive sought the basis on which the Minister
had exercised his discretion not to prosecute him in Canada. The Court held
that its ability to review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was very
limited.
Justice Laskin conceded that in appropriate circumstances an improper
motive underlying the Minister's decision to prefer extradition over prosecu-
tion in Canada would justify judicial review of prosecutorial discretion.
There must be "an air of reality" to such an allegation, however, before the
Court will order disclosure of the information sought by the fugitive. 35 Jus-
tice Griffiths in Leon reached a similar conclusion: The Court will only in-
terfere in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion "[w]here there is conspicu-
ous evidence of improper motives or of bad faith or of an act so wrong that
it violates the conscience of the community .... "396 The fugitive could not
demonstrate such improper motives, other than evidence that he would face
more severe penalties for the charges in the United States. The Court con-
cluded that the Minister had not breached his duty of fairness to the fugitive
in refusing to order production of the material relating to the surrender deci-
sion.
393. See Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 656-57 (Can.).
394. See R. v. Power [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, 616 (Can.) (outlining strict test to be met to find
abuse of process); see also United States v. Dibben [1996] A.Q. No. 1340, 18 (Que. C.A.) (Can.) (Fish,
J., concurring) (arguing that threshold for judicial intervention is high), leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3
S.C.R. vii (Can.).
395. See United States v. Whitley [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 693, 708 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), aft'd,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 467 (Can.).
396. United States v. Leon [1995] 96 C.C.C.3d 568, 575 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (citing Power
[1994] 1 S.C.R. at 616), aft'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 888 (Can.).
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The fugitive in Leon faced charges in both Canada and the United
States. He argued that prosecution in Canada was a "realistic and equally ef-
fective option" 31 that the Minister was obliged to pursue. In the Court's
view, the Minister had applied the relevant legal principles properly and had
expressly taken into account several of the factors enumerated in Cotroni and
in article 17 bis of the Treaty. Ultimately, the Minister had decided that
prosecution in Canada would not be equally effective, and there were no le-
gal grounds to dispute this decision. The Leon court distinguished Cotroni on
the basis that Cotroni concerned conduct in Canada for which the fugitive
could have been criminally charged in both Canada and the United States.
Conversely, in Leon, the fugitive was faced with charges in each country
relating to "discrete and separate acts of misconduct in both jurisdictions."3 8
The charges that the fugitive faced in the United States were broader than
those that he had faced in Canada. In essence, the court of appeal held that
Leon was not a transnational offense case after all.
By contrast, Justice Lambert, dissenting in Ross, outlined a more am-
bitious role in extradition cases for section 6(1) of the Charter. He contended
that most states with extradition treaties grant their own citizens greater pro-
tection than non-citizens against foreign extradition requests. This analysis is
not quite correct. Although generally true for civil law states, which often
are willing to prosecute on the basis of nationality jurisdiction, the historical
practice of common law countries has been to treat nationals and foreign
citizens identically.39 Moreover, the refusal of some states to extradite their
own nationals is a controversial practice that increasingly has come under
attack. 4 °
Nevertheless, Justice Lambert suggested that U.S. nationals may enjoy
greater constitutional protection than foreign nationals against extradition to
face charges in a foreign state. 401 As a general rule, however, the United
States does not provide greater constitutional protection in the extradition
context to its nationals (as compared with foreign citizens) in the absence of
397. Whitley [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 708.
398. Leon [1995] 96 C.C.C.3d at 575; see also Great Britain v. Taylor (No. 2) [1990] O.. No.
2015 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (staying charges against fugitive in Canada in favor of rendition to United
Kingdom), aft'd, Doc. CA 1046190, Mar. 18, 1991 (Ont. C.A) (Can.).
399. But cf Extradition Act, 1988, § 45 (Austl.) (permitting Australia to prosecute Australian na-
tionals for foreign offenses when Australia has declined to extradite them on basis of Australian national-
ity). The provision has not yet been applied by the courts.
400. See Christian Shachor-Landau, Extra-Territorial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradition, 29
INr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 274, 286-89 (1980); Williams, supra note 373, at 96-100.
401. See United States v. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 333, 353 (B.C. C.A.) (Can.) (Lambert, J.,
dissenting) (citing In re Assarsson, 538 F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (D. Minn. 1982)), aft'd, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 469
(Can.). Justice Lambert made no reference to the Eighth Circuit's decision affirming the trial court. See In
re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982). It appears that he may have misread Assarsson as interpret-
ing Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936), to mean that the U.S. government
faces barriers to the extradition of U.S. citizens. But Valentine says only that U.S. citizens may not be ex-
tradited in the absence of a treaty or legislative provision for doing so. See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 8. The
rule in Canada is identical. See In re Insull [1933] 60 C.C.C. 254 (Ont. S.C.) (Can.) (holding that there is
no power to extradite in absence of statutory basis).
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a specific treaty provision empowering it to do so. 4" These considerations
suggested to Justice Lambert that granting greater protection to Canadians
under section 6 of the Charter than that accorded to foreign citizens would
not "create a gap in the network of international comity created by the extra-
dition laws."" But, of course, it would do exactly that. Such an interpreta-
tion of section 6(1) would undermine Canada's treaty obligations with for-
eign states, obligations that the Supreme Court has indicated Canadians
"have a very real interest" in seeing "properly fulfilled. ""
This is not to say that section 6(1) of the Charter should play no role in
protecting the rights of Canadian citizens facing extradition abroad. None-
theless, the scope of protection that section 6(1) provides must be defined
with regard to the history of extradition practice and the reality of interna-
tional relations. In Cotroni, Justice La Forest emphasized that the history of
the Canada-United States extradition relationship demonstrated that ease of
travel between the two countries made it imperative that neither state grant
special privileges to its own nationals in the extradition process. 40 5 The ques-
tion is one of establishing a proper balance. The logical extension of Justice
Lambert's approach would be that section 6(1) would compel the adoption of
nationality-based prescriptive jurisdiction, a thoroughly implausible result4"
and one specifically addressed by Justice La Forest in Cotroni itself.47
Any advocate of a standard of judicial review in extradition cases that
contemplate the quashing of surrender orders on the basis of human rights
concerns, such as the ones put forward in this Article, necessarily must ad-
dress the problem of what to do with fugitives in the event that such a sur-
render order is quashed. Given that Canada is unlikely, under existing law,
402. See United States v. Allard [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, 571-72 (Can.); R. v. Schmidt [1987] 1
S.C.R. 500, 525 (holding that fugitive's U.S. citizenship does not entitle him to special protection from
application of foreign law and procedures after extradition); see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,
465-69 (1912) (holding that U.S. citizenship does not provide protection against extradition); Neely v.
Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1986) (re-
jecting argument that U.S. citizens cannot be extradited); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098,
1104-07 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); RESrATEMENr, supra note 104, § 475 reporter's note 4.
403. Ross [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th at 352 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
404. Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, 663 (Can.).
405. See United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, 1490-91 (Can.).
406. Several common law states have recently moved to enact nationality-based jurisdiction stat-
utes for "child sex tourism" offenses. See, e.g., Crimes (Child Sex Tourism) Amendment Act, 1994
(Austi.); An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Child Prostitution, Child Sex Tourism, Criminal Harass-
ment and Female Genital Mutilation), ch. 16, 1997 S.C. (Can.) (allowing for prosecution of Canadian citi-
zens and permanent residents for acts or omissions committed outside Canada that would constitute sexual
offense against children if committed in Canada); Sex Offenders Act, 1997 (U.K.); Sexual Offenses (Con-
spiracy and Incitement) Act, 1996 (U.K.). Such legislation is meant to address a relatively narrow prob-
lem, however; it is difficult to view these statutes as establishing a greater trend towards extraterritorial
regulation of the activities of nationals. Nationality-based prescriptive jurisdiction, of course, has a strong
foundation in international law, as recently reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Inci-
dent at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14). But there are simply no grounds for believ-
ing that the Charter requires Canada to adopt it.
407. See Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1494.
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to have a jurisdictional basis to prosecute in such circumstances, legislation
allowing Canada to prosecute such fugitives would be desirable.40 8 The prac-
tical obstacles to a successful prosecution could well prove formidable, how-
ever. In any case, there is a world of difference between the view that prom-
ulgating such legislation would be prudent and the assertion that it is consti-
tutionally compelled. There simply is no support for the latter contention.
In Ross, Justice Lambert interpreted Cotroni to mandate that prosecu-
tion take place in Canada if it is a "realistic option" so that section 6(1) of
the Charter would be minimally impaired for the purposes of the section 1
test set forth in R. v. Oakes.4" He came perilously close to suggesting, how-
ever, that "realistic" is synonymous with "possible." Justice Lambert's rea-
soning is reminiscent of that of civil courts before the recognition of the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine, which were reluctant to deprive litigants of ac-
cess to domestic courts by staying proceedings in favor of trial abroad.41
The forum non conveniens doctrine has won out in civil cases, largely due to
an increased appreciation on the part of domestic courts that justice admin-
istered by foreign courts may be comparable to domestic justice. A similar
respect for the quality of foreign justice should develop with regard to extra-
dition matters. Accordingly, "realistic option" cannot properly be interpreted
to mean merely any possibility of prosecution in Canada. Rather, in cases
involving Canadian citizens charged with a transnational offense, it should
be interpreted to require the Canadian authorities to satisfy a test modeled on
a civil forum non conveniens determination (as in Swystun)1 in accordance
with a civil burden of proof.
E. Summary
Despite the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada in Co-
troni, it is evident that the role of Canadian citizenship in the extradition
process has not yet been conclusively determined. It seems likely that Burns
soon will force the Court to face a challenge to the logic of Cotroni. This
Article has argued that the Court should not retreat from the position it
adopted in Cotroni, which contemplates a circumscribed role for Canadian
citizenship. To do otherwise would be, in effect, to mandate constitutionally
the adoption of nationality-based jurisdiction in some form. This would be a
strange result, both because there is no basis for it in Canadian law and be-
cause Canada would be compelled to adopt nationality-based jurisdiction just
408. Australia already has such legislation in place. See supra note 399; Breitenmoser & Wilms,
supra note 96, at 881-82; Crime Knows No Country, supra note 372 (arguing in favor of Canadian legisla-
tion allowing domestic prosecution for ordinary offenses committed abroad).
409. See R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135-40 (Can.).
410. See, e.g., The Atlantic Star [1973] Q.B. 364, 381-82 (Eng. C.A.), rev'd, [1974] App. Cas.
436, 453 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
411. See United States v. Swystun [1987] 50 Man. R.2d 129, 133-34 (Man. Q.B.) (Can.).
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as that form of jurisdiction is coming under increased criticism in the civil
law states that have long favored it.
Canadian citizenship's role in the extradition process should be limited,
but not nonexistent. It should play a greater role when the fugitive could face
charges either in Canada or the requesting state. In such circumstances, the
factors that influence the executive in deciding whether to extradite the fugi-
tive or prosecute the fugitive in Canada are similar to those present in a civil
forum non conveniens context. Canadian citizenship should force the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that it is more appropriate that the fugitive be extra-
dited to face prosecution abroad rather than face charges in Canada.
V. CONCLUSION
In Jamieson II, Ross, Whitley, and Leon, the Supreme Court of Canada
was presented with excellent opportunities to clarify and further elaborate its
pronouncements in earlier Charter extradition cases, particularly Cotroni,
Schmidt, Kindler, and Ng. Regrettably, the Court chose not to embrace these
opportunities. The Court would have done well to place on a more objective
footing its earlier decisions relating to the effect of the treatment that the fu-
gitive is likely to face in the requesting state upon review of the ministerial
surrender decision under section 7 of the Charter. At the same time, the
Court could have elucidated its interpretation of section 7 in the extradition
context in order to provide clearer guidelines for the lower courts.
Burns and Hurley may well present the Supreme Court with new op-
portunities to balance the public interest in maintaining an effective system
of extradition against the rights of fugitives. This balance is a difficult one to
achieve. To date, the Court has reached the proper results, but not necessar-
ily for the right reasons. The two new cases point out weaknesses in that
logic that will force the Court to reforge the foundation of extradition law in
the Charter era. In undertaking this task, the Court must resist the temptation
to adopt a more intrusive standard of review such as the domestic threshold
standard. The domestic threshold standard of review is practically unwork-
able and theoretically incoherent. Instead, the Court should refine its existing
residual threshold standard by reference to the principles that underlie it.
In future cases, the Court should make greater reference to interna-
tional human rights materials so that it may give a more defined shape to
vague section 7 standards such as "shocking the conscience" and "simply
unacceptable." In general, only conduct that is "incontrovertibly shock-
ing"-as evidenced by near-unanimity on the international plane-should
prevent extradition. While admittedly minimal, the categories of such con-
duct are not closed; they will evolve in step with international human rights
law itself. This approach has the advantage of integrating international hu-
man rights standards with domestic constitutional norms and state responsi-
bility for human rights violations. The Court could refer to the Fugitive Of-
1998]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
fenders Act as a source for structuring section 7 review. Conflict of laws ju-
risprudence also provides an indication of the approach that the Court should
adopt in extradition cases. Taken together, these considerations balance the
rights of fugitives against the smooth operation of the extradition system.
The Court should allow section 6(1) of the Charter to play a more ex-
plicit role in the extradition process. At first blush, this might seem to re-
quire a retreat from the Court's pronouncements in Cotroni, which appear to
contemplate a highly circumscribed role for section 6(1); however, the actual
application of the proposed role for section 6(1) would be sensitive to the
concerns that Justice La Forest set out in that case. In transnational offense
cases, Canadian citizens should enjoy a prima facie right to be tried for the
offense in Canada, subject to the government's ability to demonstrate under a
Swystun-like test that it would be more appropriate for the fugitive to be tried
abroad. By contrast, in cases involving exclusively foreign offenses, where
there is no basis to prosecute the fugitive for the offense in Canada, Cana-
dian citizenship should not provide extra protection against extradition.
The task of balancing the rights of individual fugitives against the
weighty public interest in an effective and speedy extradition system is a dif-
ficult one. In the Charter era, increased awareness of the rights of fugitives
has driven the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt a form of residual thresh-
old standard of review with regard to ministerial surrender decisions in ex-
tradition cases. Insofar as the adoption of a residual threshold standard of re-
view involved a move away from the traditional non-inquiry standard that
had guided the courts in extradition cases, the decision was a correct one.
Although the move to a residual threshold standard has not mollified the
critics who agitate for a full-blown domestic threshold standard of review in
extradition cases, a domestic threshold standard of review tilts the balance
too far in favor of fugitives' rights and gives insufficient attention to the in-
ternational context in which extradition must operate.
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